There are two things we can know with certainty about South African politics between now and 2029. The Government of National Unity, in its present form, will come to an end, and South Africans will elect a national government.

But there is good reason to believe that the political account of the GNU’s ending will determine the outcome of that election, whenever it comes.

The negotiations following the 2026 local government elections have brought this question into sharper focus. The ANC, having suffered another substantial electoral defeat, is considering agreements with ASA, the MK Party, the EFF, and other smaller parties that could exclude the DA from government in several of the country’s most important municipalities, most notably in the metros where the DA has now become the largest party in all but three.

There is even reason to believe that these arrangements could provide the basis for a new governing majority nationally.

However, the GNU’s collapse does not necessarily mean an immediate national election. An alternative parliamentary majority, possibly consisting of the ANC, ASA, the EFF, and MK could replace the present governing arrangement without dissolving Parliament.

Equally, the Constitution provides routes to an early election, including a majority vote to dissolve the National Assembly once three years have passed since its election in 2024. A presidential vacancy followed by Parliament’s failure to elect a successor within 30 days would also require dissolution. A new national election is therefore possible as early as 2027.

The ANC’s decline has continued well beyond the loss of its national majority in 2024. In November’s municipal elections, it fell to below a third of the vote share nationally, while the DA rose to nearly 25%. The DA became the largest party in five of South Africa’s eight metropolitan municipalities, including all three in Gauteng.

These two parties are now within six points of each other – a gap that could easily be closed given the rapid rate of the ANC’s collapse and the DA’s re-established modest upward trajectory.

Yet the same political developments that have improved the DA’s prospects have also made it perhaps more vulnerable than it has ever been.

Peculiar position

The DA occupies a peculiar position in South African politics. It is the only major party currently attracting substantial electoral support from all four of the country’s principal racial population groups. Its competitors remain far more dependent on particular racial constituencies.

The Freedom Front Plus has an obvious interest in winning white Afrikaans-speaking voters from the DA, as it managed in 2019. The Patriotic Alliance seeks to displace the DA among coloured voters. Traditionally, the DA could only attract 4-5% of support from black voters. This month, they essentially doubled that, gaining 8% of votes cast by black voters.

The ANC and ActionSA compete directly for black voters who might otherwise support the DA, while the MK Party and EFF have every reason to resist the DA’s further expansion into that electorate. Put simply, the DA’s continued growth threatens the constituencies upon which they depend.

South Africans entered the GNU period with hopes that cooperation between the country’s largest parties might begin to reverse years of economic stagnation, unemployment, failing infrastructure, and administrative decline.

More than halfway through this parliamentary term, the economic evidence remains discouraging. Official unemployment stands at 33.7% in the third quarter of 2026. The economy contracted by 0.2% in the second quarter.

There is little reason, on present evidence, to assume that the GNU will have delivered the sustained economic recovery its supporters hoped for by the time the next national election arrives, particularly if that election is brought forward.

The ANC has governed South Africa since 1994 and has presided over much of the deterioration the GNU was established to address. The DA entered the arrangement promising to help reverse that record. If the government falls short, voters will be entitled to ask what each party did with the power and influence it possessed.

Too little improvement

The most damaging accusation against the DA would also be the simplest: it entered government promising change, South Africans saw too little improvement, and the GNU ended in recrimination.

The ANC could use this account to escape responsibility for its own failures, while ASA and the PA could invoke it to justify their decision to make common cause with the ANC. These parties would have no need to enter a formal electoral alliance. They would merely need to reinforce a broadly similar public account of events.

A DA that walks away from the GNU in unexplained anger could be accused of having chosen party advantage over national stability. A DA that remains indefinitely despite repeated defeats on its most important reform proposals could struggle to explain what its continued participation was achieving. A DA excluded by the ANC and its new partners might have a stronger case, but even then the circumstances and conduct of its departure would matter.

Political responsibility for the GNU’s eventual end will be contested regardless of the facts. In this, the DA faces a demanding task. It must be able to demonstrate, convincingly and with evidence, that it exhausted every reasonable opportunity to make the GNU, and the 2026 LGE negotiations, work.

That requires a compelling account of what its ministers accomplished, which reforms they pursued, where they encountered opposition, and which decisions were taken against their input. It requires a willingness to acknowledge failures for which the party itself bears responsibility.

Voters will have little patience for a dispute conducted entirely through procedural and overtly political arguments, coalition agreements, and competing press statements. They will want to know why economic growth remained inadequate, why jobs were not created in sufficient numbers, and why public services continued to fail.

The DA’s explanation will have to answer those questions in ordinary language, with specific examples that withstand scrutiny.

Pursued credible reforms

There is, of course, another possible account of the GNU’s end and the current negotiations should they result in agreements that exclude the DA. The party could emerge from the GNU and the negotiations having established that it participated in good faith, pursued credible reforms, made reasonable compromises, and resisted honestly policies it believed would damage the country.

If the ANC nevertheless decides to abandon collaboration with the DA in favour of an alliance with other parties, the DA must ensure that South Africans understand who made that choice, why it was made, and what the DA had done to prevent it. And, perhaps most importantly, what it will do now.

Such an account cannot be manufactured at the moment of collapse. It will depend on decisions taken and explained throughout the remaining life of the government.

We know two things will happen by 2029, even if we do not know when: the present GNU will end, and South Africans will elect a new national government.

The outcome of the latter will in all likelihood be determined by who wins the argument over the former.

[Image: by MorphoBio]

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Hermann Pretorius studied law and opera before entering politics and, latterly, joining the IRR as an analyst. He is presently the IRR’s Head of Strategic Communications. He describes himself as a Protestant, landless, Anglophilic, Afrikaans classical liberal. Pretorius is the author of Rule Breakers: How the 2024 Election Campaign Changed South Africa Forever (Protea, 2025).