Newly re-democratising Hungary, after the fall of autocrat Viktor Orbán in May this year, has become the latest of former communist East Bloc nations to declassify its secret police files on informants for their Cold War-era red fascist regimes – an event which shames South Africa.
The shadow of that dark period still lays clammy hands on the present generations attempting to root democratic traditions in Soviet-poisoned soil: Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have found it necessary to outlaw public displays of communist-totalitarian symbols.
In his electoral campaign against Orbán, Péter Magyar promised to make state security files public, and, with polls saying more than two-thirds of the country supported the move, did so on 4 November, with a searchable online database.
That was the 70th anniversary of the brutal Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 to suppress the stated intention of reformist prime minister Imre Nagy to abolish one-party rule, free political prisoners, and withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.
Nagy’s gambit was triggered in part by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s “secret speech” denouncing the excesses of his predecessor Joseph Stalin, which appeared to open the door to destalinisation, and in part by widespread popular discontent in Hungary over ÁVH (Államvédelmi Hatóság, or State Protection Authority) police terror, censorship, economic hardship, and forced Russian influence.
This erupted on 23 October 1956 with a student-led demonstration in Budapest demanding free elections, an independent press, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, in which protesters toppled a massive statue of Stalin.
Kruschev responded with a tank-led invasion that killed at least 2,500 Hungarians in pitched battles, and imposed a toady as puppet prime minister, capturing and executing Nagy for his democratic daring.
The “Iron Curtain” would remain in place in Hungary for 45 years. A handful of horrified militants, like Alan and Beata Lipman, bailed out of the staunchly Stalinist SACP in protest.
Surveillance states
It now turns out, according to the files released this month, that some 60,000 Hungarians were ÁVH “network contacts,” spying on their neighbours.
Hungary wasn’t as bad a surveillance state as East Germany (the GDR), as journalist Anna Funder writes in her excellent interview collection Stasiland: “In Hitler’s Third Reich, it is estimated that there was one Gestapo agent for every 2,000 citizens, and in Stalin’s USSR, there was one KGB agent for every 5,830 people. In the GDR, there was one Stasi officer or informant for every sixty-three people.”
And yet, Lili Rutai, writing from Budapest for The Guardian, quotes Miklós Kiss, a survivor of a Hungarian forced labour camp and president of an association for victims, as saying: “People will learn there were traitors in every family, in every neighbourhood and street.”
The German Bundestag opened the Stasi’s secret police files in 1992, barely two years after East Germany ceased to exist, allowing citizens to inspect their own files; in the Czech Republic, the Soviet-era secret police files were published in full online in 2003, followed by Slovakia in 2004.
In Ukraine, Albania, North Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia (the last three being remnants of Soviet-dissident Yugoslavia), you can only read your own file; in Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, and Germany, you can do the same, and names will be published on a case-by-case basis.
In Russia itself, plus Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Estonia, and Latvia, only the files of convicted persons are accessible, but in the cases of Estonia and Latvia, the files are held in Russia; in Soviet-nostalgic Belarus, only one’s own or one’s relative’s files are accessible – under state supervision.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, the files remain closed, while in Serbia and in Georgia the right to access files was briefly granted two decades ago, then withdrawn; Lithuania published 1,669 KGB agents’ files online in 2012, but took them down in 2020.
Still alive today
An estimated 10% of the Hungarian snitches are still alive today. The searchable lists include well-known public figures such as TV personality István Vágó, DJ Tibor Dévényi, singer Róbert Szikora, Constitutional Court judge András Patyi, former Washington ambassador András Simonyi, and former central bank governor György Surányi.
The tricky thing, of course, is that many, if not most, of the civilian turncoats were coerced by communist state agents into spying on their friends and family.
Rutai cites Hungarian historian Domokos Szokolay as saying he was hopeful that “the release won’t turn into a public shaming, but that people will understand that these are complex issues”.
None more complex than in South Africa, where the surveillance and impimpi (informant) files of our political secret police, the Security Branch (SB), have remained missing or inaccessible.
That’s thanks to Brigadier Alfred Oosthuizen who in October 1992 verbally by telephone ordered the destruction of all SB files around the country covering 1960-1990; most branches complied, with very few files remaining.
The surviving indexes show, however, that the SB agents and their stool-pigeons spied on an astonishing array of civilians beyond ultra-right and ultra-left terrorist cells and the usual activist suspects: from pre-schools to churches, from journalists’ organisations to the SA Cricket Union, from the Broederbond to kitsch artist Vladimir Tretchikoff.
A lot of imploding East Bloc regimes had only a few desperate weeks in the early 1990s to destroy, redact, or relocate secret police archives, but the problem with the situation in South Africa in the same period was that the apartheid order did not collapse, but rather a transitional new order was steadily negotiated, with the spooks on both sides shaking hands under the table.
Tons of records were burned
The result is that as far as secrecy is concerned, there was no real break with the past, and tons of records were burned, with most remnants remaining inaccessible.
Fortunately, as Uki Goñi, author of The Real Odessa, told me regarding his discovery of documentation on the post-war Nazi relocations to Argentina, bureaucrats tend to be reluctant to destroy their own organisational memory, and so interlocking document sets tend to be overlooked or deliberately saved as “insurance”.
And so over two days in December 2003, I published six full pages in the since-defunct Joburg newspaper ThisDay listing 7,000 names and file numbers of Justice Department files on anti-apartheid activists that the SA History Archives had discovered still existed, an interlocking set with the missing SB files. The lists provoked a flood of applications to the National Archives, though they still needed individual redaction to prevent revenge attacks.
But that was a rare win, and the late Brigadier JP “Tolletjie” Botha of Military Intelligence’s shadowy Directorate of Covert Collection (DCC) claimed to investigative journalist Giancarlo Coccia that “we had dozens of [agents] deeply infiltrated into the ANC’s political and military structure… more than 50 percent of the ANC cadres were virtually working for us, they were on our DCC payroll”.
A former Military Intelligence officer tells me that such turncoats operated right up to ANC National Executive Committee level, where they would even be involved in bugging leadership meetings.
Maelstrom of recriminations
But, he says, he will take those leading double-agents’ names to his grave, as to reveal them would cause a maelstrom of recriminations and possible revenge killings among ANC heavyweights, with a high likelihood of destabilising our democracy.
So, as the Khampepe Commission of Inquiry peels back the layers of the conspiracy to prevent prosecutions of apartheid-era perpetrators on both sides, it is becoming increasingly obvious that – by design – the great gains of our democracy expressly did not include revealing who played both sides.
[Image: by DC_Studio]
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