This is the second of four parts of a report based on a study towards the end of the year of South Africa during the COVID-19 crisis.
The emphasis is on the pandemic’s implications for democracy and governance. The dislocation caused by the pandemic and the unprecedented government action in response stood to inflict enormous damage on an already fragile society and its compromised institutions.
The study attempts to place the pandemic and its consequences within the broad flow of South African politics, and to sketch some thoughts as to how it will influence the future.
The remaining parts of the report will be published over the next two days.
Part 2: State of Disaster: what the COVID 19 pandemic means for South Africa’s democracy
South Africa’s COVID response
South Africa’s government invoked the Disaster Management Act of 2002 to manage its response. This gave the state – through the designated minister, Minister of Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma – extensive powers to intrude into ‘normal’ life, to issue regulations abridging freedoms and to mobilise resources to ensure an effective overall response.
Such an arrangement could be justified as a necessary expedient in exceptional times (that is why ‘disaster’ regulations exist), but in disrupting the normal flow of life and governance, it can threaten societies’ rights and freedoms. Freedom House, a US-based non-governmental organisation (NGO) pointed to this as the global pandemic gathered momentum, setting out five principles to mitigate the risk:[1]
- Restrictions should be properly communicated to the public, based clearly on law, related rationally to necessary goals and transparently executed;
- Where emergency measures truncate rights, they should be for specified timeframes, under independent oversights and transparently administered. Where people have had their rights violated, recourse for justice and compensation should be available;
- The use of surveillance technologies to control the spread of the disease should be carefully and transparently monitored, and the information so gathered should not be used for other purposes;
- Media freedom should be maintained, with no censorship or interruption of communication technologies. Criminal penalties for distributing false information would likely be abused, and such information should be countered by accurate information;
- Elections should not be postponed, except as a last resort, and where experts and competing political groups agree to do so.
Managing the response
The body that came to take dominate the lockdown, the National Coronavirus Command Council (NCCC), was formed without a clear legal basis and functioned opaquely. An ‘explainer’ published by News24 in mid-May was reduced to drawing inferences from things said by the president – even though it noted that the NCCC was certainly taking decisions.[2]
A letter written in April to the president by two advocates, Nazeer Cassim and Erin-Dianne Richards, sought to probe the legality of the NCCC. They asked for clarity on the powers of the body, and expressed concern about ‘possible risks of constitutional and democratic malfunctions arising from what appears to be the questionable establishment, structure and functions of the NCC, as well as the noticeable lack of transparency from government about the body’.[3] The response, from Director General and Secretary of the Cabinet Dr Cassius Lubisi, was uninformative – merely stating that wide discretion existed for the cabinet to perform its work, and that it was not responsible for parliamentary oversight. It concluded that ‘their (the advocates’) insistence on putting in jeopardy all measures taken to save South African lives and ensure security of public health is not commensurate in our respectful view with their positions as officers of the court.’[4]
Cassim hit back at this by stating that the lockdown had occasioned great hardship by depriving people of their ability to earn an income and also in the heavy-handed actions of the security services (these are explored in more detail below), and it was right and proper that ‘debate, discourse and consultation’ might have produced better outcomes.[5] The legal basis of the NCCC has never been fully clarified.
If the institution responsible for administering the lockdown was opaque, so was the rationale for many of the restrictions which constituted the lockdown. In the opening weeks, the lockdown prohibited most economic activity and movement of people completely. Following this, the government introduced a risk-based approach with 5 different ‘levels’ of lockdown stringency that would be implemented based on how the situation was unfolding.
This strategy was fairly similar to those of other countries that periodically changed their lockdown regulations based on how the situation was unfolding at a given time. In South Africa, however, the government – by way of the NCCC – created regulations in a manner that was seemingly arbitrary and often seemed to have little or nothing to do with the actual spread of the virus. This is illustrated in the following list of products and services which were banned (at least at one point during the lockdown):
- Tobacco: Tobacco products were banned for over 140 days, and this was the subject of a number of ongoing legal actions. This was justified as being necessary to prevent respiratory problems and because of the risk of sharing cigarettes.[6] However, this explanation was widely derided as having no clear relationship to the COVID pandemic; it was also rendered to a significant degree moot since illicit cigarette sales were easily found.[7]
- Cooked food: Hot or prepared food was banned from being sold in supermarkets during the early part of the lockdown – although the regulations did not appear to require this, and were hurriedly amended to do so after a minister made this claim. The rationale for this was to prevent the unnecessary movement of people going to the shops to purchase ready-made hot food.[8]
- Clothing: A long and detailed list of the types of clothing which were permitted to be sold was gazetted as a regulation. In general, the regulations aimed to allow people to purchase only warm clothing, with the sale of items like t-shirts and flip-flops being banned. The sale of some warm-weather clothing was permitted, provided that it was displayed in shops as being for the purposes of insulating warmth. There appears to have been no reason given for this.[9]
- E-commerce: Online commerce was banned for a period of time. In this case, the government was open that it had nothing to do with preventing the spread of the virus itself, but rather because ‘unfettered e-commerce’ would be unfair to trade of other businesses like spaza shops in informal settlements.[10] This ban is especially notable as in many other countries e-commerce was expanding as people used it to avoid travelling outdoors. Political ideology almost certainly played a large role in this matter.
In June, the North Gauteng High Court ruled on an application to declare the State of Disaster and the regulations flowing from it to be unconstitutional. While it found that the declaration of the State of Disaster itself was rational, ‘in a substantial number of instances’ this was not the case in respect of the regulations. The court remarked:[11]
In every instance where ‘means’ are implemented by executive authority in order to obtain a specific outcome an evaluative exercise must be taken insofar as those ‘means’ may encroach on a Constitutional right, to determine whether such encroachment is justifiable. Without conducting such an enquiry, the enforcement of such means, even in a bona fide attempt to attain a legitimate end, would be arbitrary and unlawful. Insofar as the ‘lockdown regulations’ do not satisfy the ‘rationality test’, their encroachment on and limitation of rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution are not justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom as contemplated in Section 36 of the Constitution.
Besides the restrictions on economic activity, the lockdown by its nature abridged many of the civic freedoms – in other words, basic human rights – that were a part of life in post-1994 South Africa. These included freedom of movement and freedom of assembly. In terms of the public health goals of the lockdown, these could be rationally defended. However, these limitations invariably and predictably had knock-on effects. Closing down much of the economy and requiring people to remain in their homes would arguably, for millions of people living in crowded and often informal structures, have constituted a violation of the right to dignity.[12] In a similar vein, the government attempted to restrict the distribution of food relief by private bodies (this is explored below), supposedly to ensure better coordination of these efforts. But in interrupting programmes that provided a lifeline to the destitute and those deprived of an income by the government’s own actions, this was surely an infringement on the socio-economic rights that South Africa’s constitution pioneered.
In these areas too, there were echoes of the inconsistencies that dogged the restrictions on economic activity. Religious gatherings, for example, were permitted again in late May. Analyst Judith February argued that these had been a major means of spreading of the virus in other countries and accused the government of pandering to special interests. ‘This government,’ she wrote, ‘has now abandoned science and kowtowed to the loudest, uninformed voices.’[13]
In addition, there was some meddling in free expression. Journalists were exempted from the lockdown restrictions that required people to remain in their homes, and there were no obvious moves to restrict the media; although there were some instances where journalists were harassed while covering lockdown-related issues.[14]
Considerable attention was paid by government to ensuring that particular communication streams were amplified and others quietened. To ensure that approved information was imparted, websites bearing the .za domain were required to feature a link to the government’s COVID-19 page.[15] To combat ‘fake news’ about the pandemic (‘any person who publishes any statement, through any medium, including social media, with the intention to deceive’), the government made its distribution a criminal offense.[16] Where ‘fake news’ was identified, those hosting it (such as websites) could be required to remove it. (Interestingly, though, when an accused in a high-profile case appeared in court, the media were barred from entry.[17]) On top of this, the government moved early in the pandemic to centralise communication, requesting scientists to direct media queries to the National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NCID). A spokesperson for the Ministry of Health confirmed to the media that the government had taken a decision to limit communication on the matter to a few senior figures in government (such as ministers and deputy ministers – presumably in addition to the NCID). This was meant to combat ‘fake news’ and to remove distractions from experts so as to allow them to keep focused on their work.[18] Yet there appeared to be nothing in the disaster regulations that enabled this.[19]
This has been complemented by potential intrusion into people’s privacy through cell phone tracking. This would enable the contacts of infected people to be traced; and has been an element of successful pandemic control elsewhere. However – in common with concerns raised in other countries – this constitutes a potential breach of privacy, and has raised questions about how this information might be used in future.[20]
Security (and securitisation)
One of the most controversial measures of the lockdown was that it relied very heavily on the country’s security services for enforcement. This included the unprecedented deployment of the military to assist in policing the country, and to support the state response to the pandemic. The descriptor kragdadigheid – indelibly linked in the South African mind to the era of former president PW Botha – was picked up to describe the approach.[21] Indeed, the use of the military on this scale evoked memories of the state of emergency in the 1980s.
While the conduct of most members of the security forces was probably decent under stressful conditions, there were sufficient instances of abuse to warrant serious concern. A longitudinal survey of public attitudes and experiences of the lockdown found that in April and May around one in ten South Africans reported harassment from the police or army[22] – a minority, certainly, but not an insignificant proportion. Among the earliest of this was video footage of soldiers forcing civilians to do humiliating exercises as punishment for breaching lockdown regulations.[23] According to information made available in a parliamentary briefing, some 50 people had been killed by the security forces or had died in detention over the first six weeks of the lockdown, from 26 March to 5 May. The figures showed an overall increase of around one third over those reported in the same period the previous year.[24] The case of Collins Khosa – killed on 10 April after being assaulted at his home by soldiers – became a symbol for what had gone awry. That his assailants were initially cleared by a quick investigation could only underline the sense of impunity with which members of the security forces were perceived to be acting.[25] (A subsequent enquiry found that the soldiers had acted improperly.[26])
This was both an expression of the overall culture and operating procedure of the security forces, and the peculiar nature of the job they were expected to do. Police officers were accustomed to doing a very dangerous, violent job, often seemingly to scant effect on the overall security situation and receiving little appreciation, if not hostility from the communities they policed. Force has an entrenched role in South African policing. This being the case, coupled with the imperative of maintaining a particularly restrictive control scheme, meant that the police were bound to aggressively ‘flex their muscles’.[27] Dr Johan Burger of the Institute for Security Studies, he being a former policeman, remarked that the police were expected to enforce a lockdown in conditions that made adhering to the regulations all but impossible. The logical solution, he suggested, would be to adapt the rules to these realities, and to encourage respected civic groups to educate and inform communities about the necessity of adhering to measure to control the pandemic.[28]
The use of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), meanwhile, could best be described as reckless. The COVID deployment had precedents in post-1994 South Africa, in recent years most notably to combat gang violence in the Western Cape, a move endorsed by both the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA). But concerns had been voiced at this point that it was not suited to this role.[29] The military lacks the funding, training or equipment to fulfil a policing role – its preparedness for standard military tasks has incidentally also been questioned[30] – and measures to inculcate a new civic, human-rights based consciousness do not appear to have had much success.[31] Ray Hartley and Greg Mills of the Brenthurst Foundation commented: ‘While these are extraordinary times, the government has transgressed every known rule of military assistance to civilian authority, the first of which is never to put soldiers on the street in a public-facing, law and order role. They are not trained for it, even in well-equipped and marshalled forces, which the SA National Defence Force is not by any stretch of the imagination. Rather they would be better off playing a backroom, supportive role, releasing the police onto the streets.’[32]
The rhetoric from certain politicians and senior officers seemed calculated to drive a forceful, confrontational approach to the lockdown – a continuity with the rhetoric that had been emerging for years. Police minister Bheki Cele memorably told police officers that they should ‘push’ people back into their homes if they refused to obey lockdown regulations. ‘If you stay in your house you behave,’ he added.[33] On another occasion, he encouraged police officers to enforce the prohibition on the trade in liquor by ‘[destroying] the infrastructure where the liquor is sold’.[34] General Solly Shoke, Chief of the SANDF told a contingent of soldiers: ‘There are those who speak of human rights. All of us must enjoy our human rights. But human life is more important than individual human rights. You are out there to protect human lives and those who threaten human lives must be dealt with accordingly within, of course, the confines of the law.’[35] This was a deeply problematic assertion, aggravated by his further remark that the military would not allow anyone to disrespect its personnel.[36]
This was matched by some deeply ill-advised remarks from political leaders when challenged on the conduct of the security forces. A senior ANC parliamentarian reacted to footage of soldiers forcing alleged regulation violators to do exercises by stating: ‘They are not supposed to be beating people but the light punishment like frog jumps, that is not a violation. They are just assisting our people to be disciplined.’[37] President Ramaphosa described police abuse as a case of having ‘let their enthusiasm get the better of them’.[38]
Perhaps more concerning, though, was the manner in which this was managed. There have been concerns for some time about the rise of ‘securocrats’ in South Africa.[39] These can be understood as officials and politicians whose approach to governance focussed on the security of the state. Civil liberties, human rights and constitutional governance rank are not prioritised; indeed, they might be regarded as a threat. The State of Disaster was viewed in some quarters as an opportunity for the securocrats to assert themselves. The Daily Maverick in particular has drawn attention to the role of the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NatJoints).[40] This body brings together various security-related institutions in the state, and quietly took a prominent role in drafting regulations and monitoring the lockdown. Rather like the NCCC, this was done without a clear legislative foundation or parliamentary oversight. Natjoints, however, is more a firmly established structure, with concerns about its role and functioning having been raised in past years.[41]
Taken together, the securitisation of the lockdown and the attitude of some of the country’s leaders ensured that human rights abuses were inevitable. It was a matter of concern if not shame that the United Nations cited South Africa as an example of a ‘toxic lockdown culture’.[42] Domestically, an official at the South African Human Rights Commission invited complaints from the public, since human rights had to be respected even under these conditions. He added that the police were not always playing an exemplary role, with a number having been charged with breaking the regulations themselves. [43]
The author would like to thank his colleagues at both the Institute of Race Relations and Centre for Risk Analysis for sharing their invaluable insights with him. The Institute would also like to extend its heartfelt thanks to the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty, without whose generous support this project would not have been possible. The Institute would like to add that the views expressed here are those of the author, and not necessarily of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation.
In tomorrow’s instalment, we continue examining South Africa’s COVID-19 response, specifically as it related livelihoods, as well as the corruption scandals that bedevilled it.
[Picture: Discott, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=88923567]
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[1] Freedom House, ‘Principles for Protecting Civil and Political Rights in the Fight against Covid-19’, 24 March 2020. https://freedomhouse.org/article/principles-protecting-civil-and-political-rights-fight-against-covid-19.
[2] Hunter, Q, ‘Explainer: what exactly is the National Coronavirus Command Council?’, News24, 13 May 2020. https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/explainer-what-exactly-is-the-national-coronavirus-command-council-20200513.
[3] Jordaan, M, ‘Top lawyers threaten legal action over powers of Covid-19 command council’, Timeslive, 30 April 2020. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020-04-30-top-lawyers-threaten-legal-action-over-powers-of-covid-19-command-council/.
[4] Letter from Cassius Lubisi, Director General and Secretary of the Cabinet, to RHK Attorneys, 4 May 2020. https://twitter.com/ZiyandaNgcobo/status/1257610747921805314?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1257610747921805314%7Ctwgr%5Eshare_3&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fcitizen.co.za%2Fnews%2Fsouth-africa%2Fpolitics%2F2279205%2Fread-presidencys-shady-letter-to-attorneys-who-questioned-nccs-constitutionality%2F.
[5] ‘“Implementation of lockdown has made us a begging nation” – advocate responds to Presidency’, Polity, 7 May 2020. https://www.polity.org.za/article/implementation-of-lockdown-has-made-us-a-begging-nation—advocate-responds-to-presidency-2020-05-07.
[6] Nicholson, G, ‘Tobacco ban: Unpacking Dlamini-Zuma’s defence’, Daily Maverick, 28 May 2020. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-05-28-tobacco-ban-unpacking-dlamini-zumas-defence/.
[7] Haffajee, F, ‘Dlamini Zuma turns cigarettes into illicit drugs as the underground economy takes over’, Daily Maverick, 12 June 2020. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-06-12-dlamini-zuma-turns-cigarettes-into-illicit-drugs-as-the-underground-economy-takes-over/.
[8] Nkanjeni, U, ‘Absurd or cautious? The ban on the sale of cooked hot food debate’, Timeslive, 20 April 2020. https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020-04-20-absurd-or-cautious-the-ban-on-the-sale-of-cooked-hot-food-debate/; ‘Government explains why it banned the sale of hot foods during South Africa’s lockdown’, Businesstech, 22 April 2020. https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/391467/government-explains-why-it-banned-the-sale-of-hot-foods-during-south-africas-lockdown/.
[9] Bloomberg, ‘South Africans baffled by bizarre lockdown clothing rules’, Businesstech, 13 May 2020. https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/397591/south-africans-baffled-by-bizarre-lockdown-clothing-rules/.
[10] Phakathi, B, ‘DA puts Ebrahim Patel under pressure to fully open up e-commerce’, Business Day, 4 May 2020. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2020-05-04-da-puts-ebrahim-patel-under-pressure-to-fully-open-up-e-commerce/.
[11] De Beer and Others v Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (21542/2020) [2020] ZAGPPHC 184 (2 June 2020).
[12] Jeffery, A, Keeping liberty alive through COVID-19 and beyond, IRR Policy Paper, April and May 2020, p.12.
[13] February, J, ‘South Africa will pay the price of Ramaphosa’s folly regarding religious gatherings’, Daily Maverick, 27 May 2020. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2020-05-27-south-africa-will-pay-the-price-of-ramaphosas-folly-regarding-religious-gatherings/.
[14] See for example, ‘Sanef calls on law enforcement personnel to stop harassing journalists’, SABC, 10 April 2020. https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/sanef-calls-on-law-enforcement-personnel-to-stop-harassing-journalists/.
[15] ‘Every SA website must promote the govt portal on Covid-19, and cell number transfers banned’, Business Insider, 26 March 2020. https://www.businessinsider.co.za/no-number-portability-and-forced-links-to-the-sa-govt-coronavirus-website-2020-3.
[16] Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, ‘Disaster Management Act, 2002: Regulations issued in terms of Section 27(2) of the Act’, Government Gazette, Vol 657, No 43107, 18 March 2020.
[17] Williams, M, ‘Man who posted fake contaminated Covid-19 test kits video in court, media barred from covering’, News24, 7 April 2020. https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/man-who-posted-fake-contaminated-covid-19-test-kits-video-in-court-media-barred-from-covering-20200407.
[18] Evans, S, and Cowan, K, ‘Information squeeze: COVID-19 scientists, experts in SA silenced as government centralizes communication’, News24, 18 March 2020. https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/information-squeeze-covid-19-scientists-experts-in-sa-silenced-as-government-centralises-communication-20200318.
[19] Jeffery, op. cit., 2020, p. 17.
[20] Wild, S, ‘COVID-19: Geolocation tracking fuels concerns around privacy and data protection’, Africaportal, 5 May 2020. https://www.africaportal.org/features/covid-19-geolocation-tracking-concerns-privacy-data/.
[21] See, for example, Merten, M, ‘Police Minister Bheki Cele clenches the iron fist, with no velvet glove’, Daily Maverick, 26 March 2020. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-03-26-police-minister-bheki-cele-clenches-the-iron-fist-with-no-velvet-glove/.
[22] Human Sciences Research Council, ‘UJ-HSRC Covid-19 Democracy Survey Summary Findings’, 4 June 2020. http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/11849/UJ-HSRC%20Covid-19%20Democracy%20Survey%20Summary%20Findings.pdf.
[23] Cilliers, C, ‘WATCH: Police and SANDF force Soweto residents to do hard exercise as punishment’, The Citizen, 30 March 2020. https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/social-media/2262188/watch-police-and-sandf-force-soweto-residents-to-do-hard-exercise-as-punishment/.
[24] Whitfield, A, ‘Minister Cele must take responsibility for 32% increase in police abuses’, Democratic Alliance, 8 May 2020. https://www.da.org.za/2020/05/minister-cele-must-take-responsibility-for-32-increase-in-police-abuses.
[25] Ngoepe, K, and Wa Afrika, M, ‘SANDF report on the death of Collins Khosa “a sham”’, IOL, 7 June 2020. https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/news/sandf-report-on-the-death-of-collins-khosa-a-sham-49083492.
[26] ‘SANDF officers acted improperly in Collins Khosa case: ombud’, eNCA, 20 August 2020. https://www.enca.com/news/sandf-officers-acted-improperly-collins-khosa-case-ombud.
[27] Bruce, D, ‘Covid-19: Police abuses reveal systemic flaws’, Mail and Guardian, 16 Apr 2020. https://mg.co.za/article/2020-04-16-covid-19-police-abuses-reveal-systemic-flaws/.
Mngadi, S, ‘Police brutality during lockdown has caused citizens to live in fear of the men in blue’, Sunday Tribune, 17 August 2020. https://www.iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/news/police-brutality-during-lockdown-has-caused-citizens-to-live-in-fear-of-the-men-in-blue-cee5307f-0df1-4460-bea7-b2ad98dd2d24.
[28] Karrim, A, ‘Lockdown skiet, skop en donner: Experts say cops, army can have less violent approach’, News24, 2 April 2020. https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/lockdown-skiet-skop-en-donner-experts-say-cops-army-can-have-less-violent-approach-20200402.
[29] Stupart, J, ‘Sending the army to the townships’, African Defence Review, 5 October 2017. https://www.africandefence.net/army-to-the-townships/.
[30] See Heitman, HR, The Battle in Bangui: the Untold Inside Story, Parktown: Parktown Publishers, 2013.
[31] Bailie, C, ‘South Africa’s military is not suited for the fight against COVID-19. Here’s why’, The Conversation, 28 May 2020. https://theconversation.com/south-africas-military-is-not-suited-for-the-fight-against-covid-19-heres-why-138560.
[32] Hartley, R, and Mills, G, ‘Handing over authority to securocrats has made Ramaphosa’s “heavy cross” impossible to bear’, Daily Maverick, 12 April 2020. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-04-12-handing-over-authority-to-securocrats-has-made-ramaphosas-heavy-cross-impossible-to-bear/.
[33] ‘Cele: push them if they don’t listen’, eNCA, 1 April 2020. https://www.enca.com/news/cele-push-them-if-they-dont-listen.
[34] Quoted in ‘Coronavirus: South Africa crime rate plummets during lockdown’, BBC, 14 August 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53787846.
[35] Kgosana, R, ‘SANDF chief ramps up the tough talk’, The Citizen, 9 April 2020. https://citizen.co.za/news/covid-19/2267265/sandf-chief-ramps-up-the-tough-talk/.
[36] Mahlangu, I, ‘“Don’t let citizens disrespect you,” SANDF chief tells army personnel’, Sowetanlive, 8 April 2020. https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020-04-08-dont-let-citizens-disrespect-you-sandf-chief-tells-army-personnel/.
[37] ‘ANC MP praises soldiers for how they force public to do frog jumps’, The Citizen, 1 April 2020. https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2263601/anc-mp-praises-soldiers-for-how-they-force-public-to-do-frog-jumps/.
[38] Haffajee, F, ‘Ramaphosa calls 11 lockdown deaths and 230,000 arrests an act of “over-enthusiasm” – really!’, Daily Maverick, 1 June 2020. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-06-01-ramaphosa-calls-11-lockdown-deaths-and-230000-arrests-an-act-of-over-enthusiasm-really/.
[39] Duncan, J, The Rise of the Securocrats: the Case of South Africa, Johannesburg: Jacana, 2014.
[40] Merten, M, ‘Ceding control to faceless securocrats and unaccountable governance structures chips away at SA’s constitutional democracy, one broken bit at a time’, Daily Maverick, 25 May 2020. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-05-25-ceding-control-to-faceless-securocrats-and-unaccountable-governance-structures-chips-away-at-sas-constitutional-democracy-one-broken-bit-at-a-time/.
[41] Flanagan, L, ‘Police seeks answers about Natjoints’, IOL, 4 March 2016. https://www.iol.co.za/news/police-seeks-answers-about-natjoints-1993678.
[42] ‘Toxic lockdown culture’ of repressive coronavirus measures hits most vulnerable’, UN News, 27 April 2020. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/04/1062632. Bryce-Pease, S, ‘SA has created a toxic culture through lockdown regulations’, SABC, 28 April 2020. https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/sa-has-created-a-toxic-culture-through-lockdown-regulations/.
[43] Hans, B, ‘Military Ombud is probing 33 human rights abuse cases against SANDF members’, IOL, 25 April 2020. https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/military-ombud-is-probing-33-human-rights-abuse-cases-against-sandf-members-47191203.