The two pillars of South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy have crumbled; we do not have the resources and capabilities to undertake large-scale peacekeeping missions across the continent, and, due to our foreign and domestic stance, the US now sees us as essentially hostile.
In the space of a few weeks, the Trump cyclone has hit. However ham-fisted Trump’s statement about expropriations taking place in SA and his aid freeze might be, it is a sign the US will not give us the special treatment of the Mandela era. And much of Europe is tired of our pro-Moscow stance. They view the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an existential issue. And while some European right-wingers might wish to appease Russian President Vladimir Putin, they could still follow a Trump line on South Africa.
We are no longer important enough symbolically or in raw power terms to be given the benefit of the doubt on our leaning towards Russia, China and Iran.
The deaths of 14 of our troops in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) will ultimately lead to a substantial further cut in our contribution to peacekeeping across the continent. We simply cannot afford the large outlays required for these sorts of missions, even if they are subsidised by donor funding. Since 1994, SA has been involved in nine missions, and it is presently involved in three: Mozambique and two in the DRC.
The death of 14 of our troops in late January in the Eastern DRC follows that of seven in the Eastern DRC last year. In 2013, ten SA National Defence Force troops were killed in Bangui, the Central African Republic, on a mission that was never fully justified to the public.
The big takeaway from the disaster in the Eastern DRC is that SA, Malawi, and Tanzania did not have the sort of overwhelming force that could repel a large attack. M23 and its Rwandan backers took advantage of that weakness.
No air cover
Our troops had no air cover, as Rooivalk helicopters had been withdrawn. Most of our Gripen fighters are no longer operational. As we lacked the capability to control the air, we could not rapidly re-supply the surrounded SA base. Another problem was that lack of maintenance meant we had minimal airlift capability.
When histories are written about this miserable episode, the humiliation is likely to be attributed to lack of budgeting, poor maintenance, indecision, and poor planning.
International Relations and Co-operation Minister Ronald Lamola has said an abrupt withdrawal from the DRC would be worse than a surrender. The tragedy is that the South African contingent in the Eastern DRC has already been captured by M23. It cannot be reinforced. Extricating our force awaits a ceasefire deal that a joint summit between Southern and East African leaders pushed for over the weekend.
This will have to lead to a complete re-think of our current over-stretched defence posture.
Due to our low growth rate, the economy does not generate the sort of tax revenue required to sustain a defence budget at effective enough levels for us to be a regional power. South African defence spending in 2023 was under 0.75 percent of GDP: well below the two percent benchmark that is considered reasonable.
Asserting that these missions are all about bolstering African stability and helping countries that supported the struggle will not wear with a domestic audience. The ANC has sought to justify the DRC mission in the most general terms. Why is there a strategic imperative to support the DRC against M23 and Rwanda?
What is our real interest here?
Mining rights
The DA’s shadow international relations minister has claimed, albeit without proof, that the mission in the DRC is about protecting mining rights for the ANC elite. That suspicion could turn into a serious electoral liability for the ANC.
The ANC does not seem to have absorbed the wider message of the Trump statement. Perhaps that’s due to opposition political parties, many civil society bodies, much of the press and business adopting the fawning stance that the Expropriation Act is just not properly understood.
To counter the Trump onslaught and “misunderstanding”, President Cyril Ramaphosa will be sending envoys around the world. What will they say when they are in Washington and in European capitals?
And what do Ramaphosa’s envoys say to the Trump State Department about SA’s withdrawal of the Ambassador to Israel, and our attempt to have Israel found guilty of genocide?
It is not clear what “misunderstandings” SA wants to clear up. The Expropriation Act allows expropriation without compensation, which is property seizure. Russia, China and Iran are good friends.
Is SA now prepared to go a lot easier on the issues irritating the US? In his State of the Nation Address, Ramaphosa clearly said, “We will not be bullied.”
That could mean that Ramaphosa might be prepared, albeit at a very high price, to keep up its anti-US posture, find alternatives and ride out the four years of a Trump administration. The risk is that worsening relations with the US will mean a capital market squeeze on SA. While little of our debt is dollar-denominated, foreigners are large holders of our government debt, and a global capital market squeeze would hurt in many ways. Our financial grey-listing due to lax controls on criminal and terrorist financing would remain in place and act as a deterrent with regard to investment.
Without the US
The US has now said that Pepfar, the HIV/AIDS relief funding programme will be restored, but not the rest of the aid programme, leaving a slight gap in the government budget. Another cost to SA will be the absence of US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, from the G20 meetings. A G20 meeting without the US will lack the value and cachet it might otherwise have.
Stonewalling could push us into the Russia, China, Iran sphere, and that could result in an extreme risk of western sanctions.
The expanded Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) grouping does not really have any gravitational force as a world power grouping. It brings together many countries with widely differing interests. While Russia, China and Iran are keen to elevate the grouping, India is a lot more wary, as it has good relations with the US.
What has forcefully emerged from the events in the DRC and the Trump tornado is that we now have little international leverage left. It is time for a massive rethink. We should focus foreign policy on African issues which directly affect us, rather than bother with grandstanding on the Middle East or the war in Ukraine. And our defence should focus heavily on threats that are far closer to home.
There are times when we will have to militarily intervene in neighbouring countries. That underscores the need for us to have a vibrant economy to sustain an effective defence force.
More immediately, the ANC faces the conundrum of how it can improve relations with the US without it looking as though we are being bullied.
The views of the writer are not necessarily the views of the Daily Friend or the IRR.
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