This is the third of four parts of a report based on a study towards the end of the year of South Africa during the COVID-19 crisis.
The emphasis is on the pandemic’s implications for democracy and governance. The dislocation caused by the pandemic and the unprecedented government action in response stood to inflict enormous damage on an already fragile society and its compromised institutions.
The study attempts to place the pandemic and its consequences within the broad flow of South African politics, and to sketch some thoughts as to how it will influence the future.
The final part of the report will be published tomorrow.
Part 3: State of Disaster: what the COVID 19 pandemic means for South Africa’s democracy
Livelihoods and the economy that underpins them
As noted above, South Africa – particularly the ANC and those on the ‘left’ of the political spectrum – chose to include a full suite of socio-economic rights in the country’s constitution. By this standard, the failure to ensure ‘access’ to a range of goods and amenities would constitute a violation of human rights in itself. More than this, the deprivation of material necessities in the face of a constitutional pledge carries the risk of discrediting the entire constitutional edifice. And since satisfying these needs/rights (even ‘progressively’, as the constitution phrases it) is impossible without resources, the functionality of the economy has always been the great variable – and the great challenge.
Locking down the country’s economy and choking off households’ incomes to combat the health threat would inevitably have deleterious results. The overall economic damage inflicted can be measured in the projected fall in GDP over 2020. In the Supplementary Budget in June, the National Treasury predicted that real GDP would shrink by 7.2%.[1] This figure may, however, prove optimistic.
The lockdown was a massive blow to the country’s business community, both in terms of the restrictions to trade and the trauma in the broader economy. A number of major investments – such as by Consol Glass and South African Breweries[2] – were postponed or cancelled as a result of the economic climate and fall in demand for products. In the opening weeks of the lockdown, spaza shops and informal vendors were not permitted to trade, which hit some of the poorest communities hard, disrupting income streams and food supplies.[3] It remains to be seen just how widespread business closures following on from this were, but surveys provide some indication. Stats SA’s longitudinal surveys of business’ response to the pandemic pointed to falling levels of turnover, extensive temporary closures and uncertainty about the retention of staff. The first survey (30 March – 13 April), found that 3.4% of the firms it consulted reported having permanently closed; the second (14 April – 30 April) 8.6%; and the third (1 – 31 May), 2.2%. Overwhelming majorities felt their existence imperilled if they were not able to earn incomes within a three-month period.[4] A poll conducted by business association Sakeliga in June found that while only 5% said they would definitely close within the next year (largely, it noted, as a result of the regulatory response to the pandemic than its medical side), 52% said that they were unsure whether they could survive.[5]
The impact of this on the country’s unemployment crisis was dire. One study estimated that some 3 million jobs had been lost in the period between February and April.[6] Stats SA found that in the second quarter of the year, 2.2 million jobs were lost.[7] This represented a loss of income and inclusion (however precarious it might have been for many people) in the economy – as well as the ability to satisfy their material needs.
The latter point was emphasised by reports that hunger was a growing problem. Food insecurity had been a threat to millions of South Africa prior to the lockdown – and expression of persistent poverty – but with incomes and economic activity having been undermined, it was aggravated. A poll by the University of Johannesburg and the Human Sciences Research Council found that over a third of respondents had experienced hunger during the lockdown, along with well over a fifth who reported that someone in their household had done so.[8] Imtiaz Sooliman, director of Gift of the Givers charity put this into words: ‘Every call, every social media message, all my toll-free lines, it’s only one thing: We need food.’[9]
Both the government and private sector launched initiatives to mitigate the socio-economic impact of the pandemic. A Solidarity Fund was established to receive contributions from both the state and private sector to collect and pool funds for COVD-19 relief, with many of the country’s corporates and wealthy citizens making large contributions.[10] Two large funds were established, associated with leading business families, largely for the purposes of keeping small firms afloat.[11]
Government, meanwhile, offered support to firms through tax relief and credit.[12] The effectiveness of this was debateable. A review of research on the impact of small businesses prepared by business environment research group SBP for the Small Business Institute argued that government’s interventions here were ineffective and the take up of loan guarantees was poor. It also suggested that the government’s aid schemes were tied to another policy objective, namely to formalise informal businesses.[13]
Seemingly, government’s motivation has focused more on formalising informal businesses and collecting their data than providing financial aid to distressed businesses during COVID-19. A survey by the Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF), which has 216 000 informal sector entrepreneurs on its loan book found this to be case. Their survey revealed that only 12% of their clients had bothered to apply for business permits to access government’s loan relief, stating that even fewer will likely have applied for loans from government. In an extended radio interview, economist Xhanti Phayi exhorted government not to ‘register them or their businesses; let them work freely, be enterprising.’
To ordinary South Africans feeling the bite of the lockdown, it instituted a basket of relief measures. These included payments via the Unemployment Insurance Fund (the so-called Temporary Employer-Employee Relief Scheme, or UIF-TERS), and grant payments. The latter included an increase in existing payments – such as an extra R300 on top of child support grants – as well as a R350 Social Relief of Distress Grant, that would be available to people ‘who are currently unemployed and do not receive any other form of social grant or UIF payment’.[14]
On the other hand, the government’s record on other relief measures was less salutary. One of the most potent interventions against the worst ravages of poverty that the government had introduced post-1994 was the provision of food to millions of children through the National School Nutrition Programme. This was suspended as a result of the lockdown (although the opposition-run Western Cape reopened it in the province). Food parcels were distributed, but not sufficient to meet the needs. Concerns were expressed about growing childhood nutrition.[15] In an article setting out the national government’s response in the first two months of the lockdown, Prof Jeremy Seekings of the University of Cape Town charged that it had failed in its duties:[16]
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the national government had no plan, shut down its massive school feeding programme and impeded its regular food parcel scheme, has failed to provide much funding for food parcels and has played almost no part in delivering them to poor people.
In separate developments, the government attempted to prevent the distribution of cooked food by civil society organisations – and to control their distribution of food parcels through permit requirements. It was necessary to do this, Minister of Social Development Lindiwe Zulu said, to deal with corruption and duplication[17] (presumably the state would be able to manage this, even if its own record was deeply flawed.) In effect, this became a case of repudiating the right to food and to dignity. Ultimately, it took a legal challenge by civil society groups to compel the government to resume the school feeding scheme.[18]
It will probably be a matter of debate for some time just how well South Africa responded to the crisis and its impact on livelihoods, but some broad observations are possible.
Firstly, this crisis underlined the indispensability of the non-state sector. Private business demonstrated a large degree of commitment to the country, and to its employees. This disproved the charge that it is indifferent to considerations beyond profit – even if much of the public debate assumed a hard dichotomy between ‘lives’ and ‘profit’.[19] Private sector-based relief funds provided a rare lifeline for the country’s embattled small business community. Likewise, civil society stepped up to provide critical emergency relief.
Secondly, the increased reach of the country’s welfare state certainly did much to keep the worst effects of immiseration at bay. Its various grants were estimated to have supported around 36 million people, or close to two-thirds of the country’s population – many of these having not been eligible for such support in the past. This expansion has in turn done much to fulfil the aspirations of those who wished for a more comprehensive welfare state. Stellenbosch University academic Nic Spaull commented:[20]
The key difference between the pre-and post-COVID trend is the inclusion of young unemployed men. Previously, government grants were allocated to those who could not work or who somehow needed the state to act as ‘provider’: the elderly (old age pension of R1 860 a month); women with children (child support grant of R440 a month); those with disabilities (disability grant of R1 860 a month); and a few others. Covid-19 has pushed us into the realm long predicted as the end point of ‘grant logic’. That logic says that whether or not government can create jobs, it has a moral responsibility to prevent destitution at all costs. The right to a minimum amount of food or income is bound up in an understanding that all people have worth and their basic dignity must be protected, irrespective of the cost or the consequences.
Thirdly, the pandemic does not appear to have altered the overall thrust of policy, especially where ideological principles are at stake. Some observers confidently predicted that the stresses following COVID would enable (or compel) President Ramaphosa to execute a market-friendly reform programme.[21] This has not happened.
Rhetorically, there were occasional – but nonetheless very jarring – invocations of ideological positions associated with the so-called ‘Radical Economic Transformation’ agenda as the logical and correct response to the economic devastation wrought by the pandemic.[22] President Ramaphosa said as much in an address in KwaZulu-Natal.[23]
The president has emphasised the importance of social compacting, as he had done previously, but has also emphasised that the country’s recovery will be led by the state.[24] Veteran journalist Peter Bruce has argued that plans for post-COVID recovery produced thus far bear the hallmarks of Minister of Trade and Industry Ebrahim Patel, pointing to a restrictive, state-centred ‘siege’ economy, which ignores the country’s competitive weaknesses.[25]
Revealingly, the government appears to retain faith in state-owned enterprises as drivers of economic growth, their records in recent years notwithstanding.[26] (During the lockdown, South Africa was subjected to electricity shortages – ‘load shedding’ – even though the economy was not fully functional.)[27] The decision to retain and recapitalise South African Airways, given its record and the doubtfulness of a commercial case (at a time in which international travel has collapsed) and the competing claims on resources, is difficult to explain in terms other than ideology.
Alongside this, no compromise was entertained on race-based policies, despite their doubtful record on promoting growth and employment.[28] A particular controversy was sparked by the insistence of the Department of Tourism to use racial criteria in distributing relief to distressed businesses.[29]Journalist Justice Malala remarked on this: ‘This is well and truly and totally idiotic. It makes no sense whatsoever at any level. Say goodbye to jobs, GDP growth or a Moody’s or Fitch upgrade any time soon.’[30]
President Ramaphosa said that B-BBEE was non-negotiable. ‘The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment policy thrust of this government, if anything, needs to be enhanced,’ he told Parliament.[31] (Legal challenges to these measures failed, and the courts agreed that race was a permissible ground on which to base policy.[32]) In addition, moves to introduce more prescriptive affirmative action measures continued, fulfilling a pledge made in 2019 to be ‘very hard on employers’ who failed to make progress satisfactory for the government in meeting racial representivity targets.[33] And although the debate around it quietened down considerably, Expropriation without Compensation remained a policy goal.[34]
Corruption (and impunity?)
Corruption has been a long-standing problem in South Africa, and it is unsurprising that it manifested itself during the pandemic. Corruption has long posed a threat to constitutional governance; and by compromising governance and misappropriating resources, it threatens human rights.
The general trauma that the country went through, and the urgent need to procure goods and distribute relief made it an ideal environment for corrupt elements. Malfeasance was apparent early on, with reports of food parcels having been commandeered or redirected to local power-brokers’ associates.[35]
As the lockdown wore on, the extent and gravity of corruption became increasingly apparent. Corrupt officials and businesspeople took advantage of the UIF-TERS scheme to the extent that payments needed to be halted.[36] There was evidence of extensive problems – price gouging, poor quality supplies, the creation of dummy organisations to exploit procurement and so on – in the procurement of protective equipment.[37] These were, in part, made possible by a rickety system that predated the pandemic. A report by the Auditor General said:[38]
The pre-existing deficiencies in the supply chain processes of government were amplified by the introduction of the emergency procurement processes allowed for personal protective equipment. Based on what we have audited to date, there are clear signs of overpricing, unfair processes, potential fraud as well as supply chain management legislation being sidestepped. In addition, delays in the delivery of personal protective equipment and quality concerns could have been avoided through better planning and management of suppliers.
The circumstances under which this had taken place sparked heightened public outrage – ‘off the charts’ – even among some who had been supportive of the government and its response.[39] That a number of people prominent in government or the ANC were linked to COVID contracts could only compound this – as did the remark by ANC Secretary General Ace Magashule (whose sons had received contracts) that all ANC leaders had done business with the state.[40]
President Ramaphosa, stung by the criticism – and probably sensing that his own reputation as an anti-corruption crusader was rapidly dissipating – pledged action against wrongdoers,[41] and wrote a letter to the ANC stating that it was ‘accused No 1’.[42]
Towards the end of September, some 17 arrests were made on various counts of corruption, although these were not linked to corruption around the pandemic. Nevertheless, some commentators hailed this as highly significant as these cases were in some way linked to the ANC, compromising the party.[43] In a similar vein, President Ramaphosa demanded an explanation and remedial action after an ANC party delegation was ferried to Zimbabwe in a military aircraft.[44] Commenting on the latter, journalist Stephen Grootes wrote: ‘By taking action against a minister who used a government plane to give a lift to an ANC delegation (which included its secretary-general, no less) he is making an important point that the country does come first. This may well shore up his national approval ratings, which could be important in any battles to come.’[45]
Political culture
Democracy – and the trifecta of constitutionalism, freedom and human rights – are best assured when they are accepted as normative goods on their own, as settled practices that a society is committed to. The American political scientist, Francis Fukuyama, argues that the consolidation of democracy must take place on various levels, the most important for its durability being that of culture. This he defines as an ‘a-rational, ethical habit passed on through tradition’.[46] This rests not only on the shoulders of the state or the government, but on society as a whole. In other words, does the political culture of the state and citizens alike accept this mode of societal organisations and regard it as worth protecting as an intrinsic normative good?
The COVID-19 pandemic shook the operations of the state and political order, and in so doing provided some insight into how those in power and those subject to it would respond to a serious abridgment of their freedoms.
It bears repeating that there is abundant evidence that within the state, there have been distinctly anti-democratic and counter-constitutional impulses. From this perspective, human rights and freedoms are a hindrance to the exercise of power. During the Zuma era, there was a great deal of complicity in such behaviour. Such sentiments are by no means universal, but they do emphasise the risk that a democratic reversal would neither be not impossible, nor – by some in leadership positions – unwelcome.
Among South Africa’s people, something similar can be discerned.[47] Polling evidence has long shown that while South Africans do value their civil liberties, these are sometimes secondary to immediate material interests. In the first decade of democracy, one analysis warned that on the basis of opinion surveys, support for democracy was ‘modest’ and that ‘political culture is not yet mature enough to consolidate democratic practices’. This because democracy was associated by many with demands for socio-economic upliftment, and performance in this regard had been sub-optimal.[48]
More recent investigations reveal similar sentiments. African research network Afrobarometer,[49] for example, has recorded a decline over the past decade in the proportion of South Africans who feel that ‘democracy is preferable to any other kind of government’: from 70% in 2011, to 64% in 2015 and to 54% in 2018. Satisfaction with democracy has fallen too. Some 60% were very or fairly satisfied with democracy in 2011, 48% in 2015, and 42% in 2018. (It is notable that satisfaction with democracy peaked at 63% in 2006, which coincided with post-1994 South Africa’s most prosperous period.)
In addition, 62% of respondents in 2018 answered ‘willing’ or ‘very willing’ to the question: ‘If a non-elected government or leader could impose law and order, and deliver houses and jobs, how willing or unwilling would you be to give up regular elections and live under such a government?’. This stood at 63% in 2011 and at 61% in 2015. Public opinion was divided, more or less evenly between preference for accountable government and one that could ‘get things done’.
Also in 2018, Afrobarometer probed South Africans’ views on whether in the face of an emergency, government should be able to restrict freedom of movement. Here, a small majority of 53% was opposed to this, while 42% were in favour.[50]
Note that these responses predated the COVID crisis and they point to an underlying current of ambivalence towards democracy, constitutional rule, personal freedom and human rights.
Reactions to the COVID 19 crisis and the government’s response broadly reflected this ambiguity. Polls showed that as many as one in five South Africans were willing to sacrifice some of their rights to prevent the spread of the virus, although this decreased somewhat as the lockdown wore on. Not all rights were viewed as equally expendable, and it is encouraging that the most acceptable restrictions had a clear and rational connection to combating the pandemic – and only 19% were willing to relinquish their privacy.[51]
President Ramaphosa was widely supported for his handling of the crisis, significantly more than most of the country’s leadership and institutions.[52] This is probably best understood in view of the hopes that were invested in Ramaphosa as the harbinger of a ‘New Dawn’, and hopes for a turnaround in South Africa’s fortunes. The praise centred largely around his leadership – described in one headline as ‘bold, decisive and presidential’.[53] Social media hashtags such as #CyrilFridays and #WeAreLed proliferated. (With some amusement, people asked one another, ‘How’d you like to be going through this under Zuma?’) Schoolchildren were asked to write letters thanking President Ramaphosa.[54] Perhaps at this time, South Africa had a glimpse of the messianic leader that so many were open to.
The response from much of the country’s intellectual elites – in media and academia – often bled into enthusiastic acclamation. This was not universal, but was clearly evident. Sometimes this was quite petty, with journalists confronting presumed lockdown-violators, effectively acting as ‘prefects and enforcers’.[55]
Government, media and civil society activists teamed up formally to deal with the ‘fake news’ phenomenon. The spread of ‘fake news’ has drawn increasing attention in recent years, and disseminating it was a criminal offence during the lockdown. Arrests were made on this basis. An initiative by Media Monitoring Africa, a well-established media think tank, supported by the government and various other bodies (including the South African National Editors’ Forum), sought to encourage members of the public to join its ‘Spotters Network’ to report fake news and ‘help combat disinformation, hate speech and more’ and to ‘[dispel] false narratives.[56] An associated website, real411.org.za, was established to enable people to report suspected fake news. (Interestingly, one of its frontpage images – the only one to scroll past that did not appear to be a posed stock image – was of President Ramaphosa.) It attracted hundreds of complaints, many of which illustrated the problem. Some appeared to be motivated by disagreements with the thrust of particular commentary. And while its adjudications did recognise a difference between opinions and facts, some of its decisions did appear to be based around tacit narratives themselves.[57]
Reporting and commentary in general often gave the appearance of being narrative driven, supporting the lockdown (at least initially, although this soured as time went on) unmatched by corresponding reflection on whether it was a good strategy or of its subsidiary consequences. Critics of the lockdown were frequently given a hostile reception, with the implied criticism that they lacked concern for the country’s poor.[58] If lay commentators could be dismissed as lacking suitable expertise to challenge the lockdown, criticisms from highly qualified experts could also be dismissed on the basis that they lacked the specific expertise ‘on how to ease a nationwide lockdown’ – a standard that would seem rather unreachable, since nothing like this had been done in South Africa before. (By that standard, there was little parallel self-criticism as to whether being a journalist was a satisfactory qualification to critique scientists’ arguments.) The lockdown should not be used as a ‘political football’ – even though it was by its nature a deeply political matter – and those calling for changes were motivated by pecuniary considerations.[59] Criticism about the irrationality of some regulations were scornfully dismissed by some commentators.[60] (Although in fairness, there was considerable pushback too on the latter; in a column in September prominent public intellectual Eusebius McKaiser chastised the government for refusing to provide reasons for its decisions and on the issue of a curfew, and said caustically that ‘the ANC government is not our parent and the ANC does not own the country’.)[61]
The latter point – essentially a variant of the ‘people before profit’ critique – downplayed the reality that the state of the economy and its impact of households was a major concern to the public in all its manifestations. The lockdown was (initially) widely supported although this softened quickly probably as its economic consequences became apparent. In April, public opinion gauged by Victory Research found that while initial support for the lockdown was close to 90%, support for extending it into May was at a little over 40%.[62] Other polling showed that continuing the lockdown was supported, but that over 40% wanted significant changes to it.[63]
Stats SA found in the same month that fears that the pandemic would ‘contribute to economic collapse’ dominated – 93.2% were ‘extremely’ or ‘very’ concerned about this. This exceeded concerns about the health implications for respondents and those close to them.[64] Indeed, the cramped conditions in which millions of people live, and the precarious nature of their livelihoods – grant support during the lockdown notwithstanding – meant that compliance would always be a problem. People would take such measures to protect themselves as they were able, but the imperatives of making a living made adherence impossible for many.[65] A point made repeatedly was that the pandemic demonstrated the hard reality of poverty and inequality in South Africa – perversely (and tragically, given the circumstances), this also showed the limits to the ability of the state to enforce control, and of people’s willingness to submit to control of their freedom.
The lockdown, predictably, surfaced South Africa’s race politics. Here the growing invocation and legitimation of race-based and identarian thinking came into play. While there was legitimate comment about how enduring inequality made the lockdown enormously difficult for the country’s poor[66] – overwhelmingly black – and some more tendentious ideologically-driven pieces of analysis which ascribed behaviour to racial identity,[67] the issue burst into frame owing to events at the other end of the world, coinciding with (rather than arising from) the pandemic.
The prompt here was the death of George Floyd, an African-American man whose death at the hands of a white police officer in the city of Minneapolis provoked demonstrations across the world. South African activists seized upon this as evidence of the persistence of ingrained racism and persistent ‘white supremacy’ as a defining problem in South Africa and the world.[68] This frame of reference was used rather doubtfully to explain pathologies in South Africa, even where no obvious ‘white’ influence was apparent. The Nelson Mandela Foundation did so in relation to the killing of black people by security forces during the lockdown.[69] President Ramaphosa was more direct, in a video address accusing white South Africans of harbouring the attitudes which had led to Floyd’s death.[70]
Interestingly – perhaps revealing the extent to which South Africa has become inured to violence and brutality – this was also the event the catalysed indignation about deaths at the hands of the security forces in South Africa. Commentator and columnist Gareth van Onselen remarked: ‘Even then, the death of Collins Khosa and others only became a cause célèbre because of what is happening in the US, the land from which we take our social justice cues.’[71]
The Black Lives Matter movement (BLM) rapidly gained attention in South Africa and sparked a near-universal obeisance towards its message of the centrality of racism to social organisation. Given the country’s history, and the growth of identarian and race-nationalist ideology in the country, it gained traction among the country’s elites. (The extent to which ordinary people identified with it was unclear, although there were, for example, initiatives by former pupils of historically white schools to express discontent about their treatment.[72]) The message was given impetus by testimonies of black sportspeople, including the widely admired Springbok captain Siya Kolisi, about perceived experiences of discrimination.[73] Sports teams ‘took the knee’ in support of BLM. Schools held sessions to discuss the matters raised. Institutions pledged their support for the movement, even where it was directly hostile to them.[74] The BLM narrative was subject to very little debate and interrogation. This is so even though it is based on some very particular ideological assumptions, whose veracity and advisability are open to question.[75]
Another expression of the hold of race-based thinking among South Africa’s elites was demonstrated in the reaction to the decision of the DA to adopt a policy framework based on socio-economic need rather than on race. The condemnation of this was widespread, with commentators claiming that this would be bad for its electoral prospects, and that it signalled a sort of political extremism.[76] Very little specific evidence was advanced to support these assertions. Indeed, polling evidence suggested that South Africa’s electorate was not as averse to these ideas as such commentary would have its readers believe.[77] The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, for example, found in a 2019 survey that around three quarters of South Africa’s people believed that ‘reconciliation is impossible as long as we continue using race categories to measure transformation’ – a proposition assented to by a greater proportion of respondents, in fact, than those choosing ‘reconciliation is impossible as long as we do not address racism in our society’.[78]
Running parallel to this was the affirmation of the central place of race in the country’s constitution. As has been noted, parts of South Africa’s COVID response were based on racial criteria. This was endorsed by the courts. In ruling against the Democratic Alliance in the matter of the B-BBEE requirements for state support for businesses during the pandemic, the Pretoria High Court took a hard line in favour of race-based policy. The constitution, the court ruled, was not a ‘race neutral’ document. Vulnerability, it said, was inextricably linked to race. While it criticised the regulations for being vague, it required that they be rewritten and that the relevant minister ‘be required to consider the role of race, gender, youth and disability in the formulation of the criteria’.[79] Racial and other ascriptive criteria were not only permissible criteria, but compulsory ones. The court later refused the DA leave to appeal, saying that another court would not find differently. ‘To do so is to live in a world totally divorced from the racism and sexism that continues to divide our country and where those most in need and most in vulnerable conditions happen to be black.’[80]
The author would like to thank his colleagues at both the Institute of Race Relations and Centre for Risk Analysis for sharing their invaluable insights with him. The Institute would also like to extend its heartfelt thanks to the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty, without whose generous support this project would not have been possible. The Institute would like to add that the views expressed here are those of the author, and not necessarily of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation.
In tomorrow’s final instalment, we present the conclusion of this study, with some reflections on its possible impact on South Africa’s future as a democracy.
[Picture: Discott, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=88923567]
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[1] National Treasury, Supplementary Budget Review, Pretoria: National Treasury, June 2020 p. 27.
[2] Mashego, P, ‘South African Breweries cancels R2.5 billion in plant upgrades due to alcohol ban’, Fin24, 3 August 2020. https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/retail/south-african-breweries-cancels-r25-billion-in-plant-upgrades-due-to-alcohol-ban-20200803; ‘Consol Glass halts R2.3 billion investment in South Africa due to alcohol ban’, BusinessTech, 4 August 2020. https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/422752/consol-glass-halts-r2-3-billion-investment-in-south-africa-due-to-alcohol-ban/.
[3] Hlati, O, ‘Confusion over informal traders after amended regulations’, IOL, 6 April 2020. https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/confusion-over-informal-traders-after-amended-regulations-46311515.
[4] Stats SA, Business impact survey of the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa, Pretoria: Stats SA, 21 April 2020; Stats SA, Business impact survey of the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa, Pretoria: Stats SA, 14 May 2020; Stats SA, Business impact survey of the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa, Pretoria: Stats SA, 25 June 2020.
[5] ‘Here’s how many small South African businesses say they will close in the next 12 months: survey’, BusinessTech, 3 July 2020. https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/413399/heres-how-many-small-south-african-businesses-say-they-will-close-in-the-next-12-months-survey/.
[6] Spaull, N, et. al., Overview and Findings NIDS-CRAM Synthesis Report Wave 1, National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) – Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey (CRAM), June 2020, p. 3. https://cramsurvey.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Spaull-et-al.-NIDS-CRAM-Wave-1-Synthesis-Report-Overview-and-Findings-1.pdf.
[7] Stats SA, Quarterly Labour Force Survey, Quarter 2: 2020, Statistical Release PO211, 29 September 2020. http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2020.pdf.
[8] University of Johannesburg and Human Sciences Research Council, UJ-HSRC COVID-19 Democracy Survey, Summary National Results, Round 2, 19 August 2020. https://www.uj.ac.za/newandevents/Documents/2020-08-19%201300pm%20Coronavirus%20Impact%20Survey%20Round%202%20summary%20national%20results%20v4.pdf.
[9] Quoted in Nicolson, G, ‘Hunger numbers: millions, millions, millions need food’, Daily Maverick, 8 May 2020. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-05-08-hunger-numbers-millions-millions-millions-need-food/.
[10] See https://solidarityfund.co.za/,
[11] See https://saft.africa/ and https://sukumafund.org.za/.
[12] See https://www.gov.za/covid-19/companies-and-employees/support-business.
[13] Small Business Institute (prepared by SBP), Reflections on the impact of COVID-19 on small businesses (SMEs) in South Africa, September 2020, Small Business Institute, 29 September 2020. https://www.smallbusinessinstitute.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Reflections-on-the-impact-of-COVID-19-on-small-businesses-SMEs-in-South-Africa-September-2020.pdf.
[14] See https://www.gov.za/covid-19/individuals-and-households/social-grants-coronavirus-covid-19.
[15] Karrim, A, and Evans, S, ‘Unscientific and nonsensical: top scientist slams government’s lockdown strategy’, News24, 16 May 2020. https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/unscientific-and-nonsensical-top-scientific-adviser-slams-governments-lockdown-strategy-20200516.
[16] Seekings, J, ‘Feeding poor people: The national government has failed’, GroundUp, 2 June 2020. https://www.groundup.org.za/article/feeding-poor-people-national-government-has-failed/#:~:text=Summary,lockdown%20it%20imposed%20on%20them.&text=Because%20of%20the%20suspension%20of,the%20lockdown%20than%20before%20it.
[17] Mvumvu, Z, ‘Lindiwe Zulu speaks about Covid-19 food parcel controversy’, Timeslive, 11 May 2020. https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2020-05-11-lindiwe-zulu-speaks-about-covid-19-food-parcel-controversy/.
[18] Equal Education and Others v Minister of Basic Education and Others (22588/2020) [2020] ZAGPPHC 306 (17 July 2020).
[19] See, for example, Haupt, A, ‘Black Lives Matter? Which black lives?’, Mail and Guardian, 11 June 2020. https://mg.co.za/opinion/2020-06-11-black-lives-matter-which-black-lives/.
[20] Spaull, N, ‘How SA lost a decade of jobs in four months’, Financial Mail, 30 September 2020. https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/cover-story/2020-09-30-sas-surreal-lost-decade/.
[21] For example, Huigen, B, ‘Oom Cyril has got this’, Businesslive, 28 April 2020. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/letters/2020-04-28-letter-oom-cyril-has-got-this/.
[22] This idea became popular in the latter part of President Jacob Zuma’s incumbency. It has come to be understood as a statist and race-nationalist approach to the economy, identifying ‘white monopoly capital’ as the prime enemy. Its critics charge that it puts a revolutionary veneer on the corruption and misgovernance that came to prevail under President Zuma. Specifically, Radical Economic Transformation is associated with Expropriation without Compensation, nationalisation, state direction of the economy, and party control of the state.
[23] Erasmus, D, ‘Radical economic transformation best for SA post-Covid-19, says Ramaphosa’, City Press, 6 May 2020. https://www.news24.com/citypress/news/radical-economic-transformation-best-for-sa-post-covid-19-says-ramaphosa-20200506.
[24] Cronje, J, ‘Ramaphosa: SA’s economic recovery must be “state-led”, News24, 18 June 2020. https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/south-africa/ramaphosa-sas-economic-recovery-must-be-state-led-20200618.
[25] Bruce, P, ‘‘No, SA will not thrive in a siege economy’, Businesslive, 29 September 2020. https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/opinion/bruces-list/2020-09-29-peter-bruce-no-sa-will-not-thrive-in-a-siege-economy/.
[26] Phakathi, B, ‘SOEs could help drive post-Covid economic recovery, says Ramaphosa’, Businesslive, 18 June 2020. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2020-06-18-soes-could-help-drive-post-covid-economic-recovery-says-ramaphosa/.
[27] Dlulane, B, ‘Stage 2 load shedding to continue today and may be stepped up at short notice’, EWN, 19 August 2020. https://ewn.co.za/2020/08/19/stage-2-load-shedding-to-continue-today-it-may-be-stepped-up-in-short-notice.
[28] The impact of Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) and employment equity on South Africa’s economic prospects have been much discussed. The Institute has argued that that they have a dissuasive impact on investments, see Jeffery, A, BEE: Helping or Hurting, Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2014. This is supported by other work, for example, SBP study of small businesses (SBP, Priming the Soil: Small Business in South Africa, Headline Report of SBP’s SME Growth Index, November 2011.) BEE requirements have also been identified as a key hindrance to foreign investment (see Gules, N, ‘EU wants relaxation of BEE rules before investing in SA’, City Press, 20 November 2018. https://www.news24.com/citypress/business/eu-wants-relaxation-of-bee-rules-before-investing-in-sa-20181120.)
[29] Thompson, W, ‘Inside the battle over tourism’s Covid relief funding’, Financial Mail, 7 May 2020. https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/money-and-investing/2020-05-07-inside-the-battle-over-tourisms-covid-relief-funding/.
[30] See https://twitter.com/justicemalala/status/1247884050099916803.
[31] ‘Ramaphosa says South Africa should use the coronavirus pandemic to strengthen BEE’, BusinessTech, 19 June 2020. https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/408979/ramaphosa-says-south-africa-should-use-the-coronavirus-pandemic-to-strengthen-bee/.
[32] Solidarity obo Members v Minister of Small Business Development and Others; Afriforum v Minister of Tourism and Others (21314/20; 21399/2020) [2020] ZAGPPHC 133 (30 April 2020); Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (Economic Freedom Fighters Intervening) (21424/2020) [2020] ZAGPPHC 237; [2020] 3 All SA 747 (GP) (19 June 2020).
[33] Mabuza, E, Labour minister vows to get tough on employers not meeting equity targets, Timeslive, 27 August 2019, https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-08-27-labour-minister-vows-to-get-tough-on-employers-not-meeting-equity-targets/.
[34] ‘South Africa takes a step closer to land expropriation – but opponents say it can’t afford it, after the coronavirus’, BusinessTech, 1 July 2020. https://businesstech.co.za/news/property/412357/south-africa-takes-a-step-closer-to-land-expropriation-but-opponents-say-it-cant-afford-it-after-the-coronavirus/.
[35] ‘Food parcel distribution falls prey to corruption’, Corruption Watch, 4 May 2020. https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/corruption-steals-from-people/.
[36] Richards, N, ‘Workers left in the lurch as UIF TERS payments suspended’, The Citizen, 25 August 2020. https://citizen.co.za/business/business-news/2348864/workers-left-in-the-lurch-as-uif-ters-payments-suspended/.
[37] ‘Billions of rands looted by South Africa’s “Covidpreneurs”: report’, BusinessTech, 26 July 2020. https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/419769/billions-of-rands-looted-by-south-africas-covidpreneurs-report/; Fengu, M, ‘Substandard ill-fitting masks were procured for schools – Auditor-General report’, City Press, 2 September 2020. https://www.news24.com/citypress/news/substandard-ill-fitting-masks-were-procured-for-schools-auditor-general-report-20200902.
[38] Auditor General South Africa, First Special Report on the Financial Management of Government’s COVID-19 Initiatives, AGSA, August 2020, p. 5.
[39] ‘The Wrap’, explain.co.za, 3 August 2020. https://www.explain.co.za/2020/08/03/covid-corruption-anc-not-getting-off-lightly-this-time/?fbclid=IwAR2As_RIM6oPZWqXYfCzm1k6zXumdRDyEqBn7HHzdP4MDpqZth5FTgV5lHg.
[40] Madia, T, ‘Watch: Show me one leader of the ANC who hasn’t done business with the state – Ace Magashule’, News24, 7 August 2020. https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/watch-show-me-one-leader-of-the-anc-who-hasnt-done-business-with-the-state-ace-magashule-20200807.
[41] ‘Ramaphosa talks tough on COVID-19 corruption’, Corruption Watch, 24 July 2020. https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/ramaphosa-talks-tough-on-covid-19-corruption/.
[42] Ntshidi, E, ‘Ramaphosa on corruption: the ANC stands as Accused no. 1’, EWN, 23 August 2020. https://ewn.co.za/2020/08/23/ramaphosa-on-corruption-the-anc-stands-as-accused-no-1.
[43] Du Toit, P, ‘The ANC is in the dock alongside Vincent Smith, Edwin Sodi, and Olly Mlamleli’, News24, 3 October 2020. https://www.news24.com/news24/analysis/analysis-the-anc-is-in-the-dock-alongside-vincent-smith-edwin-sodi-and-olly-mlamleli-20201003.
[44] Maromo, J, ‘ANC to reimburse government for Zimbabwe plane trip’, IOL, 25 September 2020. https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc-to-reimburse-government-for-zimbabwe-plane-trip-e9bbf031-489a-4091-a9a6-f2441c03f806,
[45] Grootes, S, ‘Ramaphosa’s brand-new line in the sand: country before party’, Daily Maverick, 28 September 2020. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-09-28-ramaphosas-brand-new-line-in-the-sand-country-before-party/.
[46] Fukuyama F, ‘The Primacy of Culture’, Journal of Democracy, Vol 6, No 1, 1995, pp. 7-14.
[47] Corrigan, T, Die politische Kultur Südafrikas: 16 Jahre nach Ende der Apartheid, Aktuelle Analysen, Hanns Seidel Stifting, 2010. https://www.hss.de/download/publications/AA-56_Suedafrika.pdf.
[48] Mattes R, ‘South Africa: Democracy without the People’, Journal of Democracy, Vol 13, No 1, January 2002, p. 33.
[49] Dryding, D, Are South Africans giving up on democracy?, Afrobarometer Dispatch, No 372, 14 July 2020.
[50] Isbell, T, COVID-19 Lockdown in South Africa highlights Unequal Access to Services, Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 358, 28 April 2020.
[51] UJ-HSRC, ‘COVID-19 Democracy Survey, Summary national results, Round 2’, 19 August 2020, p. 4. https://www.uj.ac.za/newandevents/Documents/2020-08-19%201300pm%20Coronavirus%20Impact%20Survey%20Round%202%20summary%20national%20results%20v4.pdf.
[52] Human Sciences Research Council, ‘UJ-HSRC Covid-19 Democracy Survey Summary Findings’, 4 June 2020. http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/11849/UJ-HSRC%20Covid-19%20Democracy%20Survey%20Summary%20Findings.pdf.
[53] Molopyane, M, ‘Lockdown decision: Ramaphosa was bold, decisive and presidential’, Moneyweb, 25 March 2020. https://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-opinion/lockdown-decision-ramaphosa-was-bold-decisive-and-presidential/.
[54] ‘Mr President, you’ve got mail! Grade 2 pupils voice their appreciation in cute letters’, Parent24, 24 April 2020. https://www.news24.com/parent/learn/primary-school/mr-president-youve-got-mail-grade-2-pupils-voice-their-appreciation-in-cute-letters-20200424.
[55] For an interesting comment on this, see https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?id=318921948303794&story_fbid=1354917404704238.
[56] Lubisi, N, Join the Spotters Network’, Media Monitoring Africa, 25 March 2020. https://mediamonitoringafrica.org/2020/03/25/join-the-spotters-network-now/.
[57] See, for example, ‘Complaint ID: #830 Complaint Details: Video questions motives of farm attacks as of 06/10/2020’. https://www.real411.org.za/complaints-view/vn6gl4ku. This concerns a complaint about Youtuber Roman Cabernac’s Morning Shot podcast. Its finding reads a follows: ‘In spite of the speaker’s clear leanings towards a particular agenda, nothing he mentions around the topic of farm murders can be said to meet the requirements of mis- or disinformation, serving rather as the expression and conveyance of his personal views. However, by repeating the sentiments without evidence he nevertheless reinforces them and perpetuates the conspiracy of white genocide, which heightens fear and animosity.’ This is despite the fact that the ‘conspiracy of white genocide’ is not mentioned anywhere in the podcast, nor is it naturally to be inferred from the content. Cabernac has strong views on the ANC and its presumed attitudes towards farmers – sentiments that are far from uncommon, and not wholly unsupported by evidence. In any event, the farm murder phenomenon is complex and poorly understood as to motives. In this instance, the site seems to be holding Cabernac to account for his ‘narrative’. This could be described as a case of attempting to dispel a ‘false’ – or more accurately, a ‘disagreeable’ – narrative. (‘Brendin Horner, Farm Murders and Political Complicity’, Morning Shot, 6 October 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=deTNCeXqMos.)
[58] See “Which South Africans” interview sets social media alight’, SABC News, 14 May 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0PbKSdWR1y8; ‘Redi talks to Gareth Cliff about his letter to President Ramaphosa’, Big Debate South Africa, 9 May 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFPD2zj6DCE.)
[59] Pillay, V, ‘Stop using the lockdown as a political football’, EWN, 18 May 2020. https://ewn.co.za/2020/05/18/verashni-pillay-stop-using-the-lockdown-as-a-political-football. See also Brodie, N, ‘2020, hindsight’, Medium, 9 September 2020. https://medium.com/@nechamabrodie/2020-hindsight-9bcf7ddeb19e.
[60] Roper, C, ‘An open Whatsapp message to President Ramaphosa: “Dude, it’s not fair”’, Daily Maverick, 6 May 2020. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2020-05-06-an-open-whatsapp-message-to-president-ramaphosa-dude-its-not-fair/.
[61] McKaiser, E, ‘Why the bullshit curfew is seriously dangerous’, Mail and Guardian, 17 September 2020. https://mg.co.za/opinion/2020-09-17-eusebius-mckaiser-why-the-bullshit-curfew-is-seriously-dangerous/.
[62] ‘Public support for the lockdown’, Free Facts, No. 4, April, 2020, Issue 24, p. 2. https://irr.org.za/reports/freefacts/files/00-2014-freefacts-2014-april-2020-draft-09-05-2020.pdf; Khumalo, J, ‘South Africans are now gatvol of lockdown’, City Press, 25 April 2020. https://www.news24.com/citypress/special-report/covid-19_survey/support-for-lockdown-plummets-20200426.
[63] Human Sciences Research Council, ‘UJ-HSRC Covid-19 Democracy Survey Summary Findings’, 4 June 2020, p. 12. http://www.hsrc.ac.za/uploads/pageContent/11849/UJ-HSRC%20Covid-19%20Democracy%20Survey%20Summary%20Findings.pdf.
[64] Stats SA, Behavioural and health impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa, Pretoria: Stats SA, 30 April 2020, p. 11.
[65] Alcock, GG, ‘Revealed: Townships have ended Covid-19 lockdown’, Biznews, 19 May 2020. https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2020/05/19/township-ended-covid-19-lockdown-gg-alcock.
[66] Volodia, I, and Francis, D, ‘South Africa needs to mitigate the worst of its inequalities in tackling coronavirus’, The Conversation, 5 April 2020. https://theconversation.com/south-africa-needs-to-mitigate-the-worst-of-its-inequalities-in-tackling-coronavirus-135564.
[67] Knaus, CB, and Perkis, R, ‘The virus of whiteness’, Africa is a Country, April 2020. https://africasacountry.com/2020/04/the-virus-of-whiteness.
[68] See, for example, Mphuthing, P, ‘How George Floyd’s killing matters to everyone’, EWN, 5 June 2020. https://ewn.co.za/2020/06/05/poppie-mphuthing-how-george-floyd-s-killing-matters-to-everyone.
[69] Nelson Mandela Foundation, ‘Enough! Black Lives Matter’, Media Statement, 4 June 2020. https://www.nelsonmandela.org/news/entry/media-statement-enough-black-lives-matter.
[70] ‘Struggle against racism, related intolerance must be a relentless struggle: Ramaphosa’, SABC, 5 June 2020. https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/struggle-against-racism-related-intolerance-must-be-a-relentless-struggle-ramaphosa/.
[71] Van Onselen, G, ‘The ANC’s culture of excessive force’, Businesslive, 10 June 2020. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2020-06-10-gareth-van-onselen-the-ancs-culture-of-excessive-force/.
[72] Karram, Z, ‘SA schools react as pupils detail experiences of racism’, News24, 7 June 2020. https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/sa-schools-react-as-pupils-detail-experiences-of-racism-20200607/
[73] ‘Siya Kolisi ‘will no longer keep quiet’ on Black Lives Matter’, Sport24, 19 July 2020. https://dailyfriend.co.za/2020/09/18/das-bold-step-does-sa-a-service/.
[74] The BLM movement is opposed to private schooling, yet exclusive institutions endorsed it. See https://www.stjohnscollege.co.za/news/2020/blacklivesmatter-at-st-johns-college.
[75] The most substantial critique – one of very few made worldwide – was produced by the IRR. Crouse, G, Because #BlackLivesMatter: What Institutions Must Know About the BLM Global Network, Occasional Paper, July 2020. https://irr.org.za/reports/occasional-reports/files/because-blm-report-final.pdf.
[76] See Basson, A, ‘The DA is fast becoming the DP under Steenhuisen and Zille’, News24, 7 September 2020. https://www.news24.com/news24/columnists/adriaanbasson/adriaan-basson-the-da-is-fast-becoming-the-dp-under-steenhuisen-and-zille-20200906. Grootes, S, ‘DA’s ideological purity collides with South Africa’s reality’, Daily Maverick, 7 September 2020. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-09-07-das-ideological-purity-collides-with-south-africas-reality/. Paton, C, ‘DA now a party for some, not all, as new race policy entrenches denialism’, Businesslive, 8 September 2020. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2020-09-08-da-now-a-party-for-some-not-all-as-new-race-policy-entrenches-denialism/.
[77] Corrigan, T, ‘DA’s bold step does SA a service’, Daily Friend, 18 September 2020. https://dailyfriend.co.za/2020/09/18/das-bold-step-does-sa-a-service/.
[78]Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, SA Reconciliation Barometer, 2019, p. 25. http://www.ijr.org.za/home/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/800108-IJR-Barometer-Report-2019-final-web.pdf.
[79] Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (Economic Freedom Fighters Intervening) (21424/2020) [2020] ZAGPPHC 237; [2020] 3 All SA 747 (GP) (19 June 2020).
[80] Wicks, B, ‘DA’s anti-BEE Covid-19 funding appeal application dismissed’, The Citizen, 30 July 2020. https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/courts/2331906/das-anti-bee-covid-19-funding-appeal-application-dismissed/.