Liberation and Corruption: Why Freedom Movements Fail, Peter Hain (Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2025)
While some politicians might opportunistically have attached themselves to the South African anti-apartheid struggle as a moral pantomime, Peter Hain was the real deal. After he had spent his early years in South Africa, when state harassment made life impossible his family left for the United Kingdom. In the UK, he became involved in anti-apartheid activism, enduring not only vilification, but also an assassination attempt.
For those of his political orientation in Hain’s generation, to oppose apartheid was to support the African National Congress. The ANC connection is one he has cherished: he once referred to the ANC as the party with which “I am associated with historically”,[1] and joked about calling one-time comrades (then representing different governments) “minister”.[2] His ongoing involvement in South Africa at times crossed the boundaries of diplomatic propriety, such as when – on a 2000 visit to South Africa as a UK minister – he attacked white South Africans for “whinging”. South Africans “should stop concentrating on all the problems we know about, such as crime and corruption”.[3]
Hain’s perspectives have evolved. Corruption is the problem and one on which concentration is now well merited. Liberation and Corruption reveals his thoughts on these matters, and is also a testimony to a profound sense of disillusionment at the state of South Africa.
In this book, Hain sets out to explain why political formations like the ANC would invariably turn to venal self-interest, bending public offices to private interests, bleeding societal resources, and failing the people they had pledged to serve. “Political parties,” he writes, “intended to be instruments of people’s power usually became corrupt agencies of a new elite.” Hence, the subtitle: Why Freedom Movements Fail.
Deeply entrenched
The overall thesis of Liberation and Corruption is that corruption was deeply entrenched in colonial (or otherwise pre-liberation) societies, and that this created the context within which their successors – specifically the liberation movements, which are Hain’s prime concern – came to operate. In South Africa, he adds to work by such commentators as Hennie van Vuuren[4] and Matthew Blackman and Nick Dall[5] in emphasising the extensive history of corruption that predated the transition to democracy, often enabled and even encouraged by the prevailing political systems. Partly, this is meant to counter the view that South Africa’s previous governments were “brutal but honest”, and that corruption is a post-apartheid phenomenon.
Corruption having deep roots, it would perpetuate itself after liberation. Corrupt networks endured, and drew their former adversaries in. Corrupt elements within liberation movements could exploit the opportunities. In South Africa, he singles out former president Jacob Zuma as an example of this.
Hain is at pains to demonstrate that corruption is a universal phenomenon, and a transnational system. The case studies he presents span the globe and history. He also devotes considerable attention to highlighting the links between corruption in the global South and the global North, the latter being indispensable for receiving and laundering ill-gotten gains in the former.
Readers will find a passionately written treatise, deeply researched and often impressive in detail. It makes a respectable contribution to a growing literature on contemporary corruption around the world. Yet it is also a frustrating read. Trying to cover a global issue with its multiple historical contexts in its relatively few pages means that many issues are not explored in the depth they deserve. Relying heavily on others’ research, it’s not always clear whether Hain always endorses what they say, or whether he’s simply recording a perspective. For these reasons, it’s often unfocused. It calls for careful reading, since important points can easily be missed. This is particularly the case in respect of the central premise of the book, to explain “why freedom movements fail” – and specifically, given Hain’s own history, why the ANC has become what it is.
Distinct worldview
Surprisingly, there is little discussion of what makes these organisations a distinct political species, although this has been extensively canvassed. Indeed, scholars like Roger Southall[6] and Henning Melber[7] have argued that they represent a particular political form with a distinct worldview. They view themselves as embodying “the people”, with a unique and unquestionable historical mandate to rule and reconstruct society. From this comes ambivalence towards political pluralism and a suspicion of restraining institutions and the accountability they demand.
The resulting conceptual laxity is arguably the book’s central weakness: while it may advance understanding of the failings of post-liberation societies, it provides an inadequate explanation of why “freedom movements” specifically have “failed”, and why they may be inclined towards corruptibility.
There are some suggestions about this. Hain notes the conflation of party and state, cultures of secrecy and the ruthlessness necessitated in confronting repressive regimes. But this comes across as disjointed and mixed in with observations about corruption more broadly. This is especially disappointing for those hoping for insights into the ANC’s decline.
Hain spares little condemnation for the contemporary ANC. He discusses this largely through the lens of Zuma-era “state capture” – something he admirably stood up to. His treatment of the ANC’s prior conduct is, by contrast, restrained. Corruption in the ANC before the transition is dealt with briefly, drawing largely on the excellent work of Stephen Ellis[8] – but, frankly, a reading of Ellis’s External Mission: The ANC in Exile suggests that these pathologies were far more intrinsic to its operations than Hain allows, or at least seems to allow.
Wholly inadequate
Perhaps more seriously, the treatment of the ANC in power under Presidents Mandela and Mbeki is wholly inadequate. The ANC inherited a corrupt society, but its response was ambivalent and often desultory; party unity, party empowerment and the imperatives of office often trumping probity. There is no mention of such moments as the scandal around Dr Allan Boesak’s misappropriation of donor funds, the sacking from cabinet of Bantu Holomisa after he fingered a minister for past misdeeds, or the tenure of Jackie Selebi as National Commissioner of the South African Police Service, who enjoyed the protection of President Mbeki and would become the first head of Interpol to leave under a cloud of corruption allegations.
Indeed, James Myburgh has argued that the ANC had become an early adopter, from the 1990s, of trusts to shield its money and donors from public scrutiny, and its funds from creditors. Mandela’s lawyer, Ismail Ayob, claimed to have established some 30 trusts at his client’s behest to handle both personal and political flows.[9] Party funding remains a significant compromising factor in South Africa’s politics.
Hain points to the scapegoating and racism accusations deployed by Zuma’s acolytes, though this had been a well-developed tactic employed against critics since President Mandela’s incumbency. (Hain himself joined in this in a modest way – well-intentioned, perhaps – in his comments in 2000.) Notoriously, this was precisely how President Mbeki tried to deflect criticism of the controversial arms deal. Hain actually quotes from this piece, terming it a “robust rebuttal”. He adds that Mbeki was wrong to deny the continuation of corruption under the ANC, but then sternly asserts: “The ANC’s white critics – many apartheid fellow-travellers or actual supporters – both then and now bear witness to his assertion that it is tantamount to blaming anti-apartheid activists for state capture because it occurred under a democratically elected black majority government.”
Does this imply that criticism is less valid because of its provenance? Or indeed that the scapegoating for which he condemns Zuma is actually a reasonable response? It hardly seems to matter if the malfeasance is genuine. (Incidentally, it’s not clear from the book whether Hain regards the arms deal as having been a corruption scandal: he discusses it by reference to other commentators’ views, which produce a sort of indeterminate he-said-she-said.
“All levers of power”
Indeed, in discussing the fusion of party and state, Hain mentions – once – the ANC’s toxic and counter-constitutional programme of “cadre deployment”. In seeking to seize “all levers of power” in the country, that was the original and unabashed ANC state capture project.
Indeed, it can be argued that it has represented the most insidious form of corruption: it sought not resources, but the suborning of institutions. As strong institutions are necessary to deal with corruption, it’s hard to think of a more destructive path to have taken. This was an initiative of the Mandela era, undertaken in 1997 and 1998, when the ink on the Constitution was barely dry.
Whatever Zuma’s sins, the enabling infrastructure had been put in place long before he took office, and carried the imprimatur of loved and respected statesmen. (Another seldom remarked-upon fact is that the nominally “reformist” President Cyril Ramaphosa presided over the cadre deployment committee during the height of “state capture”. He has laughably attempted to defend the practice as subjecting appointments to additional scrutiny.[10])
It needs to be emphasised that these were the corrupting and corruption-incubating initiatives of the ANC as an institution, not of a few malevolent people commandeering its name.
Ultimately, this makes for an unsatisfying work. Writing from a position of profound personal investment, Hain appears unable properly to face the full reality of what has brought the beloved country to breaking point, or at least to articulate it. He leavens his criticism with a longing to redeem something of the ANC. In this, he represents the frustration and sense of betrayal of millions of people and institutions for whom the ANC and its kindred organisation were no mere political parties, but avatars of an advanced societal consciousness and intrinsic to their political and civic identity. They were also so regarded by their supporters internationally.
“Perhaps campaigners, like my youthful self, expected too much: that liberation would bring something qualitatively different, more just, or even more moral – not Jacob Zuma’s shameless looting nor [Nicaraguan strongman] Daniel Ortega’s shameless betrayal.” It’s a bold admission and distils what makes the work meaningful. He concludes by calling for ongoing activism, saying that battles against corruption must constantly be fought and refought, invoking the Frelimo slogan A Luta Continua – with some irony, given that party’s conduct.
Sound advice
It’s eminently sound advice but will mean nothing if a society or its thought leaders retain faith in particular political formations, hoping that their better selves will emerge. Indeed, the subtext to this work, probably unintended, is just how fatal it was to regard these organisations – or any political organisation for that matter – as “instruments of people’s power”, and to retain this illusion long after the evidence warned of the contrary.
This is an expanded version of a review published in the South African Journal of International Affairs
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[1] Dhlamini, S, ‘South Africa is becoming a failed State – Peter Hain’, Polity, 28 March 2023. https://www.polity.org.za/article/south-africa-is-becoming-a-failed-state-peter-hain-2023-03-28.
[2] Hain, P, ‘I was South Africa’s public enemy No. 1’, The Guardian, 6 February 2000. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/feb/06/peterhain.
[3] Hartley, W, ‘White whingeing is damaging SA, says Hain’, Business Day, 11 January 2000; Hartley, W, Chothia, F, and Katzenellenbogen, J, ‘Hain calls for more “economic patriots”’, Business Day, 11 January 2000.
[4] Van Vuuren, H, Apartheid Guns and Money: A Tale of Profit. Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2017.
[5] Blackman, M, and Dall, N. Rogues’ Gallery: An Irreverent History of Corruption in South Africa, from the VOC to the ANC. Penguin Random House South Africa, 2021
[6] Southall, R, Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press 2013.
[7] Melber, H, Liberation Movements as Governments: Democratic Authoritarianism in Former Settler Colonies of Southern Africa, Basler Afrika Bilbigraphien, BAB Working Paper No 1, 2013. https://www.baslerafrika.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/WP-2013-1-Melber.pdf. Melber, H, ‘Authoritarian Populism under Former Liberation Movements in Southern Africa’, Cadernos de Estudos Africanos [Online], No, 47, 2024. http://journals.openedition.org/cea/8979.
[8] Ellis, S, External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960-1990, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2012.
[9] Myburgh, J, The ANC’s clever party funding trick’, Politicsweb, 12 June 2025. https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/the-ancs-clever-party-funding-trick.
[10] Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, Report: Part VI Vol. 2: State Capture Established, President Ramaphosa’s Evidence and the Role of the ANC and Parliamentary Oversight, 2022, 173-174.