For Hamas and its backers, the attacks on Israel over the weekend might be an immense success as a show of an ability to execute large coordinated, sophisticated and devastating operations. Although well executed, the attacks could turn into a gross miscalculation by Hamas.
Whether one has sympathy for the Palestinian cause or not, the reality is that Hamas has provoked retaliation, and a massive wake-up call for Israel.
The count yesterday of more than 700 Israelis killed, over 100 taken hostage, and thousands injured is devastating. Hamas and Gaza have also taken a heavy toll, with about 600 killed and thousands injured.
The attack’s scale and daring as part of an insurgency bears a strong resemblance to the surprise of the Tet Offensive launched by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in 1968 against South Vietnam. While the Tet Offensive was launched from within South Vietnam, it was also large in scale and an example of an intelligence failure. The US and its South Vietnamese allies managed to end the offensive, but it ultimately was a factor that led to US withdrawal from Vietnam a few years later.
Unlike the US in Vietnam, Israel does not have the option to withdraw.
The impact of the attack will be more like 9/11. Key will be how Israel snaps out of its failures, its agility and what it learns.
First some perspective. While Israel was caught unawares and has paid a heavy price from the attacks, its existence was not threatened. For a country with a small population, the number killed and taken hostage was an enormous tragedy and shock. So far the attacks have not resulted in an uprising in the occupied territories on the West Bank or coordinated attacks from Israel’s neighbours. The attacks have not been sustained for more than two days and were probably pretty much a suicide mission, and unlikely to be repeated soon.
As ghastly and serious as Saturday was, Hamas has not wiped Israel off the map as is its declared aim. In many ways the attacks have shown the futility of Hamas. The recent attack has taught Israel a lesson that might have been far worse at a later stage.
The re-think will begin with ways to improve intelligence.
Israel has been lured into a false sense of security over the years. The harsh rhetoric of a right-wing government and its encouragement of settlements in the West Bank have been part of this. Israel has not faced large scale conventional attacks since 1973 and has managed to deal with the Intifadas on the West Bank, wars in Gaza, and the threats from Hezbollah in Lebanon without massive casualties.
The Abraham Accords, brokered by the Trump Administration, paved the way to Israel’s diplomatic recognition by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and an easing of tensions with Saudi Arabia. Much of the Arab world seemed to have distanced itself from the Palestinian cause.
In recent months, tensions have eased with Hamas as tensions have risen with its rival Islamic Jihad. This has led Israel to allow many more people from Gaza to work in Israel.
All this may account for why the Supernova music festival was held about five km from Gaza. It is here that Hamas killed nearly 300 people.
Against this background, Israel’s intelligence agencies may have been too reliant on electronic eavesdropping rather than the use of human intelligence. Hamas knew Israel was listening in to its electronic traffic, and therefore might have planned the operation outside of Gaza and used human messengers. Israel placed multiple sensors along the border with Gaza, and may have neglected a human military presence.
Over the years the pool of first-language Arabic speakers available to Israeli intelligence agencies has almost ceased as immigration of Jews from neighbouring countries has long ended. Knowing the rumours and talk of the Arab street was a considerable advantage. The over-reliance on electronic signals and sensors for security provides a very partial picture.
There might also be lessons from the retaliation on Gaza. In retaliation, Israel has cut off water, electricity and food, and is bombing Gaza, but the court of world public opinion will soon force it to cease this. The real problem for Israel is how to cut off supplies of arms and ammunition from reaching Gaza from Egypt and along the 40km coastline. Part of the big Israeli rethink will be what to do about effectively policing Gaza.
Israel will also have to think how to deal with the Hamas support network. The sophistication and timing of the attacks could be a give-away that Iran has played a large hand in the planning.
One issue now is how far Iran will go to protect Hamas. With a US aircraft carrier about to arrive in the eastern Mediterranean it is highly unlikely that Tehran would dare send its air force or Republican Guards to Gaza. But this does point to the danger that the conflict could easily turn into a wider regional one. Israel will be giving hard thought on what to do about Iran’s proxies in Gaza and Lebanon.
Another element in the big wake-up call is the shattering of the idea held among some Israelis that the right wing is best positioned to deal with security issues.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is likely to be out of power as soon as the crisis eases. He and his coalition have been humiliated by these events and will rightly be blamed for a failure to ask security chiefs the right questions. He is also to be blamed for splitting the country by curbing judicial review, which makes it easier for new settlements on the West Bank, the single cause of the small right wing parties which have kept Netanyahu in power.
The Hamas attack has now brought the country together and Netanyahu is likely to form an emergency government to ensure broader support for any military campaign. Whether the smaller extreme parties will be sidelined after the crisis is open to question, but that just might happen in the new political environment.
From now on, Israel will have to pay a higher price for its security and face heightened risks. All this while Palestinians are mostly living in squalor and with deep resentments, and little hope for the future.
Five years after the Yom Kippur war, Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords in 1978. There have been no wars between the two since. Any peace moves have to begin with a recognition of Israel’s right to exist.
That is why the much vaunted two-state solution, for one Israeli and another Palestinian state, is a non-starter for the time being. We are back to the default position in the Middle East.
The views of the writer are not necessarily the views of the Daily Friend or the IRR.
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