This is the last of four parts of a report based on a study of South Africa during the COVID-19 crisis.
The emphasis is on the pandemic’s implications for democracy and governance. The dislocation caused by the pandemic and the unprecedented government action in response stood to inflict enormous damage on an already fragile society and its compromised institutions.
The study attempts to place the pandemic and its consequences within the broad flow of South African politics, and to sketch some thoughts as to how it will influence the future.
Part 4: State of Disaster: what the COVID 19 pandemic means for South Africa’s democracy
Conclusion
It bears repeating that the pandemic hit South Africa when the country was ill-prepared to withstand it. Its economy was not in a strong state, and its institutions, having been run down over the years, were not optimally geared for what was to come. Not only would the country’s economy be battered, and its administration shaken, but it would stress test the health of democracy, and the resilience of freedom, human rights and constitutionalism.
Across the world, the pandemic provided authoritarians with a rare opportunity to extend control over their societies – and to do so to acclaim. The health crisis was real. But as one author put it, ‘beware the power grab’.[1] For this reason guidelines such as those proposed by Freedom House (referenced earlier) are valuable benchmarks for government behaviour in exceptional times and are important analytical tools in measuring whether the crisis damages democracy and the values that come with it.
The picture is mixed.
Governance. South Africa, although admired for its democracy and for the constitutional order that it had created, was nevertheless vulnerable to a strong current in its political culture that was never entirely comfortable with these. This was so among many ordinary people who desired protection and socio-economic upliftment, and also, critically, within the ruling party and its allies.
The lockdown enabled, in effect, a control society to be created. By its nature this undermined the country’s democracy, as any emergency measure would. The NCCC functioned with no clear legal basis. One cannot, however, avoid the conclusion that some ministers found it very congenial. The arbitrary nature of some of the regulations indicated a certain recklessness and disregard for consequences, as well as an opportunity to impose the executive’s preferences in areas that did not have a firm bearing on controlling the pandemic. In security matters, there was disturbing encouragement of coercion. The affront to freedom, constitutionalism and human rights is clear here.
The risks inherent in arbitrary regulations and in far-reaching measures intended to mitigate a public health crisis are obvious. In a constitutional democracy, rights and liberties must be guarded jealously.
Does this set a precedent for the future?
The pandemic has certainly been used to promote the introduction of the government’s National Health Insurance scheme.[2] This would see the creation of a state-controlled medical fund, which would – in theory – provide universal health coverage for the country. Whether this can be prudently managed or will be an irresistible target for corruption remains an open question. There is justifiable cynicism around this.[3] A statist approach to health, which is likely beyond the ability of the government to manage, has probably been expedited.
The formal institutions of democracy have not been dispensed with, although the influence of something like Parliament – a key institution for countering abuses – was not much in evidence. The NCCC model, however, is said to be viewed favourably as a model for future governance. A document – apparently official, bearing the letterhead of the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs and marked ‘top secret’ – proposed a ‘mirroring of this institutional form’.[4] The DA, which had exposed the document, described these plans a ‘coup d’état’.[5] The plans referred to the introduction of a proposed District Development Model, which predated the pandemic. The idea would be for all levels of government to coordinate their plans and budgets. The corresponding concern is that this model would effectively centralise governance decisions and effectively reduce municipalities and provinces to administrative units. The invocation of the NCCC as a model raises the danger that an executive-focussed and inherently opaque (and thus unaccountable) system may be envisioned as necessary to respond to developmental challenges. The pandemic will have served as a pilot.
Minister of Health Zweli Mkhize announced that he wished to have regulations issued in terms of the National Health Act which would allow him to impose lockdown-style measures to deal with a health crisis in the absence of a State of Disaster.[6] The outcome of this process is awaited, as is how it might be used in practice, but it certainly represents another potential creep in executive power over South Africa’s people.
Sadly, the pandemic also demonstrated long-term pathologies in the functioning of the state. The COVID-19 crisis demonstrated just how deeply-rooted, extraordinarily venal and destructive corruption in South Africa is. It threatens constitutional government and in so doing, gnaws at the country’s human rights culture. But it should also be borne in mind that one of the key disruptors of the constitutional order has been the ANC’s policy of cadre deployment. Yet all indications are that this is to continue – only to be executed better.[7] This is an assurance the country has heard before, and does nothing to make the practice any more constitutionally compliant. Analysis by the IRR’s sister body, the Centre for Risk Analysis further reveals that over half of the ANC’s National Executive Committee are implicated in corruption which could carry sentences of 15 years or more. These include both supporters and opponents of President Ramaphosa.[8] This will be a major impediment to strong action being taken against those engaged in corruption and dealing with the environment that nurtures it.
Another development was the emergence of a document produced by a group of ‘ANC cadres’ reportedly largely composed of former military personnel headed by the now retired head of defence intelligence Maomela ‘Mojo’ Motau. This was the outcome of a summit of ANC members, which had itself generated controversy after it attempted to involve ANC-aligned members of the security forces; the SANDF warned its members off attending. Entitled ANC turnaround strategy 2025, it proposed placing the party under administration and sharply reorienting state policy. This would involve postponing elections, expeditiously seizing private property, abolishing dual citizenship, prohibiting the employment of foreigners (and effectively expelling them from the country) and reintroducing official race classification. The document stresses the need for the security forces to be ready to deal with the expected resistance. It also proposed ‘disciplinary tribunals’ – probably an institution outside the formal legal system – to enforce order on South Africa’s people.[9] All in all, this was a formula for dismantling the country’s democracy and constitutional order.
It must be noted that this did not have the approval of the ANC or its leadership.[10] It is nonetheless disturbing as it demonstrates that such considerations exist with the party. That they were voiced by people once entrusted with the physical protection of the county should also alarm democrats and constitutionalists. It is, sadly, not surprising in view of the deliberate politicisation of the state.
Finally, South Africa was not faced with the need to decide on holding an election under the pandemic, although local elections are scheduled for 2021. Suggestions were mooted by the ANC and Economic Freedom Fighters to postpone these and combine them with the national elections, due for 2024.[11] Since both parties had backed the lockdown, which was becoming increasingly unpopular, and since for ANC – as the ruling party – was likely to be held accountable at the polls, this smacked of opportunism and expediency. Although this idea seems to have been dropped, the fact that it was considered did not augur well for constitutional governance.
Human rights and civil liberties: Abuse, sometimes lethal, by the security forces was a sad feature of the lockdown. This underlined a long-standing pathology in South African governance and society, and a constant threat to the human rights of South Africa’s people, nowhere more so than among the country’s poorest and most vulnerable. Unchecked, this presents a grave danger for the country.
On public health grounds, South Africans temporarily lost many freedoms. These abridgements were often apparently arbitrary and not always obviously connected to combating the pandemic. The motivations behind them were not well or convincingly communicated and it was not apparent at what point they might be restored. This was a serious dereliction of the principle of accountability, although as the lockdown has been relaxed, these restrictions have largely been lifted.
On the other hand, key politically-significant civil liberties such as freedom of expression were generally maintained throughout the lockdown. This was so despite some lapses and with the government attempting to ensure that its messaging dominated. But critical voices were generally not harassed, and organisations such as the IRR were able to articulate trenchant criticisms. The restrictions on ‘fake news’ might raise some concerns, though. The ANC has since the 1990s taken issue with the behaviour of the media, and has proposed measures for state regulation, such as the mooted Media Appeals Tribunal. Its criticisms have been phrased in terms of a bias against the party, the distortion of news and the use of anonymous sources.[12] These arguments have an uncomfortable familiarity to those invoked in opposition to ‘fake news’. It was also notable that civil society and media groups were active in the campaign. It remains to be seen how this will develop in future.
South African society, did, however, show itself to be difficult to control, even if this was a matter of desperate pragmatism on the part of desperate people. Ultimately, the lockdown simply could not be enforced. (Indeed, the government’s response was faulted for its opportunistic concessions on the lockdown to influential interest groups.) This calls to mind the late Frederik van Zyl Slabbert’s observation that even if government were inclined towards ‘hegemonic’ pretentions, the scope and complexity of civil society would make it impossible.[13]
Non-racialism, meanwhile, took some serious blows. Both in government and among many influential thought leaders, race remained a foremost point of reference – this was the case in policy, in court judgements and in discourse. Although polling does not suggest that this thinking is widely shared,[14] its endorsement by many in positions of influence means that race (at times, a deterministic view of race and racial identity) will continue to drive much of the country’s understanding of governance and politics. That it has infected the very understanding of human rights in South Africa is of concern.
Livelihoods: The pandemic and the response to it underlined and highlighted the socio-economic ills of South Africa and the shortcomings – immediate and long term – of the state response to them. The shrinking of the economy and the expanding numbers of the unemployed make growing immiseration likely.
The rollout of additional social grant support has provided some relief and will probably be retained. But the ‘cost and consequences’ – to recall the words of one analyst quoted previously in this study – of doing so remain central and unavoidable considerations. South Africa’s fiscal position was badly strained upon entering the pandemic and the lockdown. It worsened considerably as a result of the latter. In South Africa’s February budget, main budget revenue was projected at some R1.4 trillion, with expenditure at R1.8 trillion – leaving a deficit of some R368 billion, or 6.8% of GDP. The supplementary budget revised these as follows: revenue would come in at R1.1 trillion, expenditure at a little over R1.8 trillion, for a deficit of R709.7 billion, or 14.6% of GDP.[15] Even this might prove optimistic, as these numbers did not allow for the extension of the new social grants, or for a major public employment plan.[16] Absent major investment and growth, it is hard to imagine how this tension can be resolved. That South Africa took a loan from the International Monetary Fund with all the ideological baggage that this entailed (even accepting that the loan was a concessional one specifically geared at support during the pandemic) illustrated just how perilous the fiscal position had become.
This came without significant conditionalities, although the IMF did note the need for structural reform.[17] Accepting funds from the IMF crossed an ideological red line for many within the ANC and its alliance, raising fears that South Africa might be compelled in future to accept a reform agenda with which it disagreed.[18]
This is turn raises probably the most important political and economic question: is any pro-growth and market-friendly reform on the horizon?
The government remains committed to a statist path, in word and deed. Nothing illustrates the reality of this more vividly than the decision to retain SAA. Counterproductive policies such as race-based empowerment and EWC remain in place. (As work on this study was coming to an end, a new Expropriation Bill was published; although optimists argued that expropriation would only be used as a last resort, it skewed the relationship between the state and those subject to it firmly towards the former.[19])
Indeed, official commitment to statist growth remains even as the capacity of the state is deeply questionable (in some areas dysfunctional). To think of the South African state as ‘developmental’ is delusional. But it is a delusion with deep ideological and emotive roots, and while there is talk of upskilling, the real action that would be required – establishing a professional, depoliticised and meritocratic civil service – seems firmly off the table.
Indeed, ‘Modern Monetary Theory’ appears to have gained some favour in policy circles. The idea is that as long as governments borrow in their own currency, bankruptcy is impossible. (This matches a previous call by Ace Magashule to introduce ‘quantity easing’.[20]) This is an attractive option as it would provide an argument for the government to raise spending and avoid reform measures – but would compound the crisis rather than alleviate it.[21]
It is unfortunately not only government that seems committed the current flawed path. The response from much of the media and the country’s thought leaders to economic thinking has rather been within the existing paradigms. The DA’s plans for a race-free empowerment alternative were extensively rejected and – with some exceptions – barely interrogated on their own merits.
There is little indication of a change of direction on the economy. Even thinking on the challenges confronting South Africa’s economy remained constrained. The malaise is therefore likely to persist.
And so…
Democracy does not exist in a vacuum, and neither do the trifecta that have been used here as component parts of the concept in South Africa. The pandemic showed key vulnerabilities of South Africa’s democracy. It will be necessary to monitor the actions of the state and those who lead it for the temptation to repeat or make permanent the disaster-justified abridgement of democracy in future. There are reasons to be concerned.
Equally, would the country’s people be willing to defend it if such intrusion were to be attempted? This is difficult to answer, but some warning signs might be identified. This has less to do with what was learned from the lockdown, but in relation to the damage has done to the country and to people’s life-chances.
The pandemic and the response have without doubt increased the precariousness and thus the frustration of millions of people. The amelioration provided by grants helps here, but is not a substitute for the real desire of most people: a wage-paying job, even if it remunerates modestly.[22] This is probably best understood as a belief that even low wage work would be more lucrative than a grant, that it would provide for mobility and that it would enhance dignity. Work is, in part, about participating in society.
Here some insights might fruitfully be drawn from academic work on democratic transitions and collapses. It is fairly clear that democratic consolidation and the ability to avoid failure depends on a country’s developmental efforts. This may be doubly the case for South African, given the centrality of development and socio-economic empowerment to the framing of democracy and human rights.
One study,[23] which examined a number of variables in relation to democratic regime collapse, found that the most significant ones tended to be found in the ‘societal’ realm. These were, specifically, deep social cleavages, a malfunctioning economy and an unfavourable history. Each of these is present in South Africa, and has been exacerbated by COVID-19. In its conclusions, the study went on to say:[24]
The findings show not only which variables are related to the collapse of democracy, and in what hierarchical order, but that the key to the demise of a democratic system is a combination of variables. The most crucial variables are: cleavages, a malfunctioning economy, unfavourable history, governmental instability, and foreign involvement. If four of these negative factors appear simultaneously, the democratic regime is almost doomed to collapse
So, South Africa faces three adverse societal factors. There is no significant foreign involvement, and governmental instability is taken in this study to refer primarily to frequent changes or shifting coalitions. This does not describe South Africa at this point, but incoherent policy positioning, shifting coalitions within the ANC or the overall inability of the state to perform its functions might well resemble this. The implications of this are frightening.
Democratic failure in South Africa would likely not occur through rejection of the democratic form – there is probably no chance of this in South Africa – but through challenges to its substance. It would be seen in the dismissal of human rights norms, in ignoring constitutional limits and strictures, and a deep scepticism of freedom, though the latter might be very difficult to enforce.
In another analysis, political scientists Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi argued that the role of economic development in democratisation processes tended to post-date the transition. In other words, if countries under democratic rule, even poor and challenged ones, experienced development, this would fortify democracy.[25] Another warning to South Africa there, perhaps? But they also point out that democracy does not arise organically from socio-economic processes. It is rather a choice that its proponents will defend.
And perhaps that will be the lesson for South Africa’s post-COVID future.
The author would like to thank his colleagues at both the Institute of Race Relations and Centre for Risk Analysis for sharing their invaluable insights with him. The Institute would also like to extend its heartfelt thanks to the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty, without whose generous support this project would not have been possible. The Institute would like to add that the views expressed here are those of the author, and not necessarily of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation.
[Picture: Discott, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=88923567]
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[1] Seyhan, E, ‘Coronavirus: beware the power grab’, African Arguments, 7 April 2020. https://africanarguments.org/2020/04/07/coronavirus-beware-the-power-grab/.
[2] ‘Coronavirus accelerates South Africa’s NHI plans’, BusinessTech, 24 August 2020. https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/428108/coronavirus-accelerates-south-africas-nhi-plans/.
[3] Poplak, R, ‘Covid-19 brought us to the edge of the abyss; Ramaphosa’s ANC goes a step further’, Daily Maverick, 20 July 2020. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-07-30-covid-19-brought-us-to-the-edge-of-the-abyss-ramaphosas-anc-goes-a-step-further/,
[4] Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, South Africa economic recovery plan for Municipalities in response to COVID-19 – Top Secret, Draft 5, undated, p. 24. https://press-admin.voteda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/SA-Economic-Recovery-Plan-for-Municipalities-in-response-to-Covid-19.pdf.
[5] ‘”Top secret” plan for a command council to run municipalities likened to “a coup”’, The Citizen, 6 July 2020. https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2315775/top-secret-plan-for-a-command-council-to-run-municipalities-likened-to-a-coup/.
[6] Gerber, J, ‘Mkhize wants powers to restrict citizens’ behaviour and movements beyond a state of disaster’, News24, 14 October 2020. https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/mkhize-wants-powers-to-restrict-citizens-behaviour-and-movements-beyond-a-state-of-disaster-20201014.
[7] Naki, E, ‘Appoint the right cadres to do the job in municipalities, says Dlamini-Zuma’, The Citizen, 22 June 2020. https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/government/2306333/appoint-the-right-cadres-to-do-the-job-in-municipalities-says-dlamini-zuma/.
[8] Centre for Risk Analysis, Risk Alert, 31 August 2020; Centre for Risk Analysis, Risk Alert, 7 September 2020.
[9] ANC Cadres, ANC turnaround strategy 2025: Changing the course of history – Submission to ANC Officials, 2020. https://www.scribd.com/document/482919982/Presentation-to-Anc-National-Working-Committee#from_embed.
[10] Du Plessis, C, ‘Radical document by “retired army generals” spurs Gwede Mantashe into action’, Daily Maverick, 5 November 2020. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-11-05-radical-document-by-retired-generals-spurs-gwede-mantashe-into-action/.
[11] ‘ANC and EFF agree on new election changes for South Africa: report’, BusinessTech, 14 June 2020. https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/407507/anc-and-eff-agree-on-new-election-changes-for-south-africa-report/.
[12] ‘Media is too critical’, says ANC, News24, 4 July 2015. https://www.news24.com/News24/media-is-too-critical-says-anc-20150704. Wasserman, H, ‘The state of South African media: a space to contest democracy’, Publizistik, Vol 65, 2020, pp. 451–465.
[13] Van Zyl Slabbert, F, The Other Side of History: An Anecdotal Reflection on Political Transition in South Africa, Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2006, p. 152.
[14] See Jeffery, A, Race Relations in South Africa: Reasons for Hope 2019 – Unite the Middle, Johannesburg: Institute of Race Relations, April 2019. https://irr.org.za/reports/occasional-reports/files/reasons-for-hope-report-final.pdf.
[15] National Treasury, op. cit., p. 10.
[16] See Bisseker, C, ‘Tito Mboweni now has to pick his way through the nine circles of hell’, Businesslive
[17] International Monetary Fund, ‘IMF Executive Board Approves US$4.3 Billion in Emergency Support to South Africa to Address the COVID-19 Pandemic’, Media release, 27 July 2020. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/07/27/pr20271-south-africa-imf-executive-board-approves-us-billion-emergency-support-covid-19-pandemic.
[18] Feliz, J, ‘R70bn IMF loan a ‘grievous mistake’ – SACP’, News24, 2 August 2020. https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/r70bn-imf-loan-a-grievous-mistake-sacp-20200802.
[19] Jeffery, A, ‘Don’t drink the Kool-Aid on this Expropriation Bill either’, Daily Maverick, 15 October 2020. https://dailyfriend.co.za/2020/10/15/dont-drink-the-kool-aid-on-this-expropriation-bill-either/.
[20] Wasserman, H, ‘Explained: quantitative easing – and why Ace Magashule caused a crisis by mentioning it’, Business Insider, 5 June 2019. https://www.businessinsider.co.za/what-is-quantitative-easing-2019-6.
[21] Centre for Risk Analysis, Risk Alert, 19 October 2020.
[22] Moosa, M, and Patel, J, South Africans support Social Grants, but say Work at any Wage beats Unemployment, Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 364, 26 May 2020.
[23] Dishkin, A, Diskin, H, and Hazan, RY, ‘Why Democracies Collapse: The Reasons for Democratic Failure and Success’, International Political Science Review, Vol 26, No. 3, 2005, pp. 291–309.
[24] Ibid., p. 304.
[25] Przeworski, A, and Limongi, F, ‘Modernization: theories and facts’, World Politics, Vol 49, No 2, 1997), pp. 155-183.