As South Africa grapples with the consequences of a weakened ANC, a volatile electorate, and rising populist threats, the Democratic Alliance’s (DA) decision to remain in the Government of National Unity (GNU) remains strategically sound – for now.

Through its presence in the GNU, the DA plays both a defensive and offensive role, as my senior colleague Hermann Pretorius has pointed out. Defensively, it acts as a bulwark against the entry of radical, illiberal forces such as the EFF and MK into national government. This has been the core justification for the DA’s involvement from the outset, and it remains valid. While the ANC may be fractured, the worst outcome for the country would be a formal alliance between it and parties bent on undermining the Constitution, the courts, and the rule of law. The DA’s continued involvement reduces that risk.

But the DA’s role is not merely one of containment. By participating in government, it holds the ANC to account from within. This aligns not only with its opposition mandate but with the desires of many South Africans – including ANC voters – who are disillusioned by corruption and decay. The DA’s principled decision to vote against the budgets of departments run by tainted ANC ministers, while still supporting the overall GNU budget, exemplifies this balance. It sends a clear message: accountability matters, and participation does not mean complicity. However, the DA must work at building and preserving this posture. Passively going along with the ANC will taint the DA with the reek of co-optation and governance failures.

With that caveat in mind, there are also reputational advantages to remaining in the GNU. Ministerial portfolios offer visibility and credibility. When DA ministers succeed in delivering results, they expose the underperformance of ANC counterparts by contrast. And when the GNU fails more broadly, the public largely assigns blame to the ANC, not the DA. This dynamic strengthens the DA’s long-term electoral position as a capable alternative with governing experience, a potent asset in the context of a declining ANC.

Narrative loses its sting

Moreover, the DA’s presence in the GNU blunts one of the ANC’s most persistent attacks: that the DA is a racial threat to black South Africans. By serving in national government, side-by-side with the ANC, that narrative loses its sting. For many South Africans, the DA’s conduct in office demonstrates that its focus is not on race, but on service delivery, governance, and constitutional principles.

Beyond tactical considerations, there is a deeper strategic one. South Africa faces an uncertain political future. The ANC stands at a crossroads: one path leads toward constitutionalism and reform through cooperation with the DA and other democratic forces; the other leads toward instability through alignment with radical, populist, or ethnic-nationalist parties. The DA’s presence in the GNU encourages the former and deters the latter. It helps to stabilise the centre and preserve a democratic order in which competitive politics and liberal institutions can survive.

Critics are not wrong to point out that the GNU is messy, slow, and often dysfunctional. The DA has rightly withdrawn from symbolic exercises like the national dialogue when they have become empty theatre. But leaving government altogether would be a serious mistake.

Short-term party interests

It would cede influence, abandon strategic portfolios, and likely hasten a shift toward dangerous political alliances. A dramatic exit might serve short-term party interests but would weaken the DA’s ability to shape national policy and protect constitutional democracy.

Staying in the GNU is not a blank cheque. It is a conditional commitment, and the DA must remain alert to the risks of co-option, drift, and diminishing returns. But for now, its place is inside government, checking the ANC, serving the country, and defending the liberal centre.

[Image: Bonginkosi Tekane]

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contributor

John Endres is the CEO of the Institute of Race Relations (IRR). He holds a doctorate in commerce and economics from one of Germany’s leading business schools, the Otto Beisheim School of Management, as well as a Master’s in Translation Studies from the University of the Witwatersrand. John has extensive work experience in the retail and services industries as well as the non-profit sector, having previously worked for the liberal Friedrich Naumann Foundation and as founding CEO of Good Governance Africa, an advocacy organisation.