Section 88(2) of the Constitution provides that no person may hold office as President for more than two terms. But in the three decades since South Africa’s democratic dawn, barring Nelson Mandela, no ANC leader has managed to complete their final term in office. Whether eased out, recalled, or resigned under pressure, each has left the Union Buildings earlier than planned, part of a political rhythm that has quietly become South African political tradition.

Mandela, in an act of foresight and humility, served a single term and retired, ceding the mantle of leadership with grace rare in liberation-era politics. He set a standard not only for postcolonial Africa but for the world (Some world leaders could take note regarding how not to flirt with unconstitutional term-limit extensions).

Thabo Mbeki was recalled before finishing his second term, undone by the internal ANC wars that birthed the Zuma era. Jacob Zuma himself, scandal-soaked and faction-riddled, and at the height of state capture seemingly untouchable, was forced to resign in 2018 ahead of a no-confidence motion.

Kgalema Motlanthe was, famously, a placeholder for two months and essentially there for the signing into law the establishment of the South African National Space Agency and two bills which disbanded the Scorpions: the elite anti-corruption unit of the National Prosecuting Authority. A brief but oddly consequential presidential stint.

And now, with the ink barely dry on the start of Cyril Ramaphosa’s second term, we find ourselves peering into a familiar pattern, but this time with unfamiliar implications.

For the first time since 1994, the president of South Africa governs not with a parliamentary majority, but at the mercy of a fragile coalition. The Government of National Unity (GNU), hastily conceived after the ANC fell below 50% in the 2024 elections, was meant to represent a pragmatic convergence of interests. Instead, it increasingly resembles a patchwork quilt of conflicting ideologies and simmering distrust.

The President Unmoored                                                                                              

What makes Ramaphosa’s position more precarious than those of his predecessors is that his continued presidency is no longer determined solely by the ANC’s internal conference or caucus. In a fractured legislature where the DA, IFP, ActionSA, and others now hold real leverage, the presidency has become less of a party inheritance and more of a shared decision.

It is this shift from ANC majoritarian dominance to coalition compromise that has introduced a new kind of uncertainty within the presidency. The President is now answerable to a broader political congregation, many of whom neither like nor trust him. And the VAT debacle has been more than just a fiscal skirmish; it is increasingly playing out as a proxy war for power and ideology, not only between those parties opposing the VAT increase and those proposing it, but internally within the ANC as well. The President’s tenure is not as secure as it has historically been.

Recent polling suggests that removing Cyril Ramaphosa as leader of the ANC could unravel the ANC’s already frayed electoral prospects. According to new data from the Social Research Foundation, the party’s national support would plummet to just 22% if Ramaphosa were ousted, placing it behind the Democratic Alliance, which would climb to 28%. In such a scenario, the ANC would no longer be the country’s largest party: an unprecedented reversal in the post-apartheid era.

The poll, based on a turnout model of 58%, also shows a rise in support for Zuma’s MK party to 15%, while the EFF would hold steady at 9%. Interestingly, the IFP, currently a coalition partner, would see its support dip to just 2%, suggesting that Ramaphosa’s presence stabilises more than just his own party.

Lessons from the Past and Elsewhere

South Africa’s revolving presidential door is unusual but not unique. Italy has had five prime ministers in the last ten years. Japan has had thirty different prime ministers since the adoption of its postwar constitution in 1947. That’s roughly one every two and a half years

The ANC’s inner drama, often styled as factional, has more to do with personality and patronage. But now, with the GNU in place, the dynamics are bigger than one party. The presidency is, for the first time, a composite reflection of coalition arithmetic. That means the exit of a president is no longer just a matter of what Luthuli House wants, but a matter of what Parliament will decide.

To be clear, this is not my prediction or a premature obituary for Ramaphosa’s presidency. The man is not without cunning, and he has survived before, through Marikana, through Phala Phala, through ANC factional fights. But the pattern is unmistakable.

When a president can’t count on his own finance bill passing without opposition support, when coalition partners takes firm stances against anti-poor budget proposals, when murmurs of succession planning continue barely a year into a term (they’ve been there since the start of Ramaphosa’s first term to be honest), then this tradition of not finishing presidential terms once again become significant.

Should Ramaphosa exit early, whether by resignation, recall, or negotiated retirement, it will mark not just the continuation of a pattern, but a mutation of it. For the first time, a South African president may be forced out, not only by internal ANC dynamics, but maybe also by coalition partners.

Changing politics

Whether Cyril Ramaphosa completes his term or becomes the next name on South Africa’s growing list of prematurely departed presidents, the real story may lie in the changing politics in South Africa. For the first time since 1994, the presidency is not simply a function of ANC confidence, but of coalition consent. This subtle recalibration may prove more consequential than any single leader’s fate.

With the 2027 local government elections on the horizon, parties are already recalibrating their strategies. These elections will serve not only as a test of coalition resilience on the national and provincial levels, but also as a referendum on who the public sees as credible stewards of economic and social recovery.

For most parties, it’s a springboard and for the ANC, it may be a reckoning. But more than personalities or polling, it is the emerging precedent of shared governance, messy as it may be, that will shape our politics in years to come.

The views of the writer are not necessarily the views of the Daily Friend or the IRR.

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contributor

Daniël Eloff is a believer, husband, father, attorney and writer.