Many admit that the South African general election held on 29 May 2024 was both a wake-up call for dozing political parties which some have deemed incompetent and others retrogressive, and also an opportunity for status-quo parties that seem to have proven the malleability of the country’s political landscape.
It is crucial to concede that the outcome did not quite come as a shock, considering that the support for the long-reigning African National Congress (ANC) has seen disastrous decline since the previous election in 2019, with the party losing its key metros prior to the 2024 general election. What has been characterised as “The will of the people” is the result of support slipping down to an abysmal 40%, and the party failing to maintain its majority, thus opening the way for coalition engagement and steering South Africa into turbulent domestic and international waters.
It cannot be overstated how this unsolicited political marriage is a determinant of the state’s relationship with other nations, but equally a variable in shaping its foreign policy position and navigating a complex global environment on which views are polarised.
This piece unpacks the complex contrasting dynamics of the Government of National Unity (GNU) through the lens of international law and concerns over South Africa’s foreign policy direction in the seventh administration under a coalition government.
Potemkin GNU 1994
The union of diverse parties in government is not necessarily taboo for South Africa. In fact, the GNU constitutes the second attempt at realigning the right and left of the political spectrum into a binding consensus of power-sharing, at least at the executive level.
Ideological contradiction
Already it is plain that such a configuration has the potential for ideological contradiction. It is essential therefore that lessons are drawn from the then ANC-National Party (NP) coalition in 1994.
South Africa under the apartheid regime eventually became isolated in the international community, being perceived as a pariah state as a result of its protracted violation of human rights and its denial of freedom for the majority. It is obvious that the value system the regime subscribed to was misaligned with the fundamental principles of international law, which unambiguously reinforce the importance of human liberties. Facing growing international pressure, the NP under former president F.W. de Klerk re-evaluated its foreign policy and shifted it towards a path that was to prioritise international peace and make explicit a commitment to upholding international law.
Although its goal of representing South Africa’s diverse interests seemed promising post-1994, the coalition ended prematurely without reaping tangible results. The NP posited that the ANC led by former president Nelson Mandela lacked a commitment to genuine consensus, which it regarded as a deviation from their negotiation agreement and a promise of proportionate representation of NP constituents. This informed the NP’s withdrawal from the GNU, but what was considered the last straw was the ANC’s adoption of a constitutional condition that opposed power-sharing in 1996.
Scope of influence
The disbanding of the coalition was a failure by both leading parties to reach common ground on their scope of influence, with the ANC occupying most of the policy-making spaces. This was inconsistent with the NP’s quest for ‘real’ power-sharing. Despite its early dissolution that resulted in intangible long-term results to which we can refer for guidance, it is crucial to draw the lesson that government ought to aspire to more power-sharing, and it should be committed to the rules of international law.
SA’s new GNU
The dichotomy between the ANC and the other nine parties that form the new GNU, and their possible ideological clashes suggest the potential for policy stalemate, and problems for South Africa’s foreign policy direction. What remains in question at this point is whether the current course of action will continue, or whether it will have to adjust to some degree.
The defining rationale of coalitions requires mainly compromise, negotiation and consensus. The ANC’s having to share a piece of the political pie is not necessarily a complete loss. The advantage to be drawn from the competitive nature of power-sharing is that it will not only revive the confidence of the disillusioned voter, who might otherwise have regarded voting as futile, but also ensure that there are checks and balances in decision-making. Moreover it is unlikely that such a union would deflect the country’s founding principles on foreign policy, which articulate the need for solidarity in protecting citizens’ rights and preserving the national interest. However, it cannot be overlooked that the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the ANC don’t see eye to eye on key issues, and that this might well influence South Africa’s international posture on certain issues and allegiances.
The DA’s resistance to the formation of BRICS was evident, when it aimed to act on the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) warrant of arrest against Russian president Vladimir Putin, were he to attend the summit in 2023. The DA characterised BRICS as an expansion of authoritarian states and deemed Putin’s absence a win for international law against the ANC and its “Russian allies”.
Pro-West
This affirms a pro-West stance by the DA which runs against South Africa’s vocal stance on the de-dollarization agenda and its perception of the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war. In fact, the Rand-Dollar exchange has become more positive under the partnership of the two parties under the GNU. Talks about detaching from the Western economic hegemony under the GNU thus seems a bit inappropriate, and so does the bilateral relationship between Russia and South Africa, although the statement of intent postulates the importance of keeping to the objectives of national interest and less on political friendships.
The ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine is a crucial issue confronting the GNU. The ANC has continued to abide by the legacy of Madiba who shared close ties with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PL0). The party has since stood firm in pursuing an anti-Israel policy direction that has resulted in SA-Israel bilateral trade falling from $1.19 billion to just $350 million by 2023. The ANC’s standing firm in regarding Israel as an apartheid state is in contrast to the DA’s and the Patriotic Alliance’s view of Hamas as a terrorist group. The use of language in this instance makes evident how the politics of hermeneutics shapes collective norms and actions in the context of international law. South Africa has been vocal in calling for a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement, and in seeking to explicitly convey the idea of Israel being “genocide-committer” in the corridors of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Even so, there have been meagre results due to the United Nations’ veto-power and the inability to ensure that Israel complies with the Genocide Convention. This undoubtedly reveals the realist’s perception of power dynamics in shaping international law, and whether or how it is implemented in an anarchic world.
Despite these challenges, the ANC still holds 62% of portfolios, and an iron grip on foreign affairs and defence. SA’s foreign policy remains under the President’s control, making it seem unlikely that the current policy position will be ditched – yet, equally, it does not rule out the prospect of opposition parties exerting a growing influence on foreign relations henceforth.
This is the first of three essays on the theme of South Africa and international law submitted to the Daily Friend on behalf of students in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg by assistant lecturer Ndzalama Mathebula.
[Image: https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/3311542781]
The views of the writer are not necessarily the views of the Daily Friend or the IRR
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