The most essential objective has already been achieved in the Iranian conflict, yet many challenges remain.
As difficult as it is today to contain Iran’s aggression, Tehran’s daily strikes make clear that its missile and drone production would soon have made it prohibitively difficult to confront. Only Israel and the US had the political will to take on the IRGC in early 2026 – and in the US it was a close call.
For decades, US military planners have worried about how Iran could block the Strait of Hormuz. Had nothing been done, Iran’s missile and drone capabilities would have reached a point – probably by late 2026 and certainly by the end of 2027 – where only a massive war with huge casualties could have stopped Tehran’s nuclear weapons ambitions.
The essential objective, as clearly set out by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, was to prevent Iran from building up enough missiles and drones to become undeterrable in its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
A nuclear-armed Iran would have motivated its neighbours to seek their own nuclear weapons. It would have been far better if negotiations had produced a workable deal, but Iran was much closer to achieving invulnerability than to accepting basic nuclear proliferation safeguards, such as weapons inspections and proper safety protocols for civilian-use nuclear energy.
The essential objective, as clearly set out by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, was to prevent Iran from building up enough missiles and drones to become undeterrable in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. That objective has now been achieved.
The world had largely ignored Iran’s steady march toward an unstoppable capability, marked by surging missile production and advancing nuclear weapons development. While the remaining threats are mainly economic – and therefore harder to ignore because they provoke high prices and shortages – they are also less difficult to manage.
Clear and prudent framing
Designing solutions to complex problems requires clear and prudent framing. Rubio’s framing of these geopolitical challenges is much more traditional than his boss’s approach. Because most of the world’s media outlets are hostile to US President Donald Trump, his ability to dominate global headlines with his often contradictory statements is actually a political win for him. Trump is highly skilled at creating irresistible headlines, but that does not excuse the media’s eagerness to repeatedly take the bait.
Some of Trump’s recent contradictions seem consistent with the role of deception in military campaigns. However, information is then further distorted by today’s highly partisan media, which very often prefers criticising opponents over properly informing the public.
A non-partisan view of the Iran war should start by acknowledging how close Iran was to becoming unassailable. Had nothing been done, and had Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in a year or two, the situation would have been far worse than what we face today.
From there, however, the choices become much more complicated. One way to simplify the discussion is to think about what an ideal outcome would look like. Media outlets might be more willing to engage if many of the trade-offs weren’t so maddeningly complex. Instead of explaining all the difficult interrelated choices to the public, they too often simply criticise Trump or quote him – or both.
Under any version of a best-case outcome, Iran would no longer be a threat to its neighbours. Given that the IRGC has killed many thousands of its own protesters, attacked its neighbours, and repeatedly threatened to close the Strait, an ideal outcome would not leave the IRGC with unchecked control over Iran’s oil revenues.
Every reason
If the Strait is opened by military force rather than negotiation, Iran’s oil export revenues could be placed under the control of its neighbours. Those countries would have every reason to limit funding for advanced weapons systems.
If the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were to manage the disbursement of Iran’s oil revenues, this could open the way for meaningful political reforms in Iran. At the same time, keeping the Strait open would remain a critical security priority. Since the GCC countries do not have enough military power on their own to guarantee this, could a NATO-style arrangement develop in which one or more outside nations provide the extra firepower needed to keep the region peaceful and prosperous?
Right now, the GCC nations, together with Asian and European countries that depend on Persian Gulf oil, would be greatly relieved if the United States – with or without Israel’s support – forcibly opened the Strait. It isn’t clear how doable this is and while Trump’s Republican Party wants lower oil prices well before November’s midterm elections, both the US and Israel could benefit from Asian and European countries feeling the pressure of uncertain energy supplies.
Drones have become today’s weapon of choice. The Ukrainians and Iranians have excelled at developing them, while the Israeli and American militaries have shown exceptional skill in coordinating highly advanced operations. Meanwhile, the leaders of the EU, UK and Asian powers have watched these operations and know their own forces are outdated and cannot match that level of coordination and effectiveness. The implications are far-reaching.
Delusional misadventures
Groupings such as BRICS+ and the Global South increasingly look like delusional misadventures when compared with the urgent need to keep a vital shipping lane open. Did Trump emphasise at Davos the US need to control Greenland because he anticipated that Washington would not be allowed to use its European military bases for operations against Iran?
A plausible best-case scenario would involve a consortium of nations ensuring that Iran’s oil export revenues are used for the benefit of the Iranian people. That arrangement should stay in place until a less authoritarian regime is established. Such a development would fit with the Middle East becoming more peaceful and prosperous.
This would be a genuine turning-of-the-page moment. Radicalisation of young people might then become more common in Europe than in the Middle East.
We are currently in an interim phase that could last for months or years. The IRGC could once again try to buy time by negotiating to allow considerable traffic through the Strait. If that brings oil prices down substantially, it would suit the United States to let the standoff show how many countries are unable to protect their own interests.
There will be winners, losers and sideshows. Countries whose foreign and economic policies lack firm commercial grounding will be especially vulnerable. In this category, Western Europe and South Africa stand out.
Jet fuel
Shortages of jet fuel are expected in various parts of the world. Since Spain has refused the US the use of its military bases and fly-over rights, will Washington revoke US landing rights for Spanish airlines? If jet fuel is rationed, will long-haul flights to the southern tip of Africa be considered expendable.
South Africa was on track to benefit from improving terms of trade, but the war has reversed that outlook. Aligning with Cuba, Venezuela, Russia and Iran was never justified, and our leaders have treated G7 and G20 summits mainly as platforms to criticise the West.
The Middle East is poised to integrate far more meaningfully into a highly dynamic and hyper-competitive global economy. South Africa’s leaders should see the end of the Iran war as an opportunity to drop idealistic indulgences and realistically reset its foreign and economic policies.
[Image: Farkhod Vakhob from Pixabay]
The views of the writer are not necessarily the views of the Daily Friend or the IRR.
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