Thank you [Ricardo Teixeira] for the interview and for highlighting these important concerns in your Daily Friend piece on Saturday, An army without a backbone cannot defend a democracy. I would like to provide some context and perspective regarding the state of the SANDF, drawing from both my personal experience and the recommendations of the Defence Force Service Commission.
First, it is a privilege to be entrusted by the President to assist the Honourable Minister Motshekga in addressing structural and operational challenges within the SANDF. My involvement with the Defence Force spans several decades. This is actually the third time I have returned to assist the institution. Initially, I served as Commander of then Transkei Defence Force, and later I was called upon when soldiers raised serious concerns about their working conditions. Many will recall that I was part of the very first interim Defence Force Service Commission (DFSC), and subsequently served as a permanent member for nearly a decade. During that period, we reviewed and made recommendations on critical aspects such as troop welfare, promotions, equipment, and overall operational readiness.
It was under the guidance of President Zuma that Minister Lindiwe Sisulu involved me in addressing emerging problems within the SANDF. The findings and reports of the DFSC are in the public domain, and they substantiate many of the points I have raised. For example, our reports highlighted systemic failures such as soldiers being left without proper equipment, promotions being delayed or skipped, and the living conditions in barracks being inadequate.
The issues I flagged in the interview are by no means new. Operational failures are often less about hardware and more about institutional culture. The deployment of troops during the 2021 Durban riots where soldiers arrived on hired buses without adequate protection illustrates the consequences of weak logistics, poor planning, and inadequate leadership. Similarly, the reports of ageing riflemen still manning checkpoints, delayed uniforms and body armour, and crumbling infrastructure across bases demonstrate that morale and operational readiness are directly affected by how soldiers are treated. These are precisely the matters our DFSC reports addressed.
My emphasis on the hollowing out of the officer corps comes from my own experience. The SANDF has for years struggled with succession planning and the retention of institutional knowledge. Middle-ranked officers, the backbone that translates strategy into action, are unevenly trained, and the non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps has been neglected. Many seasoned sergeants and warrant officers have retired or left without being replaced by adequately trained successors. Without a strong NCO corps, even competent officers cannot run effective units, and young recruits struggle to transition into capable soldiers. This structural weakness directly impacts discipline, morale, and the force’s ability to respond to crises effectively.
Another area I have highlighted is accountability. Routine complaints from soldiers often go unresolved for months, procurement projects are delayed or mismanaged, and commanders rotate through sensitive posts without clear succession plans. These habits signal to soldiers that discipline is selective and that accountability is optional. The DFSC reports made very similar observations, noting that promotions should be merit-based, complaints must be handled promptly, and good performance should be rewarded while misconduct is sanctioned without bias. Unfortunately, past ministers did not implement these recommendations effectively, which has contributed to the current challenges.
Funding is indeed an important factor. Defence spending has fallen below 0.8% of GDP, far below the level needed to maintain modern operations. While the President has ordered an increase to 1.5%, financial resources alone will not restore operational effectiveness if institutional weaknesses persist. Hardware, whether troop carriers, uniforms, or helicopters, cannot replace disciplined leadership, a robust NCO structure, or a motivated, well-supported force.
The way forward is clear, and it aligns with both my recommendations and the DFSC reports. First, recruitment must focus on capability rather than simply creating employment. Modern operations require soldiers who can handle technology, read topographical data, and think critically under pressure. This could include targeted bursaries for STEM-oriented school-leavers, structured reserve-officer programs, and higher entry-level education standards for technical arms. Second, the officer and NCO corps must be rebuilt on meritocratic principles. Succession planning and mentorship programs are essential to prevent future hollowing out of the middle tier. Promotions must reflect competence and performance, not political seniority or union pressure. NCOs must be trained and empowered to enforce standards and translate strategy into operational action. Third, morale and welfare must be treated as strategic imperatives. Soldiers must feel valued, properly equipped, and fairly led. This includes ensuring basic infrastructure, reliable pay, timely delivery of uniforms and protective kit, and functioning grievance channels. A force with high morale is more adaptable, disciplined, and capable in crises.
In conclusion, I believe I have done a service to South Africa by candidly highlighting the SANDF’s weaknesses. These issues have been flagged for years, and the solutions are already outlined in previous reports. With the Honourable Minister Motshekga and the Parliamentary Committee taking decisive steps to implement them, there is every reason to believe that the SANDF can recover, rebuild its backbone, and restore public confidence. The time for action is now, before the next crisis exposes the fragility of the uniform and the cost of inaction becomes irreversible.
Bantu Holomisa
Deputy Minister of Defence and Military Veterans