In the face of widespread doubts about the credibility of the Mozambique election held last October, which was followed by three months of violent protest, President Daniel Chapo will be sworn in next week.
The country’s main opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane, who fled the country after two aides were shot dead, plans to return home tomorrow from exile. He has promised more protests until there is “electoral truth.”
With little prospect of a deal between the opposition and the governing Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo), the country seems headed into a new cycle of post-election violence and seems more likely to become a failed state.
About 270 people have been killed since the election, but even the shooting of demonstrators by police has not stopped people coming onto the streets. Mozambique has an unusually young population, and many are full of frustration and anger at their predicament under Frelimo, and they are likely to continue to take to the streets.
Foreign policy headache
Mozambique will be South Africa’s big foreign policy headache this year. Our sizable economic and security interests are seriously at stake in Mozambique. But it is unlikely that Pretoria and the region are prepared to abandon their liberation-era ally, Frelimo. This might be required to bring about stability and protect our interests.
The source of much of South Africa’s and the region’s diplomatic bind on Mozambique is that they speedily gave the thumbs-up to the election. The election observer missions from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union said the elections were well run and South Africa automatically endorsed that. After all, these are African institutions and ones that Pretoria feels it should support, no matter what.
By contrast, the European Union election observer mission said the count was flawed. Instead of looking into that, Pretoria stuck to its position.
Mozambique elections have been flawed in the past, but the latest has set off massive public violence reflecting deep dissatisfaction and mistrust of Frelimo. Perfect foresight is not possible, but much was known about the basic conditions in which the polls were taking place. SADC might have better anticipated what would happen and warned the Mozambican government of the consequences. These might have been reinforced with warnings that the region would not, as in the past, favour Frelimo.
Sanctions
It would be almost impossible for South Africa to use sanctions, as our economies are so dependent on each other, but pressure on Mozambique’s donors could be used. And diplomatic isolation alone could have an impact in changing Frelimo’s mind.
Realising the seriousness of the situation, South Africa and SADC are now rushing to find a solution. After the election, the SADC Chair, Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa, told Mozambicans to just accept the outcome. SADC now realises that the result will not be sufficiently accepted to give Frelimo a veneer of legitimacy. A SADC Panel of Elders appointed to deal with the crisis has now, instead of acceptance, called for talks between the opposition and Frelimo.
If the election had been free and fair, as SADC previously said, why is there now a need for talks on the outcome?
President Cyril Ramaphosa has been rushing officials off to Maputo to try to find a solution. Last week he sent the former safety and security minister, Sydney Mufamadi, and the week before Ronald Lamola, minister of international relations and co-operation. Both have called for dialogue, but almost three months after the election we have seen no plan to deal with the crisis.
Gulf
There is a gulf between our failure to protect our interests and our favouring Frelimo and being reluctant to take on a leadership role in the crisis. South Africa’s default position in regional crises is to do what it can to protect the incumbent neighbouring government. It does not take on a leadership role. That means delay and indecision.
There are options in SADC attempts to broker a deal. One is certainly a rerun of the election. Frelimo might scream in protest, but a tightly supervised and internationally managed rerun of the poll to ensure legitimacy could be the best option. Another is the formation of a government of national unity, but doing this based on disputed results is probably not a good deal for the opposition.
SADC should at least be telling Frelimo not to go ahead with the swearing-in of the new President, if it wants talks with the opposition.
Big South African interests are at stake here. We get most of our gas from Mozambique, we rely on the country’s ports, and South African companies are involved in almost all sectors of the economy.
Since the election, Sasol has cut back on gas production in Mozambique. In November the South African ports, terminals and logistics company, Grindrod, suspended its operations in Maputo and Matola. South Africa’s border posts with Mozambique have been intermittently closed, and the economy is grinding down.
Desperate to flee
And meanwhile, the numbers desperate to flee to SA and the region grow. With immigration a hot-button issue in South Africa and elsewhere, that could cause severe political headaches and anti-immigrant protests throughout the region.
In the aftermath of the flawed election, there are many desperate scenarios for the country. There is the possibility that extremist groups will gain support, and foreign actors could take on a larger role. There is also the chance that the Frelimo government will not be able to hold on to power without foreign support.
Rwandan forces are already helping Frelimo maintain control in Maputo, but even they could be stretched if the insurgency in Cabo Delgado province were to flare up again.
The massive breakouts from prisons last month have raised alarm bells about a breakdown in law and order, and more generally of the government.
Wait and see
At this stage, we will have to wait to see what happens with any SADC initiative. It might be a long wait, but the new Trump administration and Mozambique’s other donors might get impatient. After all, donors who are financing the fight against an Islamic insurgency in Cabo Delgado want to be sure that the money is going to a responsible government.
The ANC’s partners in the Government of National Unity have no leverage over key foreign policy decisions. They can push in public, but they have deliberately been kept well away from the ANC turf of foreign policy.
The past three months have shown the sheer ineffectiveness of our foreign policy in the region. We don’t use our regional power to good effect and do not respond with speed to crises and ensure the protection of our interests.
On the Middle East, we are bold and decisive, and uphold what Pretoria thinks is the moral high ground. Our stance on Mozambique and Zimbabwe, over the years, has pretty much shown that we are more committed to dealing with the easy targets, where we can grandstand.
The views of the writer are not necessarily the views of the Daily Friend or the IRR.
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