President Ramaphosa must have entered 2025 with a sense of cocky optimism. After a bruising election performance, he had been able to keep the ANC in office with a face-saving Government of National Unity. He had used his presidential prerogatives to apportion his party an overwhelming majority of cabinet positions, and steamed ahead with the party’s policy agenda, to the pointed disregard of his nominal partners. Ramaphosa has always been a party politician rather than a statesman.
In 2025, however, he would be able mount the global stage as a statesman, with South Africa holding the presidency of the G20. The first meeting of its foreign ministers took place last week, albeit under a cloud, since the United States Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, had signalled that he would not attend. This was followed by President Trump’s interventions, his remarks to the media, on social media and his Executive Order taking issue with South Africa’s “Egregious Actions”.
A year of prominence for President Ramaphosa and for South Africa looks to be overshadowed by the unwelcome foreign attention.
This is not just a matter of national ego, and the real-world consequences of this could be severe. President Trump has announced that the US will cut assistance to South Africa – not enormous, but important, especially in HIV treatment – but the big concern is the future of the economic ties between the countries.
At least this should be the big concern, since 7.4% of South Africa’s exports go to the US (2022 figures), while 5.4% of South Africa’s imports come from the US. Much of this is high-end stuff, both ways: machinery, electronics, technological goods. This is a relationship that a deindustrialising economy like South Africa has an interest in retaining.
Trade privileges
Take note of something here: this is not primarily a matter of the trade privileges through the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. This, again, is important, especially in particular fields like agriculture and auto manufacturing. But the trading relationship is much larger, and the real risk for South Africa is this market access.
President Trump understands this – in relation to the world as a whole – and has liberally threatened tariffs as a diplomatic tool. In fact, he seems to regard tariffs as a positive good. From the US perspective, there is a creditable argument that it has acted as a global engine for other economies by being relatively open to their products without receiving the same in return.
South Africa has a great deal riding on coming to an agreement. To this end, President Ramaphosa is sending delegations abroad. Some will target other countries in the G20, trying to rally support for itself. It will probably have some success here, since President Trump has unnerved some of the US’ closest allies, while a country like China is hostile to the US anyway.
Maybe these engagements will be useful to South Africa in its G20 presidency, as many of the interlocutors claim a deep commitment to the multilateralism that President Trump appears to scorn. At the moment, there is probably not much to be gained from trying to initiate this discussion with the US. It’s doubtful that either President Trump or Secretary Rubio would be interested in a meeting, and other officials are not in office yet. Ultimately, though, South Africa, will have to have a conversation with the new administration in the US, and plot a course accordingly.
Two things
This will revolve around two things. Firstly, South Africa’s external projection, and how it has positioned itself vis-à-vis the US; and secondly, the nature of South Africa’s internal governance.
In global matters, its external projection, South Africa is an unashamedly revisionist state. South Africa’s global positioning has been anti-Western and specifically anti-American for the better part of two decades. This is embedded in the ideological DNA of the ANC. This is ably summed up by a 2016 academic article on South Africa’s relations with Iran by Michal Onderco, a Dutch academic:
The ANC has been “the custodian and steward of South Africa’s foreign policy” in the post-apartheid era. The party’s views on foreign affairs were often governed by its leaders, and therefore party leaders tended to be those who also drove the country’s foreign policy. This imprint comes from the party’s experience in exile and during the anti-apartheid years. The ANC’s foreign policy mixes third-world Marxism with the anti-imperialism of the fight against the apartheid regime, seen as being both the epitome of imperialism, and as being supported by the imperialist powers. Some commentators argue that this intellectual heritage is associated with an altruistic attitude towards less powerful countries and their advancement, or with a desire to emerge as an alternative norm entrepreneur.
Or, as Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo, erstwhile South African representative at the UN put it, there was a “cold war” between the “North” (essentially, the geopolitical West), and the “South” (technically, the historically less developed parts of the world). When conflicts arose, the countries of the South “are forced to rally to the support of the targeted country, irrespective of its actual human rights performance.”
It has chosen to express this in various ways. On a number of key geopolitical questions, it has found itself emphatically opposed to the interests of the US and its core allies, and resolutely in the camp of its some of its most aggressive adversaries. This has perhaps been emblematically expressed through the ICJ case against Israel.
Petty stuff
It’s also indulged in some petty stuff, calculated to offend, but without any obvious benefits. This included President Ramaphosa calling out the US for police brutality after the death of George Floyd – his approach to the conduct of South Africa’s security forces at the same time being something less animated – and the proposed renaming of Sandton Drive to Leila Khaled Drive as a pointed insult to the US.
Conversely, it has pursued relationships with various non-Western powers (like Brazil and India), and anti-Western ones (China, Russia and Iran). One is hard pressed to identify any official criticism from South Africa for any of these, even for truly “egregious” conduct.
Joel Pollak, a possible nominee for the ambassadorship to South Africa, has said that frustration with South Africa is now a bipartisan issue. Democrats have been jarred by South Africa’s stance on Russia and the invasion of Ukraine, Republicans by South Africa’s alignment with China and its attack on Israel. In practice, there is probably a lot of overlap, here. The bottom line is that South Africa’s portfolio of sympathisers in the US is thinning, and it’s increasingly seen – as it has presented itself – as an enemy.
On the country’s domestic policies, denunciations of South Africa’s Expropriation Act, land reform, race-based polices and treating “certain classes of people very badly” have all featured prominently. They have also preoccupied South African commentary on the Trump contretemps.
There is a probably a mix of impulses here. Some of it is probably deliberately provocative, designed to call into question the moral foundations on which post-apartheid South Africa has based its reputation (which is in any event increasingly threadbare). There is probably an element of trolling, offering refugee status to people whom his opponents would never recognise as such. There may also be something of a sop to a white identitarian fringe on his support base.
Self-harm
And, as Pollak states, there is also an oblique but compelling cost-benefit case: South Africa’s self-harm makes it a weak partner for the US. Or perhaps one might say, a bad investment. Indeed, it’s often forgotten that eligibility for AGOA is linked to a lot of technical criteria, such as minimizing market distortions. South African industrial policy fits uncomfortably here. So does the Expropriation Act in respect of requirements about respecting property rights.
So, what could a delegation say to President Trump, should such a meeting happen?
One important initial point is that “explaining” South Africa’s position is a non-starter. South Africa has broadcast some of its positions as loudly as it could. South Africa’s ambassador to Washington, Ebrahim Rasool spoke about lowering the megaphone, but he misses the point.
Megaphone diplomacy from both the government and the ANC has made it abundantly clear where South Africa stands, and whom it loathes. It was bad diplomacy to do so to a country with which South Africa enjoyed so asymmetric a relationship, but what’s done is done. Going forward, it might wish to think carefully about its tone and mode of communication.
And “explaining” some other things is just redundant, since they make very little sense, outside – maybe – the parochial perspective of the ANC. South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment regime, for example, imposes enormous costs on business. It has been useful for enriching a small coterie of people and enabling not-so-small corruption. It’s been a big disincentive to investment, a cost carried by the country as a whole. That won’t change because an emissary attempts to “explain” it. Nor to justify it with reference to apartheid and colonialism. (It’s concerning that the government believes this to be an effective argument.)
Besides, South Africa’s diplomatic corps is probably not up to doing any of this. If it had been able to do so over the years, it’s doubtful the current situation would have arisen.
Deal
Fortunately, there probably is a deal to be made. Whatever Trump’s failings, it would be a mistake to imagine that he is acting out of spite. Aggressively, yes, impulsively, absolutely. But he is responding to some real concerns for the country he leads.
South Africa must first define what matters to it and what it can reasonably hope for. Good relations with the US are probably not really on the table at the moment. That is largely on South Africa. Rather, the focus should be on a transactional exchange, hard rands-and-cents/dollars-and-cents calculations. More than anything, South Africa needs to maintain its economic links.
A bitter pill to swallow will be the need to make some initial concessions. One would publicly to walk back the renaming of Sandton Drive. That can be phrased on South Africa’s part as injecting maturity into the relationship, realising that pointless gestures distract from the substance of diplomacy and so on.
Another would be to drop demands that Taiwan remove its offices from Pretoria. South Africa is, after all a sovereign state vis-à-vis China as well as the US.
A third would be recalling Ambassador Rasool. He appears to have performed adequately – at least by the standards of South Africa’s diplomatic corps – during his previous term as ambassador to the US. But he is also closely identified with South Africa’s pro-Palestinian orientation and has made imprudent comments about President Trump. He is also fundamentally a politician. South Africa needs someone in that office with a more sympathetic view of the US, and also more focused on business. (He would be an unfortunate sacrifice in this situation, probably not altogether fair to him, but worth it for the relationship.)
Tony Leon has been mentioned as a possible candidate… that’s not a bad idea, but one that the ANC would probably never accept.
Guarantees
Similarly, since it has introduced new expropriation powers – and since senior members of the ANC have loudly trumpeted these powers are going to be used – it could offer some additional guarantees to US-based companies. (This would be a quick and painless win if, as some other members of the ANC and the government have asserted, there is no intention of going after investors’ assets.) The Act itself would need to be fundamentally reformed; as it has already being signed into law, this is likely to involve another domestic fight. Again, a problem South Africa created for itself.
These initial steps wouldn’t themselves do a great deal, but they would signal the possibility of further discussions and a possible reset.
Longer-term, the US would need to be reassured that South Africa’s conduct does not pose a threat to American interests, or at least that it’s conduct is not primarily motivated by this. The ICJ case against Israel was a hazardous gamble, all things considered, but it’s also in train, and even withdrawing from it (which the ANC would never do) wouldn’t change that. Still, if South Africa could find some moral courage to speak out about, say, the state of women in Iran, the Uighurs in China and so on, it might be able to make a credible argument that its conduct is normative, not ideological. It is, of course, but appearances here could be useful.
In the same vein, South Africa should take the security concerns of the US seriously. For instance, claims that Chinese pilots were being given training in South Africa are weighty concerns, and South Africa should be careful to avoid such entanglements.
The wild card is whether something is going on beneath the surface that US intelligence has picked up, and South Africa’s government would prefer to keep secret. It’s been noted that the Executive Order refers to nuclear cooperation between South Africa and Iran. If there is truth to this, it’s hard to imagine the relationship between South Africa and the US being recoverable for many years.
Well advised
Beyond this, South Africa would be well advised to look some of the criticisms that have been levelled at its internal governance and policy mix. Remove the current US administration from the mix, and South Africa would remain anaemic and disordered.
One may despise President Trump and all who sail with him, but race-based policy and threatening property rights are a millstone around South Africa’s neck. A thorough programme of reform is long overdue. (Last week’s column expressed frustration that Trump’s intervention had distorted debate on issues that urgently demand them.) South Africa owes this to itself.
Finally, President Ramaphosa has called on the country to unite on this issue. A fair call. But the first step is for the President and his party to accept that such unity comes at the price of genuine compromise. So far, the non-ANC members of the ruling coalition have spoken in defence of the country. Their offices could be useful in demonstrating that South Africa is indeed reorienting itself, and moving towards a foreign policy grounded in pragmatism and the interests of growth and the wellbeing of its people.
That is, of course, if the President can step up as a statesman, rather than a party politician.
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