Whose side is South Africa on? Today’s South African national and provincial elections  is helping focus attention on its relationship with Washington D.C. Bilateral support to reconsider the United States diplomatic relationship with South Africa has suddenly surfaced during an election year in both countries. 

What happens to the relationship after the South African election or, for that matter, after the US general election on 5 November? Will Congress seek to sanction South Africa for its perceived anti-western, anti-U.S., anti-democratic leanings? Or will the status quo continue, regardless of who occupies the White House or which political party controls Congress?

Throughout much of the Cold War South Africa managed to maintain ties with Western powers, primarily as a perceived anti-communist ally and a strategic partner owing to its mineral resources and geographic location. But those relations became strained, as popular support rose to combat the apartheid system of separate development that resulted in racial discrimination. There were also tensions due to South Africa’s military engagement against a loose coalition of southern African countries committed to ending apartheid and white minority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia ( collectively known as the “Front Line States”).

The ANC came to power three decades ago amid a wave of global support, especially from Western democracies who hailed the end of apartheid.  Under the early leadership of Nelson Mandela, with some initial success in redressing historical disparities and making economic progress, South Africa appeared to all who cared as a golden child on the global stage, supported almost unequivocally by Western democracies. However, warning signs began to emerge in 2008, fourteen years into ANC rule, when President Thabo Mbeki, a technocrat, was deposed in what effectively amounted to a palace coup in Polokwane, and was replaced by Jacob Zuma as president of the ANC, and by extension, South Africa. 

Zuma’s accession

What followed Zuma’s accession was pervasive corruption, economic decline, the wholesale pilfering of state resources, widespread patronage, an explosion of violent crime, and increased black economic empowerment requirements.  As South Africa’s listless economy was surpassed by Nigeria in the past decade, South Africa struggled to find relevance on the global stage. After joining the pseudo-alliance of developing states now known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the country gained virtually no advantage, and in large measure turned inward as South Africans dealt with one corruption scandal after another. 

When Covid appeared in Africa in early 2020, South Africa, like nearly every other country, was caught completely unprepared, or at least acted as if it had no idea how to handle the pandemic. The ANC government imposed the most draconian and incomprehensible lockdown on the planet, banning the sale of open-toed shoes, cooked chicken, cigarettes, alcohol, and walking in public. Rather than harnessing the strength of its human capital and its domestic pharmaceutical industry, which includes companies such as Aspen Pharma, President Cyril Ramaphosa joined the COVAX coalition, relying on external actors. Then Ramaphosa, on the world stage, spent months attacking the U.S. over what he called “vaccine Apartheid,” while ignoring the role his own country could have played in developing or testing vaccines in South Africa’s robust pharmaceutical industry.

While South Africa’s Covid conduct is not the proximate cause of current Congressional dissatisfaction with Pretoria, it should have served as a clarion call regarding the ANC’s approach to its Western benefactors. Ramaphosa and his party are fond of biting the hand that feeds them, railing against the West, particularly the U.S., and now, even Israel.  Ramaphosa’s allegations about Covid vaccines should have sent warning bells ringing at our embassy in Pretoria, at the State Department and in the White House. Unfortunately, the comments passed largely unnoticed by a distracted Biden administration.

While the White House and State Department have long remained silent on perceived ANC transgressions, South Africa’s actions since February 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, finally got the attention of Congress. And what of those actions? South Africa is a sovereign state, entitled to its own foreign policy and choice of friends, partners and allies, no? Yes, Pretoria is entitled to its own path. But it should expect consequences when its actions run counter to its benefactors’ national interest.

In 2022, when 141 members of the UN General Assembly voted to condemn Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, South Africa (like several African states) abstainedANC officials traveled to Russia, ignored Ukraine’s plight for 18 months and then conducted a combined naval exercise with Russian and Chinese forces. When a US-sanctioned Russian defense contractor’s cargo ship surreptitiously slipped into South Africa’s main naval base in Simonstown and, under of cover of darkness, unloaded containers and then loaded others on board, the ANC initially dismissed public questions. However, when U.S. Ambassador Reuben Brigety publicly rebuked Pretoria, claiming that South Africa had transferred arms to Russia, the ANC could no longer ignore the public relations fiasco. A long and convoluted “independent” investigation followed. Few in South Africa or in Washington believed the report’s conclusions that nothing untoward had occurred.

Attention

The aforementioned tensions failed to get the attention of American politicians. It was only after the nearly bankrupt ANC returned from Tehran and condemned Israel for Jerusalem’s response to the brutal Hamas invasion on 7 October, 2023, that officials in Washington finally began to notice that South Africa, under the ANC, all too frequently acts counter to US national security interests. The ANC is also all too often convivial with totalitarians and state supporters of terrorism. 

South Africa’s claim to the moral high ground over Gaza is questionable, at best. When Gambia took an historic step of challenging Myanmar in the International Court of Justice for genocide against its Rohingya Muslim minority, South Africa was silent and did not join the case. However in the aftermath of the Hamas invasion, not only did South Africa’s foreign Minister Naledi Pandor make a telephone call to Hamas, but her ministry also permitted Hamas officials entry to South Africa in December 2023, weeks after the Hamas invasion of Israel.

The negative view of South Africa was also not helped by a purported Hamas claim that Naledi Pandor congratulated Hamas on its brutal assault.  Although the ANC-led government quickly brought genocide allegations against Israel and is concerned about hunger in Gaza, it remains largely silent on the crises closer to home in Africa, like those in Sudan, Niger, Mali, and elsewhere. It fails to condemn genocidal efforts and war crimes in places like Tigray in Ethiopia or hunger in Sudan.

Naledi Pandor and her bosses mistakenly believe that South Africa is of strategic importance to the US, and they can therefore count on generous and largely cordial relations, regardless of Pretoria’s actions. Unfortunately, their attitude may be poorly informed. 

Tyrants

Given the ANC’s clear penchant for poking its benefactors in the eye while supporting tyrants and expressing selective outrage, what is at stake? There is little at risk for Washington. South Africa no longer consistently has the largest economy in Africa. In the 4th industrial revolution, Pretoria’s minerals are not nearly as critical as the ANC believes they are.

While the US is South Africa’s second largest trading partner (behind China), with approximately $20 billion in annual two-way trade, South Africa needs the trade far more than the US does. Trade is not remotely even; it is heavily skewed in favour of Pretoria. The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) allows South Africans to send most products and services into the US market entirely duty free. The US enjoys no such reciprocity.  In fact Pretoria has often been hostile towards US exports to South Africa, imposing 62% tariffs on U.S. poultry, for example. Loss of AGOA access would harm South Africa, not America.

From 2009 to 2022 Pretoria consistently received over $300 million annually from Washington ($218M in 2023). This assistance has been essential for HIV/ AIDs programmes (South Africa has over 7.6 million HIV positive citizens, the highest number in the world). American assistance also covers a host of other important programmes.

The ANC is playing with fire. They may be fortunate if the bipartisan effort under way in Congress to cut assistance is simply electioneering for a domestic audience.  If so, there will be little to no change in ties between the two “friends.” Also, the outcomes of elections on both sides of the Atlantic may figure heavily in the equation. 

Should the deeply unpopular ANC fail to secure a majority today,  it will be forced into an undesirable coalition, potentially with the rabid Economic Freedom Fighters (who constantly attack the ANC politically) or the upstart new MK Party under former president and convicted felon Jacob Zuma. If the party implodes (a possible but far from certain outcome), opposition parties will need to form a majority or minority coalition. Should that happen, Congress is unlikely to punish Pretoria.

Whatever the election results, the current ANC leadership has either failed to grasp the dangerous waters it is sailing in by slapping the US in the face with its foreign policy actions, or is whistling past the cemetery. Apparently, the ANC simply does not care about repercussions, feels it can weather the storm, or is clueless of the jeopardy South Africa now finds itself in vis-a-vis its diplomatic relationship with Washington.

The views of the writer are not necessarily the views of the Daily Friend or the IRR.

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contributor

Colonel (Ret) Chris Wyatt, is a retired U.S. Army Military Intelligence Officer and Foreign Area Officer for Sub-Saharan Africa and past Director of African Studies at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He was previously the Senior Military Advisor to the U.S. Mission to the African Union (USAU). Colonel (Ret) Wyatt has extensive experience across Africa with assignments in Tunisia, Liberia, Botswana, Malawi, Niger, Mauritania, Uganda and Ethiopia. His tours in Africa include duty as the Senior Defense Representative, Security Assistance Officer and Attaché assignments.