Amidst South Africa’s political realignment, less well-considered is how a new political force could emerge to replace the African National Congress (ANC).

I have written extensively on the political arithmetic behind this.

A new political entity may only need around 15% of the vote for a centrist coalition to govern at a national level, without the ANC. This assumes that the support of the current centrist/centre-right parties remains stable. That same 15% would therefore need to bleed from the ANC’s voter base and not that of the current centrists.

Many political upstarts in the past few years have essentially been breakaways from the pro-market Democratic Alliance (DA), and have campaigned in DA heartlands or competed with the DA for votes.

Yet they have all been personality-driven, elite-sponsored, and top-down. That is not the correct starting point.

New political dynamic

South Africa’s new political dynamo will not come from suburbia. The DA is thus a key ally and not a competitor. The missing link in South Africa’s political calculation for a centrist majority is a party that appeals to the aspirational, lower-middle class in the townships.

A bottom-up approach that resonates in township suburb-hinterlands and informal settlements could yield better results.

The townships won the election for the ANC in 1994. That may also be the ANC’s deathbed.

My previous writing has also detailed how public opinion in South Africa leans to the right, being generally pro-business, pro-law and order, and socially conservative.

An organic movement which meets these criteria could be the breakthrough SA needs.

This column details how that movement may arise.

Stage 1 – Start slowly (and not as a party)

A new movement may wish to start as a policy coalition. It could agree that for businesses in the townships to grow, “it should be easier to employ people in the formal sector… business regulations should be reduced”.

Similarly, “to improve the security situation, councils should cooperate more with private security companies.”

Such an approach may attract buy-in from food security and education groups. South Africa’s many successful civil society groups could provide input but should fall short of explicit endorsement. Evidence suggests that successful civil society groups experience decline if they morph into political parties.

With this, a grassroots, bottom-up method, key leaders may emerge organically that chime with township voters, rather than seemingly aloof technocrats parachuted in from Sandton.

When starting a business, one first establishes a gap in the market, before jumping to the production of a product.

Stage 2 – Grow the movement; Remain open-minded

Continuing to move slowly, it is important for the movement to also remain open-minded on political policy, so long as it remains pro-business and will kick-start economic growth.

The movement may be libertarian. It may be centre-left economically but socially conservative.

Yet the underlying thread is to liberalise key parts of the economy, reduce labour market regulation and allow businesses to grow.

Its brainchild should be the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the townships. Those could afford the townships low taxes and exemptions from South Africa’s detrimental labour laws. Such a policy is in large part responsible for China’s economic ascent.

The movement should evidence tangible examples of parallel governance and service delivery – community security groups improving the policing situation, for example.

The bottom-up movement can also be side-to-side. It could get the backing of ANC members disillusioned with the party, as well as previous upstart parties that have not gained the desired support.

At this point, it may gain momentum and scale with South Africa’s many black intellectuals, and faith and business leaders.

By my reckoning, such a movement may only need around five to ten well-known personalities to get the critical 15%.

Stage 3: Representation

At this point, the entity may attract elite funding. That would not be problematic if the party now starts to develop proper democratic structures.

Its activists would now pursue workshops and townhall meetings, as its policy agenda becomes a form of national dialogue.

At intervals, it should be asking,

  • “Are we succeeding in creating jobs and parallel governance?
  • Are we showing up in the polls as we would like?
  • Are we likely to dominate the township vote?
  • Are we competing where we will win?
  • Can we be sure we are not reliant on a single political figure?
  • Do we have lasting democratic, internal party structures?”

If the answer to these is “Yes”, then this may be South Africa’s political start-up that finally fires.

Forward

One must not underestimate how difficult it is for a new political party to advance. South Africa’s system of no minimal thresholds allows for many newbies to take one percent here or one percent there. But most fade away, and critical mass is often a multi-year slog.

One should not be dismissive of new entrants as “rats and mice”. Each new voice represents participation in the political process and an observer-eye on each election.

Alliances between the already-existing, ideologically-aligned groups risk parties competing for the same voters. That can work if they appeal to different ethnic constituencies, as evidenced by the DA and the Inkatha Freedom Party.

Yet the townships were instrumental to the ANC’s win in the 1994 election. In 2024, senior ANC officials took the decision to strike a deal with the DA to win back the township, peri-urban vote.

Going forward, the townships could be the battleground on which the ANC’s base ebbs away. Or they could be ANC hotbeds of support for another generation if the party decides to turn the screw on reform.

Once again, the path to prosperity lies with ordinary people.

The views of the writer are not necessarily the views of the Daily Friend or the IRR.

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Image: Grok


contributor

Sean McLaughlin worked as a Data Analyst for Wood Mackenzie, a provider of data and research for the energy industry, from 2021 to 2024. Prior to that, he worked in market intelligence on Latin America and Spain between 2016 and 2020 for Acuris (now part of ION Analytics). He has written extensively on the issue of Northern Ireland in the EU-UK Brexit negotiations for think tank VoteWatch Europe. He holds a degree in Arabic and International Relations from the University of St Andrews, Scotland, as well as a degree in Data Science for Business from the University of Stirling, Scotland. Any views expressed are personal.