South Africa’s defence debate has reached the point where polite language is no longer useful.

The country has spent years speaking about strategy, posture, transformation, regional influence, maritime security, border safeguarding and future capability. The plans have become more ambitious while the force has become less capable

This is the central problem. South Africa’s ambition exceeds especially its fiscal and aged prime mission equipment means.

The SANDF is still expected to protect the Republic, secure its borders, support the police, respond to disasters, contribute to regional stability, protect maritime interests and preserve conventional military capability. At the same time, the force is operating under severe budget constraints, ageing equipment, maintenance backlogs, proportional personnel cost and declining readiness across critical systems.

That gap cannot be managed through another document alone. It requires hard, realistic, implementable and sustainable choices.

First choice is about missions

South Africa must decide what the SANDF is realistically expected to do in the next five to ten years. A defence force cannot be stretched across every political priority while being funded as if those priorities do not carry costs. Border safeguarding, maritime awareness, internal support under lawful conditions and the preservation of selected conventional capabilities should be treated as immediate priorities. Other commitments must be tested against available funding, equipment and personnel.

This will be uncomfortable. South Africa has long wanted to see itself as a continental stabilising power. That role has foreign relations and diplomatic value, yet ambition without deployable capability weakens credibility. Underfunded regional commitments place pressure on soldiers, equipment and logistics. They also distract from urgent domestic requirements. If a mission cannot be properly funded, resourced, sustained and equipped, it should not be treated as a serious commitment.

Second choice is about money

The country must either fund the defence posture it claims to want or reduce that posture to what it can actually sustain. There is no dignity in pretending otherwise.

The defence budget is already too small for the number of tasks placed on the force. Personnel costs consume most of the available funding. Maintenance, training, infrastructure, ammunition and spares are left to fight for the remainder. This is how readiness quietly collapses. Aircraft stay grounded. Ships spend too much time alongside piers. Vehicles wait for parts. Soldiers train with fewer resources. Commanders are left to manage decline while politicians speak of renewal.

More money alone will not fix this. A larger allocation without serious reform would carry the same old risks. Reform without funding is also not serious. The country needs a defence compact that ties any future funding increases to measurable outputs.

  • Personnel reform must be addressed.
  • Capital acquisitions, renewals, maintenance funding must be secured.
  • Procurement must be disciplined.
  • Irregular expenditure and weak audit outcomes must carry consequences.

The public must see what it is buying.

Third choice is about the industrial base

No military can sustain capability without an industrial ecosystem behind it. South Africa must decide which sovereign defence capabilities it is prepared to preserve.

This does not mean trying to rebuild every part of the old Denel or every historic capability. That would be an expensive and unsustainable fantasy. The country must identify the capabilities that matter most for operational independence and long-term sovereign security.

  • Ammunition production matters.
  • Artillery support matters.
  • Missile capability matters.
  • Aerospace maintenance, repair and overhaul matter.
  • Test infrastructure matters.
  • Design authority matters.
  • Critical engineering skills matter.

These capabilities should be protected, modernised and supported through practical models. Some will require public funding. Some will require partnerships. Some may need joint ventures, operating leases or public-private structures. Some may need consolidation. The guiding test should be simple: does this capability support the SANDF, protect sovereign knowledge and sucirty, retain skills and generate credible revenue?

Denel fits squarely into this conversation. It should neither be preserved out of nostalgia nor abandoned through neglect. The challenge is to identify those capabilities that remain strategically indispensable, reform them decisively, partner where appropriate and allow non-essential legacy structures to fall away. The task is to preserve what still matters.

Parliament must now play a much stronger role.

  • Defence leaders should not be allowed to arrive at oversight meetings with another sweeping unrealistic vision document and expect applause.
  • Parliament should demand a realistically and affordable costed plan with hard timelines. It should ask:-
    • which missions are funded to what extend,
    • which prime mission equipment are serviceable,
    • which industrial capabilities are being preserved,
    • which projects are delayed, why and when will it be mitigated,
    • which contracts are executable, and
    • which commitments are being withdrawn because they are no longer affordable.
  • That plan should be specific enough to test.
    • It should show the real cost of border safeguarding, maritime awareness, internal support operations and selected conventional capabilities.
    • It should disclose the serviceability status of major and critical prime mission equipment.
    • It should identify, with fully qualifications, the maintenance backlogs.
    • It should explain how personnel cost pressure will be managed.
    • It should set out Denel recovery milestones, PMP implementation timelines, procurement reforms and consequences for failure.

The SANDF does not need another plan that sounds impressive while avoiding the arithmetic. It needs a realistic, pragmatic and sustainable sequenced recovery path.

  • Stabilise readiness.
  • Protect sustainment.
  • Reform and fix personnel cost pressures.
  • Restore procurement discipline.
  • Preserve sovereign industrial capabilities.

Only then should force expansion become part of the discussions.

This is not defeatism. It is realism. A country that understands its limits can still act strategically. A country that refuses to admit its limits will keep producing plans that collapse on contact with reality.

South Africa still has assets worth protecting. It has experienced soldiers, sailors and airmen. It has engineers, artisans and defence companies that still know how to develop, build and support complex systems. It has strategic geography, maritime responsibilities and regional influence. It has enough left to build from, provided the correct decisions are made soon.

The danger is delay. Every year of indecision costs skills, readiness, credibility and money. Every unfunded commitment drains the force further. Every postponed maintenance cycle makes recovery more expensive. Every weak governance decision makes industry partners and customers more cautious.

The hard choices are no longer theoretical. Every year of delay allows decay to make them instead. Leaders can either make deliberate decisions, guided by realistic achievable priorities, resources and accountability, or allow those decisions to be imposed by deteriorating readiness, shrinking capability and institutional decline.

Serious countries do not confuse aspiration with sovereign capability. They match commitments to resources, strategy to affordability and ambition to execution. South Africa can still do that—but the opportunity is narrowing with every year of delay.

[Image: Ricardo Teixeira]

The views of the writer are not necessarily the views of the Daily Friend or the IRR.

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author

Kobus Marais is a defence analyst, and former parliamentarian who served as the Shadow Minister of Defence from 2015 to 2024.