‘Far from falling apart, SA must and will succeed; she will enhance her co-operation with the world and stand as a beacon of the resilience and potential of diverse human societies.’
So wrote Mukoni Ratshiṱanga, former spokesman for President Thabo Mbeki, responding to despondency about the state of South Africa in the wake of the July unrest. Specifically, he was writing in response to a piece that had appeared in the New York Times under the heading ‘SA is falling apart’.
Scenes of mayhem and destruction, loss of life, armed neighbourhood militias fighting off mobs, and the general impotence of South Africa’s security forces – if not the state as a whole – make the heading eminently credible. The sense that South Africa is moving past a tipping point has probably never been more vividly real than it is now.
Not a new concern
It is not, however, a new concern, nor one unremarked on. Indeed, it has been a prominent point of conversation for over a decade. Brian Pottinger’s prescient 2008 book, The Mbeki Legacy, summarised many of the concerns, warning that South Africa was treading a dangerous path towards a failed state. This theme was repeated again and again in numerous other publications – books, articles and media pieces – the names of two of which are particularly arresting: Alex Boraine’s What’s gone wrong? On the brink of a failed state, and Justice Malala’s We have now begun our descent: how to stop South Africa losing its way.
Indeed, those of us with longer memories might remember when articles about South Africa brimmed with optimism. And there was certainly evidence to support that – think of prudent fiscal control from the late 1990s into the 2000s and the sometimes quite remarkable provision of services and amenities. Yet beneath this, South Africa’s prospects were steadily eroded by the choices that were foisted upon it.
Failure to meet the demands of modernity
In broad terms, to channel Pottinger’s thinking, what was at issue was the failure of the country – or, perhaps better put, its leadership – to rise to the demands of modernity.
Political diktat was never far away. While the wonders of the ‘developmental state’ (or in Ramaphosa’s terms, the ‘capable state’) have been punted for decades, the ability of South Africa’s institutions to fill this role was always questionable. In 1997, when the ANC committed itself to the politicisation of the state through its odious ‘cadre deployment’ policy, it became well-nigh impossible. Today, it is delusional.
Yet cadre deployment remains ruling party dogma, a self-inflicted hindrance to making the country work.
Ratshiṱanga writes eloquently on the ‘need to accelerate inclusive economic growth.’ Amen to that. It is also something that in its various permutations has been loudly declaimed for decades. Long memories, once more, will recall the ANC’s 1994 campaign slogan, ‘Jobs, jobs, jobs’. It hasn’t lost its potency, although it will have lost a great deal of its credibility.
Number of unemployed
The unemployed in South Africa number between 7.2 million and 11.4 million, depending on the definition. These are staggering figures when seen alongside a labour force of 26.4 million. Doing anything meaningful to bring these people into the labour market – not to mention those entering the economy every year – would require an almost unprecedented boost in investment to drive growth of over 5% per year for a decade or more.
This would be a monumental task under the most propitious conditions. Under the realities of contemporary South Africa, it is a Herculean one.
It is complicated, if not rendered impossible, by a policy and regulatory environment that could probably not do more to discourage hiring if it had been designed to do so. (Perhaps it had been, at least in respect of low-wage, low-skill employment.)
Poor policies
This is not merely a matter of labour market policy. Empowerment policy has long been a burden on South African business – indeed, it has failed so comprehensively to produce real, poverty-beating empowerment that even its supporters do not attempt to defend it on its record.
These policies, like cadre deployment, remain inviolate. Not only that, they are to be made more intrusive and rigid.
Meanwhile, the state moves to empower itself to seize property. The ANC’s preferred formulation of the first-ever amendment to the Bill of Rights will require that ‘certain’ land be held under state custodianship. This is a discomfortingly broad term – for what does ‘certain’ mean? – and could well set the country on the path to nationalisation in swathes of the country. Today, incidentally, represents the last opportunity for South Africa’s people to make their voices heard against this measure.
Watch too for how the intrusion into property rights begins to manifest itself in respect of assets other than land.
If South Africa is to draw any modicum of consolation from the recent chaos, it must start with recognising that Ratshitanga may in fact be wrong. There is no inevitability in South Africa’s resilience, nor in its ultimate success. These events have thrust before us more evidence, if any should have been needed, of just how dire the state of the country has become.
South Africa may succeed. It remains a country of enormous potential, but this will count for little if it persists on its current course. Its failure is, sadly, also a possibility. How South Africans, and particularly those in positions of power and leadership, choose to respond will determine which outcome will prevail.
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