South Africa’s ruling party finds itself trapped in a tightening vice. Pressures are mounting from three directions: from outside the country, domestically, and from within the party itself.
What links these challenges is not just their severity, but the ANC’s inability to respond to them in a coherent, constructive way. A party once celebrated for its strategic discipline now seems paralysed, unsure of where to turn. Yet it must find a response to the pressure if it is to survive.
Pressure from abroad
The international front is led most clearly by the United States. South Africa depends heavily on trade with the US: over 600 American firms operate locally, and the US is one of South Africa’s largest export destinations. It is also the source of major trade concessions under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
In a Social Research Foundation poll conducted in September 2024, the United States was by some margin the most popular country South Africans would consider living, working, and raising their children in, preferred by 26% of respondents over the UK (18%), Germany (14%), Cuba (11%), China (8%), and Russia (3%). But while ordinary people look favourably upon the US, the ANC has often been hostile towards the US, and relations have recently soured at the ANC-led governmental level.
The Trump administration has voiced growing disquiet over several South African policy positions, notably the government’s obsession with race-based legislation, its threats to property rights through laws like the Expropriation Act, and its hostile foreign policy alignment with authoritarian regimes. President Trump’s provocative step of offering refuge to “persecuted Afrikaners” has embarrassed the South African government, and Pretoria’s outright denial of any grievances will do little to mend fences. There is a real risk that South Africa’s standing as a reliable trade partner could be downgraded – with serious consequences for jobs and growth.
Additional dangers lurk in the future. There are mutterings about US economic sanctions on individuals, including high-ranking members of the ANC, which would complicate the international travel and financial arrangements of those targeted. US sanctions on South African bonds – or even giving such a measure public consideration – would spike yields and place a government dependent on borrowed money in a very difficult financial position. For a country with an inordinately low fixed investment rate of 15% of GDP (where the world average is 26%), losing access to the US as one of the most important sources of funds for such investment would be an own goal of note.
The ANC, as the leading partner in the GNU coalition and as a party reserving sole responsibility for foreign policy, is under pressure to formulate a response to this pressure. But to date its efforts have not been successful, as the US has responded disdainfully to its maladroit overtures. It is doubtful that President Ramaphosa will be able to persuade President Trump that he is wrong on South Africa when the two leaders meet later this month.
Pressure from within the country
The second source of pressure is domestic. The ANC’s support collapsed in the 2024 elections, plunging from 57% in 2019 to just 40%. The loss of its majority was not a statistical quirk. It was a rejection, reflecting that voters increasingly aren’t buying what the ANC is selling. And the trend continues: recent polling shows the party losing even more ground, with the most recent IRR polling placing support for the Democratic Alliance (30.3%) ahead of that for the ANC (29.7%) for the first time.
Civil society is more assertive than ever. Organisations like the Institute of Race Relations (IRR), Sakeliga, and others are challenging the ANC’s core policies, especially its racially discriminatory laws and pro-poverty interventions. At the same time, public sentiment is shifting: more South Africans want pro-growth policies that expand opportunity for everyone, not those that divide the country into rigid racial categories.
Instead of racial bean counting and grievance politics, voters want growth, jobs, and competent government.
In IRR polling, 77.8% of respondents said the government should focus more on job creation, versus 19.9% who preferred a focus on social grants. Some 81.7% of respondents wanted the government to place public procurement on a value-for-money basis, while just 16.6% preferred the current system of overspending for transformation. Some 75.8% agreed that “all this talk of racism and colonialism is by politicians who are trying to find excuses for their own failures”, while 20.7% disagreed. And 84.0% thought people should be appointed to jobs on merit, while 15.1% thought “only black people should be appointed” until representivity was achieved or “for a very long time ahead”. The proportion that thought South African sports teams should be selected only on merit and ability and not on racial qualities was 91.7%, with just 6.6% disagreeing.
The ANC is finding itself out of step with public sentiment, to its electoral detriment. In addition, its policies act as a tax on growth, preventing a free-market-led recovery that would promote upward socio-economic mobility. This is adding more pressure on the party to change; the longer its intransigence persists, the graver the consequences it will suffer.
Pressure from within the party
The third squeeze is internal. The ANC is struggling to fund itself. Its leadership is divided over how to deal with the Democratic Alliance’s participation in the Government of National Unity. The fight for control ahead of the 2027 elective conference has already begun. Key policy questions, such as whether to raise taxes or how to engage with the United States, expose a deeper incoherence at the top. The party is no longer aligned behind a clear direction.
This is not a short-term crisis. It is a symptom of organisational drift. The ANC lacks a vision for South Africa’s future that can unite its members and appeal to voters. In the absence of that vision, it has defaulted to familiar positions: race-based laws, state intervention, and rhetorical attacks on critics. These offer short-term comfort but long-term damage. They deter investment, shrink the economy, and alienate voters.
Paralysis and decline
The result is paralysis. The ANC knows it is under pressure, but it cannot act decisively because it no longer knows what it stands for or where it wants to take the country. And so it clings to the only tools it knows — the very ones that helped cause the crisis.
There is still time to change course, but not much. South Africa needs a government that encourages growth, restores trust in public institutions, and unites people around shared goals. The longer the ANC resists that shift, the more it risks being overtaken by events. If it cannot adapt, it will eventually collapse under the weight of its contradictions.
The next local elections, due in late 2026 or early 2027, may prove decisive. Voters will have the chance to reward parties that offer real solutions and to reject those that remain trapped in the past. The ANC can no longer count on its history to shield it from accountability. The question now is whether the ANC is prepared to lead in a new era, or whether it has already reached the end of the road.
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