Tony Leon, whom I admire greatly for his important contributions to South Africa and especially for his important role in protecting the independence of the judiciary during the Codesa negotiations, showed a wilful determination – in talking about Europe and the United States in a recent interview – to misunderstand Donald Trump’s tactical approach, referring to TACO, or Trump Always Chickens Out. (He should read ‘The Art of the Deal’).
Leon then made the throw-away comment on the Trump Administration strategy regarding Europe that “… [t]here is not a coherent US policy … to the extent that there is a theory behind it at all”.
I suppose a large part of the problem is that if you only read the legacy media, you will not understand what Trump is trying to do and the approach that he is taking.
It is regrettable that Leon, as with many liberals, allows his dislike and disdain for Trump to cripple his analytic abilities. Rather than Leon’s dismissive approach, I would suggest that it is important for us in South Africa to understand the Trump administration strategy and to consider the implications for our country. The recently published US National Security Strategy gives us a good insight into this strategy.
Leon also spoke in favour of Carney’s Davos speech: that middle-sized countries should band together to stand against the two superpowers – the US and China. The idea that there is a moral equivalence between the US and China plus its authoritarian allies is absurd, and again shows the “liberal” refusal to recognise that there are evil regimes in the world.
This idea of moral equivalence should have been laid to rest by the Iranian regime’s recent willingness to slaughter tens of thousands of its own people (69 people were killed at Sharpeville) and the Chinese treatment of ethnic minorities in the colonised areas of Tibet, Mongolia and Xinjiang.
The historian Niall Ferguson, who I think is the most important historical commentator today, maintains that the world is now in the midst of the second cold war: no longer between the West and the USSR but between the US and the authoritarian axis (China, Russia, Iran and Venezuela, and to a lesser extent Syria, North Korea and Cuba (and South Africa?). Ferguson goes on to say: ‘We need to remember that in a cold war you have a fundamental choice between the systems that are hostile to freedom and the systems that protect it’. He also suggests that siding with China for economic gain is a very shortsighted approach.
Although the US National Security Strategy does not talk of a new cold war, it does talk of the threat to national security, and this idea is clearly implicit.
China
One of the major achievements of the Trump Administration, and historically it will probably be the most important one, is the pivot away from the complacency of the unipolar moment after the collapse of the Soviet Union, towards a recognition of the threat posed by a dictatorial, communist regime in China and its increasingly organised and coordinated authoritarian allies.
The recognition of this threat provides the context of the entire US strategy. And, far from being ‘not coherent’ and without a theoretical basis, it is clearly well-thought-through, comprehensive and strategically literate. The recognition is that there is a threat to the US national security that needs to be contained and limited. What is also clear is that the Trump administration takes the issue extremely seriously and is willing to take harsh and often controversial action to achieve the strategic objectives, regardless of the howls of outrage from the ‘liberal’ media and ‘liberal’ governments. The contextual corollary is also that it is a battle for primacy between democratic and authoritarian forms of government.
When England ruled the waves, it became clear that the country that geographically dominates the world is in the prime position for power and wealth. During the unipolar moment, the US dominated the world geographically, but this domination is now under threat, as China rapidly increases its military capabilities and especially its navy, and develops its ties with its Axis allies.
A prime action to protect geographical dominance is to establish an exclusion zone. US policy has always been that it will not tolerate interference or a threat to its dominance in the Western Hemisphere. This was expressed through the Monroe Doctrine against the European powers and has found expression now in the Trump corollary.
The second Trump administration has moved quickly and effectively to establish this exclusion zone. The immediate problem areas were Chinese influence in Panama, creating a threat to US access to the Panama Canal, and Venezuela which, run by a criminal government, not only destabilised the region but also had close oil links to the authoritarian regimes. These have both been addressed.
In Panama, Chinese control of the canal has been replaced, and Maduro has been removed. It is noteworthy that the Trump Administration has learnt from the Iraq ‘regime change’ disaster, and is not trying to govern Venezuela. But it is also clear that the Venezuelan government now reports to Washington rather than to Beijing and Moscow. Cuba is a minor problem which will probably correct itself, having lost the support of Venezuela. The Western hemisphere north of the US is more difficult and the issues are yet to be resolved.
Unreliable
Greenland is strategically crucial for US security. This will be discussed later. Canada, under the Liberal government, is proving itself to be an unco-operative and unreliable ally. Canada is entirely dependent on the US economically and for defence and Carney’s stated aim to achieve independence from the US is strategically illiterate and nothing more than virtue-signalling. Indeed, as expected, he was loudly lauded by the liberal media (and Leon).
Trump is putting huge pressure on the Canadian government to fall into line (including possibly encouraging secession among the western Canadian states). He has also clearly placed the long-simmering issue of Greenland security on the table.
Beyond the exclusion zone it is necessary to project power further throughout the world. This projection of power is multi-faceted and complex, but needs to be underpinned by the ability to project military power. US military theory maintains that the US must be able to operate in at least three separate areas of military conflict simultaneously. But if you have Russian aggression in Europe, Islamist insurgencies in the Middle East and Africa (and Europe?) and China threatening Taiwan, then there is a problem.
It is believed that the US has been so weakened by the complacency of the unipolar moment and the debilitating attacks of the post-modern movement that this is no longer possible. To address this, the strategy is to establish a network of reliable partners with at least one in each area of possible conflict. The partners will then provide the core defence in their region of conflict, supported by US military might and a nuclear umbrella.
In Europe, Russia poses the major threat, and NATO is clearly the primary ally. But, if you exclude the US, NATO is militarily rather pathetic, largely economically stagnant and generally not ideologically well-aligned with the US. Europe was not even able to meet Russian aggression on its own continent without substantial US backing.
Let us be clear, without the US nuclear umbrella, Europe is largely defenceless. In a war, NATO is likely to be a drain on the US rather than a benefit. Since his first administration, Trump’s strategy has been to force Europe to be a more reliable partner by getting the NATO member countries to increase their defence expenditure and carry a more equal share of the burden.
The estimates are that the US carries 60% of the NATO burden, despite having the same size population and economic power as the other members combined. The speech recently by Mark Rutte, the head of NATO, supporting Trump’s position showed a clear understanding of the issue. The hostile reception to his speech in the European parliament showed the difficulty in solving the problem and how completely out of touch the European elites are.
Meloni
Reliable partners are not only an issue of military strength; there is also the issue of ideological alignment and political will. The US is clearly trying to pinpoint countries that are reliable and aligned. Bottom of the list is Spain. Italy, under Meloni, is clearly important and partly plays the role of mediator between the EU and the Trump Administration.
Poland is playing an increasingly important role. It has a fast-growing economy (per capita GDP has increased by 116% since 2004 compared to the EU average of 27%); it has now entered the top 20 economies by GDP; it is significantly increasing its defence spending; it now has the largest standing army in Europe after Russia; it has a conservative government (if you can ignore Donald Tusk) which is clearly aligned with Trump’s thinking; it is right next to Russia and has great historical animus against Russia. Trump’s recent suggestion that Poland should replace South Africa at the G20 is probably part of this equation.
In Germany, the prime minister, Merz, is slowly and laboriously starting to make reforms. People in the Trump administration have spoken in support of the AfD which is seen as more ideologically aligned with the US administration. The UK has backed down on its plan to hand over the strategically important Chagos islands to Mauritius, which is seen as largely aligned with China, and a Farage-led government is in the offing (though I believe a reformed Conservative government would be a better option). France, the other important power, appears politically paralysed, but is also facing the probability of a future government more closely aligned with the US’s strategic interests.
Whether the French will ever be able to sort out their problems is debatable, considering that they were not even able to implement the much-needed reform to increase the retirement age from 60 by a few years. De Gaulle once famously quipped “How can you govern a country which has two hundred and forty-six varieties of cheese?” Indeed.
In the Middle East, Israel is by far the most important ally. The current close co-operation with Israel is clear, as compared with the absurd policies of the Obama and Biden administrations. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are also allies, but far less reliable. All three are important because they all recognise the Islamist threat and the danger of the regime in Iran, and are willing to act to counter that threat.
In Asia, Japan is the pre-eminent ally, especially under the new prime minister Takaichi. Japan also guards the northern sea access to China. Close historical ties with The Philippines make them a key security partner and they guard the southern sea access to China. Both are currently significantly increasing their defence spending and military capabilities. The current governments in South Korea and Australia make them less reliable as allies. India will probably fall on the right side if push comes to shove, but in the meantime, it is playing a far wilier game based on perceived national self-interest.
Vulnerability
Two areas of vulnerability for the US in this global geographic dominance are the southern tip of Africa which guards the sea routes between the Indian and Atlantic oceans, and Greenland which guards the Greenland, Iceland, UK (GIUK) gap which controls access from the North Sea to the northern Atlantic. With the melting of ice packs in the Arctic, this gap is becoming more important. Greenland is also important due to its closeness and access to the Arctic, which is seen as geographically strategically important.
And finally, Greenland is crucial for the US Golden Dome missile defence system. The shortest flight path for intercontinental ballistic missiles from Russia (and perhaps China) to the US is over Greenland. The Ukraine/Russia war and the Israel/Iran 12-day war have shown the importance of ICBMs and drones in war today, which has added urgency for the Trump administration to address this vulnerability, especially considering the unreliability of the current Canadian government under Mark Carney, and previously under the ridiculous Justin Trudeau.
The southern tip of Africa is strategically very important for military and navy movement between the Indian and Atlantic oceans, but also because it is one of the major oil shipping routes. Simonstown is very important and this explains the recent naval exercises by the Axis allies, coordinated by China. It also explains Trump’s increasing frustration and irritation with the ANC government. Namibia is an alternative for the US, but Simonstown is, and has always been, by far the superior choice. Things may have quietened down as focus has shifted to Venezuela and Iran, but the issue is not resolved for the US administration, and we can expect further Trump attention in the future.
Beyond global geographic military dominance there is also the domestic ability to respond to a military threat. During the second world war, the size of the US industrial base allowed it to quickly produce the military equipment and armaments required to win the war. The situation today is very different. In 2024, China’s manufacturing sector was 60% larger than that of the US; it produces over 12 times more steel and over 1,000 times the gross tonnage of commercial ships.
This vulnerability, as well as the supply-chain vulnerability exposed by the Covid epidemic, is a huge concern for the Trump administration and these are now seen as national security issues. The security strategy aims to address this by developing American industry and strengthening supply chains. One of the major elements of this is the attempt to reorganise the global trading system, often through the implementation of tariffs.
Control of energy is also important. Now that the chimera of a renewable energy utopia is fading, there is a more realistic understanding of the importance of reliable energy. This is addressed in the strategy as an important issue. The US is energy-independent, thanks to fracking and Trump’s ‘drill baby drill’ approach.
Russian oil
A major problem is NATO, as Europe and specifically Germany are dependent on Russian oil.
When Trump warned of this during his first term he was ridiculed by the ‘liberal’ media and ‘liberal’ politicians. He has been proved correct. Europe is now paying for Russian oil which is paying for the war in the Ukraine. So Europe is paying for Russia to wage war against Europe. The disastrous net-zero policy (which can be seen as a form of mass insanity) has pushed up the price of energy in countries like Germany and the UK to the extent that their industries (even the previously mighty German car manufacturing industry) are unable to compete.
Heavy industry has all but disappeared and the industrial base is depleted. Artificial Intelligence is also energy-hungry, so any chance of an AI industry developing in European countries is remote. The UK has the absurd policy of ignoring its own North Sea oil and instead buying Norwegian North Sea oil. Make sense of that.
The other side of the energy coin is that China does not have oil and is therefore very vulnerable. About 30% of China’s oil comes through overland pipelines from Russia and, to a far lesser extent, from Kazakhstan. For the rest it is dependent on seaborne oil imports – mostly from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states via the Strait of Hormuz; some from Nigeria and Angola around South Africa and across the Indian ocean and some from South America across the Atlantic, around Africa and across the Indian ocean.
The choke points are: the Suez Canal, controlled by Egypt (mostly US aligned); the Strait of Hormuz largely controlled by Iran, the Cape (for the moment aligned with the authoritarian powers?) and the Malacca Strait, controlled by Malaysia. Eighty percent of China’s seaborne oil comes through the Malacca Strait. Malaysia is generally seen as aligned with China but as the Strait is less than 30 kilometres wide, it is vulnerable to blockade action by a foreign navy, especially since the US has a naval base in Singapore which is right next to the Malacca Strait.
In addition, just beyond Malaysia is the Philippines which has strong historical links with the US. Any blockade of the Malacca Strait would cripple China’s industry and military capability very quickly. Also, being dependent on Russian oil is a major weakness for China. Although Russia is one of the largest economies in the world, this is largely due to oil rather than industry. John Kerry in 2014 disparagingly referred to Russia as a ‘gas station masquerading as a country’. The weakness of Russia’s military capabilities has also been highlighted in the war against Ukraine, but Russia is still a huge nuclear power. China is attempting to reduce this dependence by a strong renewable energy push, including nuclear, but this is not even close to supplying its energy needs.
How does all of this relate to South Africa?
The first point we can make on the position of South Africa as regards this US Strategic Strategy is that we are currently backing the wrong horse both morally and strategically. The idea that South Africa is a moral superpower, which was recently claimed by Naledi Pandor and Ebrahim Rasool (this is probably the current thinking in DIRCO and behind the legal action against Israel) may have had some truth during the Mandela era but is now palpably absurd when you consider the countries with whom we align, the extent of domestic corruption and the disregard for the needs of the South African people.
Authoritarian axis
It is strategically wrong because the authoritarian axis powers are actually very weak. The Trump administration has easily addressed the issue of Panama and Venezuela. Iran is unlikely to remain viable under its current regime for much longer. Its proxy powers like Hizbollah have been virtually destroyed, and it is noteworthy that neither Russia nor China has been able to offer it much support against the current US action. It can be argued that Iran only became powerful due to the seriously stupid policies of Obama. Russia is being weakened by its war against Ukraine. So that leaves China, which is not in a strong position. China is surrounded by hostile US allies – mainly Japan and The Philippines. Since 2023 Xi has systematically purged the top echelons of the People’s Liberation Army (the PLA). In the most recent purge earlier this year the top two military leaders were removed, and a third is under investigation.
The entire leadership responsible for ICBM including nuclear missiles has been removed. The top Central Military Commission now comprises only Xi himself and Zhang Shengmin who is basically a political commissar. So China has no military people at the top of its military. The Chinese military also has no battle experience, and its abilities are an unknown quantity. Although China has been rapidly expanding its military equipment, the effectiveness of this is also questioned due to the extent of corruption with, for example, reports of fuel for missiles being replaced with water, and defective battleships.
Xi has also rolled back economic reforms implemented by Deng Xiaoping and this is impacting on economic growth. The economic problems China faces are enormous. And the demographic issue is a continual and growing problem.
And, as for BRICS? Brazil and India no longer appear very interested, and can anyone think of any important recent initiative?
The new US strategy is far more transactional – there is far less focus on aid and far more focus on trade. As Marco Rubio has clearly stated, the US policy is now ‘America first’; where interests are aligned there will be productive partnerships and where interests are not aligned there will be hard bargaining.
Considering this, South Africa has a number of strategic advantages:
There is a greater focus on supply chains and especially of Liquified Natural Gas and energy infrastructure. Southern Africa is important for this: Mozambique, Angola, Namibia are coming onstream and, hopefully, South Africa in the near future.
South Africa’s sophisticated economic infrastructure and especially its world-class financial sector make it important for dealing with the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. For US companies, offering the opportunity to their top people the chance of living in Cape Town or Johannesburg is a great advantage, preferable to, for example, Lagos.
Critical minerals
The large reserves of platinum and manganese group metals make South Africa important as regards the need for critical minerals.
And, as discussed above, Simon’s Town is strategically very important.
These advantages suggest that South Africa can develop a very profitable relationship with the US if we are willing to align with the US rather than with the authoritarian axis. Frans Cronjé has suggested that the Trump administration is very keen to work with South Africa as regards investment and economic development. The benefits that would flow to South Africa are huge.
With US support, South Africa would also be better able to escape the net-zero policies which Europe is currently trying to impose on us.
The choice is ours, but first we will have to get rid of those in charge of DIRCO.
[Image: Ben Mater on Unsplash]
The views of the writer are not necessarily the views of the Daily Friend or the IRR.
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