This year has been one of the electoral contentious years in history.

There was an unprecedented number of elections, with incumbents either being voted out or at least getting a bloody nose from voters.

According to the Financial Times, every developed country which held an election this year saw the incumbents lose vote share or get voted out completely: the first time this has happened since this phenomenon has been tracked. It was a pattern that held from Japan to Europe to the United States.

In addition, it was not only developed countries where this occurred. Incumbents got bloody noses in the developing world too, from South Africa to India to Botswana to Senegal. 

Of course, the conditions in various countries differ greatly, and no single cause can be identified for this anti-incumbency move, but political scientists and economists believe the spike in global inflation in the aftermath of the Covid pandemic played a role. In many African countries elections were seen as “jobs elections,” with unemployment a serious problem in many countries on the continent.

Differing results

There were three elections held in Southern Africa, with differing results in all three. Here in South Africa the ANC lost its majority, which it accepted with good grace, and soon formed a coalition government (with some of its ideological rivals) to stay in power. In Botswana, things went even worse for the governing Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which received a shellacking, losing its majority and winning only four of the 61-elected seats in the country’s Parliament. Here too, the governing party reacted with good grace, with outgoing President, Mokgweetsi Masisi, accepting the result and pledging support for his successor, Duma Boko.

It was a different story in Mozambique. Here the governing Frelimo won an easy victory, with its presidential candidate managing over 70% of the vote. In the parallel parliamentary elections it won nearly 80% of the seats. However, opposition parties cried foul, with a number of local and international organisations also claiming that there had been rigging and intimidation, and opposition parties saying in parallel counts that it was clear Frelimo had not won. Security forces have also cracked down on protestors, with a number of people killed. At the end of last week Human Rights Watch said that at least 30 people had been killed in unrest.  South Africa closed its Lebombo border post with Mozambique for a few days.

It seems that unlike South Africa and Botswana, Mozambique will not see the power of its long-standing governing party broken, with all that this means for the country’s economy and prospects.

But there is another country in the region which goes to the polls this year, with Namibia scheduled to hold an election at the end of the month.

Which way?

But which way will Namibia go, once the votes are counted? 

Like the other countries, it has had a governing party – Swapo – which has been in power for decades. And like South Africa, Botswana, and Mozambique, it faces similar problems, such as high levels of poverty and unemployment (especially youth unemployment), with a growing number of voters who are too young to remember the independence struggle.

Swapo is likely to face a similar fate as that suffered by the ANC and the BDP. It lost significant support in the last election held in 2019, also losing significant support in local elections – held in 2020. This trend is likely to continue. In addition, a candidate not from Swapo could be elected President and Swapo could also lose its majority in the country’s parliament even if it still wins the presidency: both situations unprecedented in post-independence Namibian politics.

While Swapo is almost certain to lose support in the election, what will happen if it sinks to below 50%, as the ANC did, or if another party manages a majority, as happened in Botswana? Will it follow the example set by Pretoria and Gaborone or will it follow the Frelimo blueprint, which was long ago perfected in Harare?

As it stands, Swapo is likely to follow the path of its immediate neighbours, rather than that of Mozambique. Since independence, Namibia has held free-and-fair elections, with intimidation of opposition parties rare. Open political contestation has been a feature of electoral politics in Namibia, with election results accepted by all. Namibian institutions have also been robust.

No tradition

There is also no tradition of involvement in politics from the military or the security forces in general, with these entities sticking to their defined and accepted roles in Namibia since independence.

At the same time, Namibians who have worked with senior people in Swapo say that, as a rule, senior officials in the party are decent people who are unlikely to want to sully their legacy or reputation by tarnishing Namibia’s post-independence democratic credentials. 

Finally, the example of how the BDP and the ANC accepted their losses is likely to be of more influence over Swapo than the behaviour of Frelimo.

And it cannot be overstated how important it will be for the region if the majority of elections held in Southern Africa are peaceful, and results not contested by long-standing governing parties. As Mmusi Maimane, former leader of the DA and now leader of BOSA said this week, writing in News24: “Democracy brings a dividend of peace, stability, and global market confidence, which leads to investment and economic growth.”

If Swapo gets a bloody nose in elections at the end of the month, or is even voted out completely, it must do what’s best for the country and accept the results. When parties refuse to accept the democratic will of the people, they hasten their path to the scrapheap of history, as Frelimo is doing. But on the balance of probabilities, Swapo is likely to do the right thing, and accept the democratic will of the Namibian people.

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Marius Roodt is currently deputy editor of the Daily Friend and also consults on IRR campaigns. This is his second stint at the Institute, having returned after spells working at the Centre for Development and Enterprise and a Johannesburg-based management consultancy. He has also previously worked as a journalist, an analyst for a number of foreign governments, and spent most of 2005 and 2006 driving a scooter around London. Roodt holds an honours degree from the Rand Afrikaans University (now the University of Johannesburg) and an MA in Political Studies from the University of the Witwatersrand.