South Africa has reached a point where the public conversation about defence must become honest and more transparent.
The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is still expected to fulfil its constitutional mandate to defend the Republic, protect its territorial integrity, safeguard its people, support regional stability and assist other organs of state during domestic crises. Yet it is funded at a level increasingly incompatible with those responsibilities.
This contradiction sits at the heart of South Africa’s defence crisis.
Section 200(2) of the Constitution states that the primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people. Yet year after year, government continues to expect the SANDF to do more while providing it with less.
We speak about sovereignty, border security, maritime protection, disaster response and regional stability as though these are aspirations that can be sustained through policy statements alone. They cannot. Every one of these responsibilities ultimately depends on capability, and capability costs money.
The 2026/27 defence budget stands at approximately R57.6 billion, roughly 0.7% of GDP. That figure should concern every South African.
No serious country can indefinitely maintain a credible defence force at such a level while simultaneously expecting it to fulfil an expansive constitutional mandate. Parliamentary committees, defence analysts and the Department of Defence itself have repeatedly warned that current funding trajectories are incompatible with long-term operational viability.
The uncomfortable truth is that South Africa is approaching the point where it must choose between maintaining a credible defence force and maintaining the illusion of one.
The most effective way to prevent conflict is not to abandon military capability but to maintain enough of it that potential adversaries think twice before testing the state’s resolve. Deterrence remains one of the oldest and most successful principles of national security.
Countries that can defend themselves are less likely to be challenged. Countries that cannot do this often discover the cost of weakness too late.
This reality is frequently obscured by bureaucratic language. Defence committees receive presentations filled with programmes, plans and strategic concepts, yet a more fundamental question often goes unanswered: can the SANDF actually do what South Africa expects it to do?
That is the question every taxpayer and voter should be asking.
A defence force does not become ineffective overnight. It becomes hollow gradually. This is what has happened with the SANDF’s defence capabilities over many years, since the birth of our democracy in 1994.
The uniforms remain. The ranks remain. The headquarters remain. The ceremonies continue. Meanwhile, the foundations of military capability beneath the surface are eroded.
Aircraft remain on inventory lists while serviceability declines. Naval vessels remain commissioned while maintenance is deferred. Vehicle fleets age while spare parts become scarce. Ammunition stocks diminish. Technical skills are lost. Infrastructure deteriorates. Maintenance backlogs accumulate.
The public often sees only the visible symbols of military power: Gripen fighter aircraft, frigates, submarines, helicopters, artillery systems and armoured vehicles.
But military capability is not measured by what appears on paper.
It is measured by what it can actually deploy, and how it can fight, sustain itself and remain operational when required.
A fighter aircraft that cannot fly contributes little to deterrence. A warship that cannot sail contributes little to maritime security. Artillery without ammunition is little more than an expensive museum piece.
When budgets can no longer sustain readiness, a country is left with the memory of capability rather than the reality of it.
This is why the defence debate cannot be reduced to simplistic demands, either for more money or for personnel cuts.
Additional funding without reform and reprioritization would risk entrenching inefficiencies that have accumulated over decades. Equally, reform and realistic priorities without adequate resources would simply accelerate decline.
South Africa requires both.
The first priority should be to stabilise readiness around the missions that matter most. Border safeguarding, maritime security, airspace awareness, support to civil authorities, and selected conventional capabilities must be aligned with realistic threats, measurable outputs and available resources.
The second priority must be personnel reform. More than two thirds of the defence budget are consumed by personnel expenditure. The result is that soldiers increasingly compete with equipment, training and maintenance for scarce resources. A force structure that crowds out operational capability is ultimately unfair to the very personnel it is intended to support.
This issue might be politically difficult, but it should be unavoidable.
The third priority is protecting sustainment funding. Equipment only remains relevant if it can be maintained, repaired and upgraded. If South Africa wishes to retain fighter aircraft, naval capabilities, artillery systems and strategic mobility assets, it must fund the industrial and logistical ecosystems that support them.
Only once these foundations have been stabilised should defence expenditure gradually increase towards more sustainable levels.
Any increase, however, must be linked to measurable reform, stronger oversight, improved procurement practices and genuine accountability for outcomes.
The SANDF cannot be rebuilt through blank cheques. It can only be rebuilt through a combination of investment, reform and discipline.
This discussion also extends beyond the military itself.
Institutions such as Denel, Armscor and the broader defence industry remain important strategic assets. A country that loses the ability to maintain, repair, manufacture and modernise key defence systems inevitably becomes dependent on others for its security.
Once sovereign capabilities are lost, they are exceptionally difficult and expensive to rebuild.
The choice facing South Africa is therefore straightforward.
Either we fund the defence capability that we claim to require, or we reduce it to what we are genuinely prepared to sustain, and then accept the strategic consequences that follow.
What is not sensible is pretending that the SANDF can continue to carry an expanding constitutional mandate on a shrinking budget, while capability further erodes.
Defence realism is not militarism, it is the minimum level of seriousness required of a sovereign state.
[Image: Ricardo Teixeira]
The views of the writer are not necessarily the views of the Daily Friend or the IRR.
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