Few propaganda machines have worked as hard to craft the image of a brilliant strategist for their political master as the modern Russian one.
Even fewer leaders have failed worse than Putin at justifying it. From staking his bets on intelligence doctored to please the emperor’s ears, to encapsulating himself in the echo chamber of his own spin, to believing his generals that he had the ‘world’s second army’, the former middle-management KGB officer must be struggling with an impostor syndrome.
His army still looks stuck in Trotsky’s paradigm, top heavy and thieving, the rank and file untrained to take initiative for fear of severe punishments (but also outshining superiors), and the eternal Red Army bug of shoddy supply lines and logistics (where everything relies on a train).
The Russians were pushed out of Kyiv and Sumy by some anti-tank Javelins and Stingers. They lost what possessions they had gained initially around Kherson and Kharkiv to three dozen HIMARS rocket launchers. The fear of the almighty Russian army turned out to be no more than fear itself.
Not even nuclear escalation helped Putin. Used to upping the ante when in a tight spot – up for a Syrian invasion to make Crimean recognition in 2014 (and the interference in US elections) palatable, or Transnistrian unrest in Moldova for a peaceful occupation of the Donbas – he must have felt that violating international law and treaties to which his country is a signatory would be worth it. The world did not take the bait.
His worker-peasant army now leads in losses among all ranks, but staggeringly among senior commanders in the field.
The USSR, twice the size of Russia and still a superpower then, lost 15 000 men over a decade of fighting in Afghanistan. That now looks like an average month in Bakhmut. Because the Russian draftee cannot be trusted, much less when armed, colonels and generals descend into the field, to be obliterated by precision strikes. By way of comparison, the US has lost only two generals since WWII. The whole Russian show seems frozen in that era now.
Meanwhile, the UK and Canada are training Ukrainian troops, officers, and NCOs to NATO standards. Tens of billions of dollars in direct aid and lend-lease (ironically, another WWII hangover in US legislation, but now used against Russia, albeit to again free Ukraine) see the Russian appetite for combat becoming increasingly modest.
Cold War relic
Only a Cold War relic like the ANC does not see that Putin is on a downward spiral, with few winning moves left. It sees the Western squabbling, and its apparent weakness after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. It saw EU leaders forming policy in consultation with a teenager who has spent less time in school than Zuma. It must be something of a shock to now see the West united, and imposing its influence via sanctions.
Russia cannot produce modern vehicles or airplanes, its oligarchs and securocrats cannot get out, and Russia has no capacity to carry on a prolonged war of attrition. When oil and gas taps get closed from the buyers’ end and grey schemes on sanctions-busting are exposed, less and less revenue is left, which can only be compensated for by meat fodder. We will get to that.
Putin’s remaining allies are such ‘stalwart democracies’ and ‘economic powers’ that they include Belarus, Syria, Eritrea, North Korea, and Venezuela among their dwindling numbers. He must have thought that India and China could be counted on, using anti-colonial rhetoric – ironic, given that Russia has been an empire since the 18th century – but they seem to be taking a strictly pragmatic stance, perhaps even exploiting Russian desperation to obtain favourable rates on energy.
South Africa under its current dispensation can (perhaps?) be counted on, what with murky Russian ships collecting unknown gear at Simon’s Town or hosting the BRICS, to which Putin no doubt will crack an invite.
Even that is becoming less and less tenable. South Africa’s shameful voting record on UN resolutions condemning the aggression is support of a kind for Putin, but we have a different beast altogether now. The Russian seat on the Security Council is in doubt, because it seems the Russian Federation did not apply for UN membership. It simply took the USSR’s warm seat, in contravention of the UN’s own charter, which states that it should have applied for membership, as all other USSR constituent states did. There is a fresh order of arrest from the International Criminal Court in The Hague for the kidnapping of Ukrainian children, no ordinary war crime. Allowing Putin to slip away, as happened with Al-Bashir in 2017, during the BRICS summit hosted by South Africa poses risks that even East German-trained ANC comrades should be wary of.
A delicate position
The world is reconsidering its stance on Russia, the process so much under way that even Chairman Xi found himself in a delicate position: how much time to spend on his recent Moscow visit and what vague declarations to sign up to?
China cannot insist on territorial integrity, something important if it wants Taiwan, while batting for the occupation of 18% of Ukrainian territory. When Xi did his sums, with his economy 80% geared towards exports, he knew that sanctions would hurt hard. Xi is smart enough to know that his legitimacy depends on maintaining economic growth and lifting many more Chinese out of poverty.
Ukraine’s sacrifices are making the world safer – the concern about China invading Taiwan is lessening, since Beijing is now also watching how Moscow failed to take Kyiv. It is having second thoughts about its appetite for Taipei.
It is not just globally that Putin is facing an arctic reception. Grumbling elites have had much of their stolen loot frozen. They are unable to enter the EU at all, much less their homes in it. The oligarchs do not count for much, their role being of bagmen who make payments when it will not look nice if the Russian state makes them directly.
But the securocrats are in a league all of their own, unsurprisingly, if they rule over men with guns with little legal oversight.
There is traditional mistrust amongst intelligence and army and some heavy backstabbing and manoeuvring is under way, as one tries to lay the blame on the other. The KGB successor, FSB, is arguing that soldiers cannot seem to accomplish much, while army chiefs blame all on faulty FSB intel, the invasion being orchestrated by the latter.
If that wasn’t enough, more risks of internal unrest are brewing. Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner Group of ‘mercenaries’ and Chechen potentate Ramzan Kadyrov are forming private armies, with other regional authorities following suit, directly challenging the Russian state’s monopoly on violence.
Mysterious, yet armed, Russian dissident groups fighting under the Ukrainian flag are making incursions into Russia. Guerrilla activities have spiked, from arson of recruitment offices to sabotage of railways and bridges. Returning Russian soldiers suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder are showing a propensity for violence, echoing the eras post-Afghanistan and Chechnya.
Insufferable conditions
Conscripts are protesting against mobilisation and war, admittedly disguised as objecting to insufferable conditions because of freshly enacted Stalinist-style legislation. Because he does not want unrest in major metropoles, largely populated by white Great Russians, Putin has been disproportionately drafting men from disenfranchised ethnic minorities in peripheral regions, leading to the risk of ethnic tensions. Mothers in Dagestan or Bashkiria have voiced their discontent.
Debilitating corruption and incompetence affect provisions, ordnance, and equipment, proving the army to be a paper tiger. Weak logistics and supply lines lead to demoralised troops, already unsure of what they’re fighting for.
Unclear goals of the war and Kremlin meddling affect military objectives, with news of stupefying numbers of Russian casualties quickly reaching the front. Russian czars do not survive military defeats – an iron law of history – and Putin no doubt must be considering Nicholas II’s fate, who overdid the mobilisation so much that his conscripts overthrew him.
The last bits of moral support, apart from South Africa’s, come, oddly, from the fringes of the West’s own right wing. They still see Putin as their man of honour, family man of traditional values, church-going Orthodox man, and set aside his thievery and poisonings, babes out of wedlock, and subjugation of Church to State. If they were to dig deeper, they might recognise that Zelensky is far more deserving of that role. One is a declining Stalin, while the other is a rising Churchill. All bets are off.
Zelensky, in contrast, has not been doing badly. When he asked for ammo and not a ride, he earned some massive cred, which meant internal stability, law and order, and a functioning state. High morale prevails within the SBU, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, who know they are fighting to protect themselves and to avoid more massacres like Bucha or Irpin. They have confidence in their Commander-in-Chief.
Zelensky has shown strong leadership and regularly goes to the frontline to boost morale, something reflected in his approval ratings. He leads a nation united, because missiles raining down affect everyone equally, including Russian speakers from the east of the country.
Unprecedented appearance
He pulled off some unprecedented appearances before the UK House of Commons, the EU Council, and US Congress, resulting in support from the British PM and the US President. He must be feeling confident preparing his counteroffensive after retaking Kharkiv and Kherson.
In every war, truth is the first casualty. We must be cautious trying to elucidate trends under the fog of war. However, some things are clear, after some smoke has lifted. Medvedev’s drunken tweets aside, Russia has discredited itself far more that Putin expected.
Its propaganda failures are carefully exploited, its troops are justly deemed as occupiers and aggressors since the beginning of the conflict, its leadership and government are roundly condemned.
Russian officials are mistrusted, the disconnect between their language of diplomacy and the barbaric behaviour of the Russian ruling class finally noted and acted on. Russian has a word for that position, ‘neroukopozhatny’, or ‘unhandshakable with.’
Ramaphosa, do you want to back a loser?
[Image: Дмитрий Буханцов from Pixabay]
The views of the writer are not necessarily the views of the Daily Friend or the IRR
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