- This is an abridged and adapted version of the IRR’s latest Blueprint for Growth paper, In Service of the Public: Reforming South Africa’s Public Administration., written jointly by Sara Gon and Terence Corrigan,
With the 2024 elections, South Africa entered what promises to be a new phase in its politics. The loss of the ANC’s absolute majority has meant that its assumptions about the nature of governance are no longer necessarily dominant. Probably in no field is this as important as in the functioning of the public service.
While governments may come and go, the apparatus of state typically remains intact. And one of its biggest challenges will be harnessing a public sector that has served mainly the ANC for 30 years. It is a public sector which has, in many cases, aided and abetted the ANC’s rule, often while failing to perform the duties mandated. Indeed, the problems besetting the public service are acknowledged as a major brake on South Africa’s prospects even by the ANC itself.
Foundations
The public service refers to the staff of the official institutions established at various levels – municipal, provincial and national government, as well as by state-owned or administered bodies, which provide services for the benefit of all the people in South Africa. The Constitution makes clear that the public service is to be meritocratic, that it should be professionally operated and that public servants are to be held to high standards of conduct (while the state is to respect their interests).
As of September 2023, there were 1,734,566 people employed in South Africa’s national and provincial public sectors. In addition, there were 344,809 municipal employees and the 222,960 employees of state-owned enterprises (SoEs), universities and technikons.
The Constitution established the Public Service with an extensive “developmental” mandate. This required that it should not just provide services efficiently and lawfully, but that it should strive to address the accumulated deficits in living standards and opportunities. This demanded first-rate public administration. It implied a state apparatus staffed by skilled and enthusiastic civil servants, that could draw on enormous reserves of material resources and expertise, and the integrity of which was beyond question. This is not how things have turned out.
The context
The ANC took power in 1994, and with it control of a state that brought together numerous pre-existing administrations. Their capacities and professionalism were widely divergent. The ANC was determined to alter the racial composition of the public service, deeming it politically hostile. An early imperative was therefore to embark on a programme to reengineer the demographics of those working in the state, albeit with at least a rhetorical acknowledgement of the importance of retaining skills and the goodwill of committed civil servants whom the post-1994 institutions had inherited.
This was matched by a rapid move to place politically reliable people into influential positions. It quickly took on the form of an overt party-political programme. This was encapsulated in a 1998 party document: “Transformation of the state entails, first and foremost, extending the power of the NLM [National Liberation Movement – the ANC and its allies] over all levers of power: the army, the police, the bureaucracy, intelligence structures, the judiciary, parastatals, and agencies such as regulatory bodies, the public broadcaster, the central bank and so on.”
The most important expression of this was the ANC’s programme of “cadre deployment”. In terms of this, a party committee would decide where hand-picked party activists (or at least, people sympathetic to and approved by the ANC) were to be employed. In principle, it sought to ensure that its deployees were present in all influential bodies across society, though given its control of the state, this would always be the most accessible site.
Phase one: Bringing the Public Service into Democracy
The early period following 1994 saw extensive changes in the composition of the civil service. The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, published in 1995, set out a detailed vision of the institution going into the future, along with a comprehensive list of challenges. The ideal was a highly skilled, appropriately-sized civil service that would reflect the country’s demographic profile, would be responsive to the imperatives of the constitutional order and would provide excellent services to the country’s people.
While the White Paper supported the race-based transformation agenda, it did note that many existing public servants felt insecure in their positions and that their willingness to serve the new dispensation should be acknowledged. It also noted that the valuable skills that some of these public servants possessed were essential to the successful operation of the service and the execution of the government’s plans.
Perhaps because of mistrust for the (white) staff it was inheriting, and perhaps because demographic transformation was a relatively – albeit deceptively – simple issue to address, the new government set to work to alter the racial and gender composition of the public service. Indeed, at times this was expressed as a priority surpassing all else. As one ANC MP, Maria Rantho, who later went on to the Public Service Commission, put it in the late 1990s: “It is imperative to get rid of merit as the overriding principle in the appointment of public servants.”
Meanwhile, the drive to ensure a politically reliable public service (from the point of view of the new administration) led to a programme of voluntary severance of employees, not infrequently with generous packages to incentivise this. This produced significant disruption, with a loss of institutional memory and of already insufficient technical and professional skills.
Institutionally, one of the most important bodies set up by the Constitution to regulate the public service was the Public Service Commission. The PSC was first established in terms of the 1993 interim Constitution as an oversight organ for the public service, and this was restated in the final 1996 Constitution.
The PSC’s activities included: monitoring adherence to regulations on personnel procedures and transformation policies; promoting a high standard of professional ethics; evaluating the management of information technology; and monitoring, evaluating and investigating service delivery, and related organisational systems and practices nationally and at provincial level.
Potentially the fulcrum of the public service in the democratic era, the PSC’s role was diminished by the Public Service Act (PSA), passed in 1994. This removed the PSC’s executive powers, leaving it largely confined to advice and recommendation.
The Act gave politicians very wide discretion over government administrations. For example, it granted executive authorities the responsibility for decisions regarding the structure of departments. These included a department’s internal organisation, planning, human resources management and so on. It was also responsible for staff recruitment and performance management. Wide-ranging powers of appointment were granted to the president, to cabinet ministers, and (at provincial level) to members of relevant executive councils, although provision existed for these to be devolved for operational purposes.
As time passed, the ANC gained confidence and began to push more aggressively for its “hegemony”. It paired the discretion granted to politicians in terms of the PSA with its own structured party programme of cadre deployment, as outlined above.
The pitfalls of political discretion became visible early on. The ANC did not have the skilled people for all the jobs that needed to be filled. It is doubtful that a skills-scarce society like South Africa did in its entirety. Not all politicians and not all politically influenced appointments were committed to the public good – some were party hacks, while others were just venal. Many of those appointed were not up to the task, were evidently favoured as a form of patronage or because they were considered suitable for the interests of the party. The appointment in 2000 of Jackie Selebi, a long-time party activist and latterly diplomat, as National Commissioner of the South African Police Service proved to be an especially embarrassing and damaging case, not only because of his evident unfamiliarity with policing, but because he was compromised by criminal connections.
This was later compounded by internal conflicts within the ANC. These took on a particularly destabilising form in the contest between Thabo Mbeki and his sacked former deputy, Jacob Zuma, which culminated in Mbeki’s loss of the party presidency at the ANC’s Polokwane Conference in 2007, and the country’s presidency a few months later. It also spilled over into battles in the public service, as senior officials lined up behind their preferred contender, or hedged their bets, declining to take contentious decisions until they discerned which way the winds of state would blow. Zuma’s presidency would go on to infamy, associated with the moniker “State Capture”, though it bears acknowledging that he inherited the features of the system that would prove so damaging.
The PSA, then, had the effect of enabling extensive political influence in the running of the civil service, and indirectly in fueling the problems that pushed the state towards acute crisis.
Ivor Chipkin, one of South Africa’s foremost public administration analysts, sums this up: “The Public Service Act grants politicians wide discretion in operational decisions in state organs and in the recruitment of public servants. The situation is even worse at local level where the politicians are the administrators. Cadre deployment is possible because the law allows politicians to appoint officials.”
Phase two: the Zuma era
The rise of Jacob Zuma coincided with the debilitating global financial crisis. In many respects, the global turmoil served to underline South Africa’s dire circumstances. Governance had already been the subject of growing concern – even the ANC’s then secretary general, Kgalema Motlanthe, conceded in 2007 that corruption was “far worse than anyone imagines” and that “the rot is across the board” – but South Africa now turned to a fatally compromised politician to lead it.
It was also at this time that the accumulated weight of inadequate skilling and sundry other failings clearly manifested itself. In 2009, a report on the state of municipal governance painted a dire picture of the sphere of government most directly responsible for day-to-day, quality of life service provision. “From evidence to date,” the document stated in its introduction, “it is clear that much of local government is indeed in distress, and that this state of affairs has become deeply-rooted within our system of governance.”
The 2012 National Development Plan emphasised the need for a “capable and developmental state” to drive a growth and development agenda. The plan expressed concern about the politicisation of state institutions, a dearth of skills, organisational and leadership confusion, and deficient professionalism in the public service. Its extensive suite of recommendations included measures to insulate the public service from political interference – notably by enhancing the role and powers of the PSC – engaging in ongoing training and career development, ensuring clear understanding of the standards and outcomes expected of public servants, and developing more robust and accountable systems of delegation and oversight.
A few years later, in 2014, the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) published a review of the public service after 20 years of democracy. It argued that much had been achieved in “transforming” South Africa’s institutions but that that a major challenge it faced was “the lack of core skills needed for effective administration in the public service”.
The thrust of the document was in line with the NDP, pointing to problems such as deficiencies in the skills profile, the propensity of public servants to move from one position to another, poor coordination between different parts of the government, and the instability in governance systems that this engendered. The document echoes the NDP’s calls inter alia for dealing with political interference, for focusing on skills development, for better coordination across the public service, and for the cultivation of a professional ethos.
One former public servant interviewed for the review provided a picture of how these problems were experienced in practice. The picture painted was of a state of paralysis and avoidance of responsibility. Political preferencing was often played out within factions of the ANC. Many senior officials’ contracts were linked to the incumbency of political principals; risking the deprivation of their livelihoods by changes within the party. There was a strong aversion to attracting attention or risking the displeasure of influential politicians, and thus for officials to take responsibility for potentially contentious decisions.
Meanwhile, consequence management was weak. Lacking strong direction and goal orientation, poor productivity was tolerated. Corrupt and criminal interests had taken advantage of this to influence employment decisions and resource allocation: the phenomenon of “ghost workers” and the consequent payment of salaries for non-existent work being an egregious example that has dogged the public service since the 1990s. Where attempts were made to impose discipline, this was met with strong resistance from unions, often without due regard for the impact on the institutions and the services they provided. Human resource departments might collude in this by stalling the provision of necessary documents, while some employees learned to “game the system”, such as by seeking transfers or taking prolonged sick leave to avoid consequences.
By the latter part of the Zuma presidency, the problematic condition of the public service was essentially common cause. There was also general recognition of the nature of the problem. The latter had four broad expressions: An inadequate skills base across the board; weak management, poor coordination and problems with delegating authority; corruption; and political meddling in the operation of the public service.
Phase three: the Ramaphosa era
The post-Zuma era was heralded by the election of Cyril Ramaphosa – formerly Zuma’s deputy – to the presidency of the ANC in December 2017, and his elevation to the country’s presidency early the following year. His accession to power ignited a profoundly hopeful atmosphere, holding out the possibility of restoring the country’s institutions. A key part of this since 2018 has been directed at rebuilding state capacity, which went by the term “capable state”.
In policy terms, the creation of an efficient and effective public service has two key components: firstly, dealing with the outright pathology of corruption; and secondly, addressing the various structural impediments to the operation of the public service.
Efforts at combating corruption have followed much the same path (in theory) followed by previous administrations, albeit with the claim that this was being undertaken with greater sincerity.
The efficacy of these measures has been widely questioned. Indeed, the erosion of the capacity of law enforcement bodies over the preceding years has made this task a difficult one. It is therefore hard to see game-changing success if these efforts are not paired with substantive success in the second component, addressing the structural deficiencies in the public service.
Dealing with structural problems is arguably more complex. The report of the Zondo Commission is typically cited as a record of the corruption that pervades South Africa, but it pointed to something more serious: the suborning of South Africa’s institutions. Much of this has concerned the ability of political office bearers to influence appointments within the State.
This theme has been taken up by a number of experts and commentators in the public administration field. For example, a 2022 study by Ivor Chipkin, Michelle le Roux and Rafael Leite of the New South Institute – Personalising and De-personalising Power – drew attention to the phenomenon of structural politicisation. One important point was that the requirements for appointment to many senior state positions were inadequate; (the only requirement for appointment as Commissioner of Police, for example, was to have a clean criminal record).
Chipkin returned to this point in a later contribution (The Five Cs of the Contemporary Crisis of Government and how to Overcome Them, co-authored with Rafael Leite,) writing that the structural design of South Africa’s public administration “makes each and every public servant in South Africa a political appointment, potentially.” The report went on to note the disjuncture in the system, where the Public Finance Management Act conferred on senior civil servants extensive financial discretion – but given the powers their political principals held, they were constrained in what they were able to do. “In effect,” they write, “new managers’ hands are held behind their backs by politicians. This largely explains why after 1996 there have been so many conflicts between ministers and senior officials. The problem is that senior officials, irrespective of race, could not do their jobs unless their political superiors allowed them to. The likelihood of conflict was built into the very structure of government.”
Also In this context, the Democratic Alliance mounted a legal challenge to the ANC’s cadre deployment initiative. It sought to have the records of the cadre deployment committee made public, and a declaratory order made against the practice. It was successful on the first count (although, despite a court order, the records have not been made public, aside from what had previously been produced to the Zondo Commission), but at this writing had not succeeded on the second.
A growing consensus was therefore emerging that the public service was compromised, and that unwarranted political interference was a significant factor in bringing it to this point. This was both a function of the design of the system and of the manner in which it had been run.
Professionalisation
The role of political interference has dominated public discussion of public service reform, and for good reason. However, the government’s (formal) approach is rather more wide-ranging. The central element of its professionalisation initiative was in the publication of A National Framework towards the Professionalism of the Public Service.
The document sets out in detail proposals for reforming the public service. Among these was a wide-ranging revision of the legislation and associated regulations and directives germane to professionalism; tighter pre-entry and promotion requirements (including the expanded use of tests); compulsory participation in induction and reorientation programmes; a review of performance management systems and their reform; and ongoing development and training to ensure relevant skills and professional capabilities were available and updated as the administrative demands evolved.
The reformed system would foreground merit. The influence of politics on senior appointments would be reviewed, through the increased involvement of the PSC in appointments and fixed-term contracts – subject to performance reviews – for senior public servants. The goal of all this would be to build a public service able to take on the developmental functions that had been so much a part of the original state vision.
Four observations need to be made about this document. Firstly, it was a framework, making recommendations, but leaving actual policy design to various departments and bodies; secondly, the proposals are systemic in nature, and would depend on being implemented as a whole; thirdly, the success of the Framework places a lot of emphasis on changing the culture of the public service; fourthly, it is quite remarkable in that it mentions cadre deployment explicitly and critically (“cadre deployment practices must be reconsidered for merit-based recruitment and selection in the public sector”).
Part of the professionalisation agenda has been expressed in recent pieces of legislation: the Public Administration Management Amendment Bill (PAMA), and the Public Service Amendment (PSA) Bill.
Dealing with a number of technical issues, the PAMA Bill aims to harmonise operations across the various spheres of government, strengthen the prohibitions against civil servants doing business with the state, and coordinate collective bargaining across the sector.
The PSA Bill arguably stands to be more impactful. Among other things, it would vest administrative powers in department heads and clarify the role played by the President and provincial premiers in appointing and managing the “career incidents” of heads of departments. The responsibility for administration and appointments would move from the executive (or political) authority to the head of department, thus firmly rooting operational control in the administrative leadership, and senior civil servants would be barred from occupying political office. The crucial issue is that this bill should reduce the discretion of politicians to recruit staff and interfere in operational matters.
The Public Affairs Research Institute (PARI), a prominent think tank in the field of public policy and public administration, remarked that while it welcomed the passage of the PSA Bill, it felt that more was needed.
PARI’s view was that the key to the professionalisation drive was not to depoliticise administration, but rather to introduce appropriate “checks and balances” to ensure that it was not subject to corrupting political influences, though still ready to carry out a democratically determined mandate. For this reason, it had previously argued that the key to effective reform was to ensure that political influence was confined to certain parts of the process – largely to setting policy – while appointment, staffing and training should be undertaken by other actors. A strengthened, independent and non-partisan Public Service Commission would need to be at the centre of reform efforts and exercise oversight on the operation of a reformed public service – and to operate as a bulwark against undue political interference.
Where to from here?
So, what would a reformed public service look like, and how would this be achieved? Ivor Chipkin points out that the public service is a complex system. Any one intervention will likely depend on others for its success. This is accurate, and multiple sets of reforms will be needed.
The first seeks to address the political and policy-related roots of the current problems. This concerns (i) depoliticising and reforming the public service and (ii) reassessing the role of unions. The second relates to operational control. In this sphere, the concerns are (iii) leadership and management and (iv) establishing and maintaining organisational discipline. The third relates to enhancing the capacity of the public service to play a value-adding and developmental role in society. This concerns (v) recruitment, (vi) capacitation and (vii) the judicious application of technology.
Depoliticisation and reform
The deliberate politicisation of the civil service through cadre deployment and the outsized structural role conferred on politicians in the appointment of staff both need to be dealt with decisively.
The suggestion that cadre deployment is an uncontentious practice, perhaps only poorly applied, must be rejected. As the Zondo Commission report stated, it has no justification in the Constitution or in law. The practice must be unambiguously discarded.
But even if cadre deployment were to be abandoned, this would not necessarily be the end of the matter. Dismantling the structured process by which the ANC seeks to exert influence might simply be replaced by a more informal system by which pressure is applied by individual power brokers.
More fundamentally, depoliticisation requires thorough reform of the public service, removing the avenues that have enabled undue political influence. The key will be fully to restore the Public Service Commission to its role as fulcrum of the public service, and of the careers of public servants. An absolute separation of the latter from political influences is neither possible nor desirable – since in a democracy, it is the prerogative of the incumbent government to have its policies carried out. However, it is critical to guard against the preferencing or prejudicing of public servants based on their political allegiances, and also to ensure that their first-order priorities are always aligned with the fulfilment of their duties.
Thus, the model proposed is for the PSC to create a buffer of sorts between the political authorities and the professionals who staff the institutions. Ultimately, it would sign off on staff policy, and would hawkishly protect a meritocratic ethos (which would need to be developed) from political or any other intrusion. Where senior appointments might justify some political input, as in the case of Directors General, these would be appointed from a shortlist compiled by the PSC, following an appropriate interview, selection and vetting process. The resulting relationship would be one of cooperation between the political and administrative principals, rather than that of superiors and subordinates.
The role of the unions
The ANC has a long-standing alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions, which is well organised and has been critical in marshalling support for the ANC at elections. Cosatu has been able to exert formidable influence on labour legislation and on government’s approach to the public sector workforce.
Public sector wage increases reflect the perceived political hazards to the ANC of not adequately acceding to strident demands.
For ordinary South Africans, the sense that public servants are generously remunerated is a source of frustration and cynicism. The public sector unions bear a share of the blame for this. It is not their responsibility to manage workforces, and they should not be able to veto policy decisions and protect shoddy performance.
Addressing this requires a multi-faceted approach that takes into account the interests of the unions. Consultation between managers and union representatives is important, especially when measures that adversely affect their members are under consideration. But while trade unions must be consulted properly, their interests should not be the primary consideration for management’s decisions, nor indeed the only conduit through which management communicates with employees. Communication is always management’s right and obligation. Unions represent their members and can communicate what and how they choose; but they aren’t the employer, who always retains the right to communicate with employees, whether they are union members or not.
Above all, union officials at lower levels should not usurp the functions or prerogatives of management from lower-level managers, and junior managers should be able to rely on the support of their superiors in resisting any attempts to do so.
Much of the power that unions (particularly Cosatu) hold derives from their strategic political standing. This has created a devastating conflict of interest, and it is imperative that this relationship is fundamentally reconstituted. Managers attempting to manage and to impose consequences need not only to be supported by the institutional resources (such as human resource departments), but also by the political leadership. Unless political leaders are willing to support public service reform and to back managers attempting to implement it, it is doubtful that the required reforms can be successfully carried out.
It is imperative that unions need to “up their game”. The reality is that whatever privileged party-to-union relationship has existed will (and should produce) diminishing returns. Unions in a more competitive environment will need to rely on the transactional nature of the employer-employee relationship. They will have to make their appeals based on the value they can add to the functioning of the public service and to the provision of services to the country as a whole. This will demand a better quality of union thinking and action, which, if achieved, stands to benefit of the country as a whole.
Good leadership and management
While policy and politics are important, the key ingredient for success is good leadership and professional management. It is the experience, commitment and hard work of managers and leaders in the public service that will create the efficiencies that are crucial to successful change. This is a process that may take significant time to show positive results.
A former leader in a municipal council (an elected representative who took on an executive position) approached for this study described his experiences in managing the transition from control by one party to another.
Initially employees were generally apathetic and sceptical. They had become accustomed to operating without much certainty as to what they were supposed to do. However, in his experience most people tended to be pragmatic rather than ideological. But the majority saw little value in undermining the new administration.
The key to achieving a positive response from employees was to act decisively and be prepared to take tough decisions, and then be prepared to take responsibility for the outcomes of those decisions. The broader lesson is that political leadership needs to be willing to be held accountable for its policy choices and the leadership it provides; in so doing, it provides the administrative leadership with an implicit bargain where the latter must agree faithfully to carry out that policy.
According to the IRR’s interlocutor, for political leaders, being cordial with employees was very important. Meeting with them directly and exercising oversight by “doing the rounds” regularly was a powerful statement of commitment. Confrontation should be, he said, avoided as much as possible (though avoidance was not always possible) and rewarding excellence was crucial. The tolerance of mediocrity has, after all, been a significant part of the downfall of South African public service.
Thus, very strict but fair performance criteria must be implemented, and employees held responsible for their performance. Poorly performing employees need to be worked out over time with careful recourse to proper disciplinary procedures.
Conversely, if an incumbent is competent and trustworthy, management must make sure to support the employee, particularly if their loyalty to the public institution transcends their party loyalty. If such a competent person wants to resign, it may well be worth trying to persuade the employee to stay.
Skills in the South African environment are at a premium, as are the intangibles of work performance, such as work ethic and an imaginative approach to problem solving. The loss of institutional memory is deeply damaging to the effectiveness of organisations. Workflows and outputs depend on systems and processes that take time to learn and understand, even regarding things as pedestrian as keeping the minutes of meetings, or accounting for resources. Qualifications without relevant experience are often insufficient. For all these reasons, it is worth making an effort to hold on to good employees.
Organisational discipline
Key to all of this is dealing with failings in staff discipline. Managers need to be fully conversant with how disciplinary processes function, and to process matters quickly and thoroughly, so that employees understand that misbehaviour and incompetence will have consequences.
Structurally, getting the discipline function right demands that weak and uncooperative human resource departments be reformed. Since they are crucial to instituting consequence management, it is imperative that they operate efficiently. A reformed PSC should prioritise this and ensure that stiff consequences follow when HR officials obstruct these processes.
Note, however, that human resources departments must not manage staff on behalf of managers; they must act as a resource to assist management only.
Discipline requires a culture of responsibility among managers. A crucial rule is that discipline must be conducted by the manager directly responsible for the employee. First, it is a responsibility the manager must exercise as a necessary part of all his or her managerial responsibilities. Second, it is crucial to reinforcing the authority of the manager, both with the disciplined employee and with regard to what other employees can expect if they breach their compact with the employer.
A point that is often overlooked or misunderstood by managers is that disciplinary processes are not dependent upon the conclusion of any parallel criminal proceedings. The two processes have nothing to do with one another. A criminal charge for theft laid against an employee becomes a matter for the state’s legal processes to decide whether to carry through, or not, to a possible conviction. While the employer may lay the charge, after that the process is not the employer’s to manage.
The disciplinary process is both the employer’s right and duty to commence and carry through. The criminal outcome is irrelevant to the in-house proceedings. The latter concern the enterprise, are usually completed very much faster, and for the charge to be proven the employer only has to prove the employee’s guilt on the “balance of probabilities”.
Too often an excessive suspension period is justified by claiming that the outcome of the criminal case must be awaited before a disciplinary hearing can be commenced. Not only are the two processes unrelated, but the onus on the prosecution to prove the commission of the crime is much greater than that of the employer, namely, “beyond any reasonable doubt”.
So, while a crime may not be proven on that strict onus in a court, it may be proven on a balance of probabilities by the employer, which would entitle the employer to dismiss the employee irrespective of what is happening in the criminal proceedings.
Even if the employee is later found not guilty in the criminal proceedings or the case is dismissed on a technicality, the employer is under no obligation to reinstate the employee. If the employer’s onus was met, the dismissal stands.
Given the very likely possibility that a criminal charge may not even get to court, or the process may be hugely protracted, the real punishment for misconduct or poor performance will lie in the loss of a job. A possible criminal conviction is too remote, and from the employer’s point of view it should be irrelevant to deciding the question of the employee’s continued employment.
Recruitment
Official plans have called for making the public service an attractive and preferred career. For many incumbents, it has been a safe and protected one. One aspect to changing this lies in a new system of recruitment.
The key concept here is meritocracy. If in the 1990s, this was a concept to be rejected. It is now a concept that is imperative to reviving the public service. A meritocratic public service would be an organisation whose members command respect from society and evince respect for themselves and the institutions they operate. It is one in which its tasks are carried out efficiently and to the benefit of society as a whole. If employment in the public service is to come with special prestige, the bar to entry must visibly be a high one.
To do this, new recruits should undergo an entry exam appropriate to the position they hope to occupy. This would evaluate such skills as comprehension and problem solving, as well as (where necessary) professionally relevant content, such as knowledge of planning or the law. Sitting and passing this exam would not guarantee employment but would make one eligible to enter the public service, subject to the availability of a position, performance in interviews, verification of other qualifications and so on.
The goal would be to ensure that new entrants are highly competent, highly motivated and proud to have distinguished themselves merely in the process of appointment. It would also signal that a demanding and performance-oriented culture is being established; in time, the hope is that this would become the overall expectation of all public servants.
Capacitation
Organisational effectiveness rests on the individual capabilities of each member to fulfil his or her tasks, and of the ability of the leadership to ensure a cumulative, integrated outcome of all these efforts that achieves the purpose for which the organisation was established. Organisations must manage the inherent tension between requiring staff to follow leaders and respect chains of authority, while giving them enough freedom to deploy their skills and show value-adding initiative.
An effective system would optimise and balance these demands.
A particularly important matter here is the building of a suitable skills base. Skills deficiencies are universally recognised as a significant burden on the public service. Intuitively, the response would be to contract skills (through consultants or through outsourcing functions) or to introduce training programmes. Both can play a positive role, provided they are properly integrated into the work of the public service and not seen as an escape from responsibility.
Capacitation, meanwhile, is a process that needs to be managed with great care and deliberation. It needs to proceed from an understanding that skills and their application are as much the outcome of exposure to effective practice as of formal instruction. This makes the retention of valuable institutional memory important because on-the-job learning depends on the presence of experienced and capable colleagues.
It is also imperative that employment and progression be based squarely on merit. Although academic qualifications matter (and are required for certain positions), the suitability of candidates for their positions must be the determining factor in their appointment or promotion. For this reason, an entrance exam could be used to vet new recruits as to their aptitudes. For career progression, relevant, well-thought-out development programmes can be provided and used as a metric. These may be academic or practical; one public servant mentioned the importance of accurately recording the proceedings of meetings as a skill that is often absent.
Technology
The ongoing use of technology could be a valuable and practical tool for achieving the reforms set out above. To some extent, it already has: the use of verification technology has successfully identified “ghost workers”. This should be encouraged. The full digitisation of staff records, for example, would be a valuable resource for disciplinary purposes.
However, technology is ultimately no more than a tool, and its successful application is only possible to the extent that public servants are able to use it. A report published by the University of California cautioned:
Technology presents the greatest risk when it’s simply layered on top of already overwhelmed workers and processes, because there is no capacity built in for evaluation and recalibration to ensure that the technology is working as intended. Within the public sector there is enormous variation in size, resource capacity, mission, and political and social context, all of which affect whether and how technology is implemented.
The message is that technological solutions can contribute to dealing with the structural problems afflicting the public service but are not a complete solution. Unless accompanied by strengthened management and properly capacitated staff, they can exacerbate existing problems.
And so…
The public service as it stands is unfit for purpose. This is the case whether fitness is defined in a small-government sense or in the expansive developmental sense that successive administrations have nominally aspired to. This analysis concludes that the public service is urgently in need of thorough reform, principally – though not exclusively – to resolve the contradiction between the currently existing system of effective political control and the need for professionalism and management autonomy. It is plain that the matter needs to be resolved decisively in favour of the latter.