The Transatlantic Alliance – which has existed in some form since 1940 – seems shakier than ever. Europe is angry at what it sees as American attempts to cut it out of peace talks over Ukraine, and America’s lack of commitment to the defence of Europe. The Europeans also fear that the Trump administration may be aligning too closely with Russia.
The US is upset at what it sees as European free-riding on US defence spending and a supposed lack of gratitude. Various factions within the Trump administration have different views as to why Ukraine, specifically, and Europe, at large, should not be supported by the US.
The news is moving so fast on Europe, the US, and Ukraine that I won’t go into that too much here. I would rather take a step back to look at the Transatlantic Alliance in the bigger picture.
Under threat?
Is the Transatlantic Alliance under threat? Well, there are certainly indications that it may well be. The US Secretary of Defence, Pete Hegseth, kicked off much of the current debate with a speech he gave on 12 February saying, “We’re also here today to directly and unambiguously express that stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe.”
A year earlier, on the campaign trail, President Trump had said he would encourage Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” to a NATO country that did not meet the Alliance’s pending guidelines on defence spending.
Trump’s so-called “buddy-in-chief” Elon Musk recently tweeted that the US should leave NATO, saying it “doesn’t make sense” for the US to pay for Europe’s defence.
In concrete terms: the US has said that it no longer plans to participate in annual military exercises in Europe after 2025.
European leaders have taken this very seriously. French president Emmanuel Macron said last week, “I want to believe that the United States will stand by us. But we have to be ready if that is not the case.” When Trump was elected, Macron made similar comments, saying that “Europe can no longer entrust its security to the United States alone. It’s up to us to guarantee our security.” Macron has even gone so far as to propose extending France’s nuclear deterrent to other countries in Europe as a replacement for America’s nuclear umbrella.
Other European leaders have echoed these statements. The soon-to-be German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, said shortly after winning the German election that “My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA.” What made this more shocking was that until very recently, Friedrich Merz was one of Germany’s biggest supporters of the Transatlantic Alliance. Since then, Merz has announced a plan for Germany to exempt defence spending from Germany’s constitutional fiscal rules and to spend huge amounts on rebuilding Germany’s rather neglected military.
Even Poland, which has for years been the closest American ally in Europe, is making noises that it no longer trusts the US alliance. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said last week that a “profound change of American geopolitics” had put Poland and Ukraine in an “objectively more difficult situation.” Poland is apparently discussing with the French the possibility of stationing French nuclear weapons in Poland or developing its own nuclear weapons programme.
Shockwaves
America’s halting of aid to Ukraine has caused shockwaves in Europe, with numerous European countries which have bought into US weapons programmes beginning to reassess their options and consider alternatives to American-bought weapons, fearing being cut off by the US themselves. The most important of these is the American F-35 programme, with some in Europe suggesting that alternatives to the advanced fighter-jet programme should either be considered or self-developed.
Clearly these developments suggest that we may be on the cusp of a greater realignment of global geopolitics, with the powerful US + Europe + Japan + South Korea bloc breaking up (South Korea is a defence manufacturing powerhouse which has recently signed major deals with Poland. Fears of American unreliability have prompted Seoul to begin investigating its own nuclear deterrent, which has led to the US considering placing South Korea on the list of “sensitive countries” which seek to limit nuclear weapons development potential).
Whilst collapsing the Transatlantic Alliance has not been a long-standing goal of the US, pulling back from Europe has been such a goal. Barack Obama famously declared his East-Asia foreign policy strategy a “pivot to Asia”.
This was continued into the first Trump administration with the trade war with China, a policy continued into the Biden administration who maintained many of the Trump tariffs on China. This longer trend suggests that US policy-changes made by the Trump administration may not be reversed entirely, even if the Democrats win the next presidential election.
Good riddance, some might say. The Transatlantic Alliance was a relic of the Cold War. Some Americans will cheer the hoped-for reduction of spending and responsibilities that withdrawal from Europe could potentially bring. Some Europeans will cheer the freedom from Washinton’s control, and the growing sense of agency which Europe has lacked for decades.
Ultimately however, both sides may come to regret the breakdown of the partnership, many of the benefits of which are taken for granted.
European underinvestment
Whilst the US has been complaining about European underinvestment in defence and free-riding on US security guarantees since at least the ‘70s, the reality has always been more complex. Europe’s lack of initiative and defence spending has often suited America, and created in Europe a sort of “learned helplessness” which allows the US significant control over policy and the strategy of the alliance.
For example, the only time the NATO treaty has had its main clause invoked was after the September 11th attacks on the US, when America’s NATO allies provided military support to the US for the war in Afghanistan. The allied forces in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014, when engaged in active combat missions, were strategically dominated by the US, despite a third to half of its combat forces being supplied by NATO allies. A third of the allied casualties in the war were suffered by non-US allies (not including Afghan government force casualties which numbered over 60,000).
In Afghanistan, the US was able to pursue its foreign policy objectives almost as it wished, whilst receiving significant support from its European allies.
When it comes to arms purchases, Europe has been a major buyer of US arms, with America encouraging European countries to limit their own arms development programmes and rather buy American. Notably, fourteen European countries have signed up to buy hundreds of advanced fighter jet F-35s by the year 2030. This results in more manufacturing jobs for the US and its European allies being integrated into the supply chain of the US defence industry.
On the purely military front, the Transatlantic Alliance, as expressed through its official body, NATO, has created a unique fighting force with no equal.
One of the big military lessons of the Second World War was that well-coordinated alliances win wars. Despite the major differences between them, the United States, the British Empire, and the Soviet Union cooperated on all levels, strategically, operationally, and tactically to leverage their individual strengths so as to decisively win the conflict. The Axis powers by contrast hardly cooperated. Japan and Germany failed to agree on attacking the Soviets at the same time. Germany and Italy often didn’t share intelligence, and the Germans harvested equipment and resources from their smaller allies such as Hungary to boost their own strength.
It was these lessons that went into the DNA of NATO, which today leverages the specialisations and strengths of all its member states as much as possible, to create an integrated and well-coordinated military force. Even tiny Luxembourg contributes, with a new high-quality military satellite.
Force multiplier
This acts as a force multiplier for the US, whose military strength in Europe and around the world is greatly boosted by its web of allies, who can supply intelligence, logistics, and funding even when they don’t provide troops.
Another benefit of America’s close defence relationship with Europe has been its ability to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. Since getting the bomb, the US has tried, and quite often failed, to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Nukes boost the US’s negotiating power as the holder of one of the world’s main nuclear arsenals. This helps to prevent smaller conflicts between countries turning into nuclear wars, as they do not have their own nuclear weapons.
This policy has been on life-support for some time. France, against the wishes of the US and Britain, acquired nuclear weapons in 1960. Israel followed in the 1960s. India joined the nuclear club in the 1970s, as did South Africa. Pakistan made its own nuclear weapon in 1998. And North Korea became the latest country to test a nuclear weapon in the mid-to-late 2000s. As of this time, Iran seems on the verge of getting its own nuclear weapon.
With the wealthy countries of Europe and Asia now fearing America’s unreliability, the possibility exists that Germany, Poland, Japan, and South Korea could all develop their own nukes in the coming years, which could lead to even more countries following suit. This will mean a world with diminished American (as well as Russian and Chinese and Indian) bargaining power and more scope for nuclear miscalculation.
Lastly, a Europe looking out for itself and on bad terms with the US might not be keen to help the Americans in the event of a clash with China. It could provide the economic support China would need to triumph in a conflict with the US.
Strategic and political issues
On Europe’s part, the loss of a reliable American ally will cause significant strategic and political issues.
Losing American defence support does now mean that European countries, worried for their security, will now have to spend more on their own defence, shifting that money from their generous welfare programmes.
More than that, however, Europe’s internal dynamics may shift without the balancing effects of the United States. Europe is no stranger to conflict and with the soothing blanket of American hegemony now ripped away, we may slowly see a Europe develop where the old differences between Europe’s nations, which were previously smoothed over by the role of the US, will begin to re-emerge in unexpected ways. To manage this situation, Europe will need good leadership to keep European unity strong, and not the bumbling technocrats it has been dominated by in recent decades.
The Transatlantic Alliance and its official expression, NATO, have been one of the longest-lasting and most successful multilateral alliances in world history. Both the US and the Europeans may only realize that they didn’t know what they had until it is gone.
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